cratylus-第22章
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importance。 It gives a new interest to distant and subject countries； it
brings back the dawning light from one end of the earth to the other。
Nations； like individuals； are better understood by us when we know
something of their early life； and when they are better understood by us；
we feel more kindly towards them。 Lastly； we may remember that all
knowledge is valuable for its own sake； and we may also hope that a deeper
insight into the nature of human speech will give us a greater command of
it and enable us to make a nobler use of it。 （Compare again W。 Humboldt；
'Ueber die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues；' M。 Muller；
'Lectures on the Science of Language；' Steinthal； 'Einleitung in die
Psychologie und Sprachwissenschaft：' and for the latter part of the Essay；
Delbruck； 'Study of Language；' Paul's 'Principles of the History of
Language：' to the latter work the author of this Essay is largely
indebted。）
CRATYLUS
by
Plato
Translated by Benjamin Jowett
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE： Socrates； Hermogenes； Cratylus。
HERMOGENES： Suppose that we make Socrates a party to the argument？
CRATYLUS： If you please。
HERMOGENES： I should explain to you； Socrates； that our friend Cratylus
has been arguing about names； he says that they are natural and not
conventional； not a portion of the human voice which men agree to use； but
that there is a truth or correctness in them； which is the same for
Hellenes as for barbarians。 Whereupon I ask him； whether his own name of
Cratylus is a true name or not； and he answers 'Yes。' And Socrates？
'Yes。' Then every man's name； as I tell him； is that which he is called。
To this he replies'If all the world were to call you Hermogenes； that
would not be your name。' And when I am anxious to have a further
explanation he is ironical and mysterious； and seems to imply that he has a
notion of his own about the matter； if he would only tell； and could
entirely convince me； if he chose to be intelligible。 Tell me； Socrates；
what this oracle means； or rather tell me； if you will be so good； what is
your own view of the truth or correctness of names； which I would far
sooner hear。
SOCRATES： Son of Hipponicus； there is an ancient saying； that 'hard is the
knowledge of the good。' And the knowledge of names is a great part of
knowledge。 If I had not been poor； I might have heard the fifty…drachma
course of the great Prodicus； which is a complete education in grammar and
languagethese are his own wordsand then I should have been at once able
to answer your question about the correctness of names。 But； indeed； I
have only heard the single…drachma course； and therefore； I do not know the
truth about such matters； I will； however； gladly assist you and Cratylus
in the investigation of them。 When he declares that your name is not
really Hermogenes； I suspect that he is only making fun of you；he means
to say that you are no true son of Hermes； because you are always looking
after a fortune and never in luck。 But； as I was saying； there is a good
deal of difficulty in this sort of knowledge； and therefore we had better
leave the question open until we have heard both sides。
HERMOGENES： I have often talked over this matter； both with Cratylus and
others； and cannot convince myself that there is any principle of
correctness in names other than convention and agreement； any name which
you give； in my opinion； is the right one； and if you change that and give
another； the new name is as correct as the oldwe frequently change the
names of our slaves； and the newly…imposed name is as good as the old： for
there is no name given to anything by nature； all is convention and habit
of the users；such is my view。 But if I am mistaken I shall be happy to
hear and learn of Cratylus； or of any one else。
SOCRATES： I dare say that you may be right； Hermogenes： let us see；Your
meaning is； that the name of each thing is only that which anybody agrees
to call it？
HERMOGENES： That is my notion。
SOCRATES： Whether the giver of the name be an individual or a city？
HERMOGENES： Yes。
SOCRATES： Well； now； let me take an instance；suppose that I call a man a
horse or a horse a man； you mean to say that a man will be rightly called a
horse by me individually； and rightly called a man by the rest of the
world； and a horse again would be rightly called a man by me and a horse by
the world：that is your meaning？
HERMOGENES： He would； according to my view。
SOCRATES： But how about truth； then？ you would acknowledge that there is
in words a true and a false？
HERMOGENES： Certainly。
SOCRATES： And there are true and false propositions？
HERMOGENES： To be sure。
SOCRATES： And a true proposition says that which is； and a false
proposition says that which is not？
HERMOGENES： Yes； what other answer is possible？
SOCRATES： Then in a proposition there is a true and false？
HERMOGENES： Certainly。
SOCRATES： But is a proposition true as a whole only； and are the parts
untrue？
HERMOGENES： No； the parts are true as well as the whole。
SOCRATES： Would you say the large parts and not the smaller ones； or every
part？
HERMOGENES： I should say that every part is true。
SOCRATES： Is a proposition resolvable into any part smaller than a name？
HERMOGENES： No； that is the smallest。
SOCRATES： Then the name is a part of the true proposition？
HERMOGENES： Yes。
SOCRATES： Yes； and a true part； as you say。
HERMOGENES： Yes。
SOCRATES： And is not the part of a falsehood also a falsehood？
HERMOGENES： Yes。
SOCRATES： Then； if propositions may be true and false； names may be true
and false？
HERMOGENES： So we must infer。
SOCRATES： And the name of anything is that which any one affirms to be the
name？
HERMOGENES： Yes。
SOCRATES： And will there be so many names of each thing as everybody says
that there are？ and will they be true names at the time of uttering them？
HERMOGENES： Yes； Socrates； I can conceive no correctness of names other
than this； you give one name； and I another； and in different cities and
countries there are different names for the same things； Hellenes differ
from barbarians in their use of names； and the several Hellenic tribes from
one another。
SOCRATES： But would you say； Hermogenes； that the things differ as the
names differ？ and are they relative to individuals； as Protagoras tells us？
For he says that man is the measure of all things； and that things are to
me as they appear to me； and that they are to you as they appear to you。
Do you agree with him； or would you say that things have a permanent
essence of their own？
HERMOGENES： There have been times； Socrates； when I have been driven in my
perplexity to take refuge with Protagoras； not that I agree with him at
all。
SOCRATES： What！ have you ever been driven to admit that there was no such
thing as a bad man？
HERMOGENES： No； indeed； but I have often had reason to think that there
are very bad men； and a good many of them。
SOCRATES： Well； and have you ever found any very good ones？
HERMOGENES： Not many。
SOCRATES： Still you have found them？
HERMOGENES： Yes。
SOCRATES： And would you hold that the very good were the very wise； and
the very evil very foolish？ Would that be your view？
HERMOGENES： It would。
SOCRATES： But if Protagoras is right； and the truth is that things are as
they appear to any one； how can some of us be wise and some of us foolish？
HERMOGENES： Impossible。
SOCRATES： And if； on the other hand； wisdom and folly are really
distinguishable； you will allow； I think； that the assertion of Protagoras
can hardly be correct。 For if what appears to each man is true to him； one
man cannot in reality be wiser than another。
HERMOG
