cratylus-第4章

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and　the　'friends　of　the　ideas'　（Soph。）？　or　is　it　to　be　attributed　to　the

indignation　which　Plato　felt　at　having　wasted　his　time　upon　'Cratylus　and

the　doctrines　of　Heracleitus'　in　the　days　of　his　youth？　　Socrates；　touching

on　some　of　the　characteristic　difficulties　of　early　Greek　philosophy；

endeavours　to　show　Cratylus　that　imitation　may　be　partial　or　imperfect；

that　a　knowledge　of　things　is　higher　than　a　knowledge　of　names；　and　that

there　can　be　no　knowledge　if　all　things　are　in　a　state　of　transition。　　But

Cratylus；　who　does　not　easily　apprehend　the　argument　from　common　sense；

remains　unconvinced；　and　on　the　whole　inclines　to　his　former　opinion。　　Some

profound　philosophical　remarks　are　scattered　up　and　down；　admitting　of　an

application　not　only　to　language　but　to　knowledge　generally；　such　as　the

assertion　that　'consistency　is　no　test　of　truth：'　or　again；　'If　we　are

over…precise　about　words；　truth　will　say　〃too　late〃　to　us　as　to　the　belated

traveller　in　Aegina。'



The　place　of　the　dialogue　in　the　series　cannot　be　determined　with

certainty。　　The　style　and　subject；　and　the　treatment　of　the　character　of

Socrates；　have　a　close　resemblance　to　the　earlier　dialogues；　especially　to

the　Phaedrus　and　Euthydemus。　　The　manner　in　which　the　ideas　are　spoken　of

at　the　end　of　the　dialogue；　also　indicates　a　comparatively　early　date。　　The

imaginative　element　is　still　in　full　vigour；　the　Socrates　of　the　Cratylus

is　the　Socrates　of　the　Apology　and　Symposium；　not　yet　Platonized；　and　he

describes；　as　in　the　Theaetetus；　the　philosophy　of　Heracleitus　by

'unsavoury'　simileshe　cannot　believe　that　the　world　is　like　'a　leaky

vessel；'　or　'a　man　who　has　a　running　at　the　nose'；　he　attributes　the　flux

of　the　world　to　the　swimming　in　some　folks'　heads。　　On　the　other　hand；　the

relation　of　thought　to　language　is　omitted　here；　but　is　treated　of　in　the

Sophist。　　These　grounds　are　not　sufficient　to　enable　us　to　arrive　at　a

precise　conclusion。　　But　we　shall　not　be　far　wrong　in　placing　the　Cratylus

about　the　middle；　or　at　any　rate　in　the　first　half；　of　the　series。



Cratylus；　the　Heracleitean　philosopher；　and　Hermogenes；　the　brother　of

Callias；　have　been　arguing　about　names；　the　former　maintaining　that　they

are　natural；　the　latter　that　they　are　conventional。　　Cratylus　affirms　that

his　own　is　a　true　name；　but　will　not　allow　that　the　name　of　Hermogenes　is

equally　true。　　Hermogenes　asks　Socrates　to　explain　to　him　what　Cratylus

means；　or；　far　rather；　he　would　like　to　know；　What　Socrates　himself　thinks

about　the　truth　or　correctness　of　names？　　Socrates　replies；　that　hard　is

knowledge；　and　the　nature　of　names　is　a　considerable　part　of　knowledge：　　he

has　never　been　to　hear　the　fifty…drachma　course　of　Prodicus；　and　having

only　attended　the　single…drachma　course；　he　is　not　competent　to　give　an

opinion　on　such　matters。　　When　Cratylus　denies　that　Hermogenes　is　a　true

name；　he　supposes　him　to　mean　that　he　is　not　a　true　son　of　Hermes；　because

he　is　never　in　luck。　　But　he　would　like　to　have　an　open　council　and　to　hear

both　sides。



Hermogenes　is　of　opinion　that　there　is　no　principle　in　names；　they　may　be

changed；　as　we　change　the　names　of　slaves；　whenever　we　please；　and　the

altered　name　is　as　good　as　the　original　one。



You　mean　to　say；　for　instance；　rejoins　Socrates；　that　if　I　agree　to　call　a

man　a　horse；　then　a　man　will　be　rightly　called　a　horse　by　me；　and　a　man　by

the　rest　of　the　world？　　But；　surely；　there　is　in　words　a　true　and　a　false；

as　there　are　true　and　false　propositions。　　If　a　whole　proposition　be　true

or　false；　then　the　parts　of　a　proposition　may　be　true　or　false；　and　the

least　parts　as　well　as　the　greatest；　and　the　least　parts　are　names；　and

therefore　names　may　be　true　or　false。　　Would　Hermogenes　maintain　that

anybody　may　give　a　name　to　anything；　and　as　many　names　as　he　pleases；　and

would　all　these　names　be　always　true　at　the　time　of　giving　them？　

Hermogenes　replies　that　this　is　the　only　way　in　which　he　can　conceive　that

names　are　correct；　and　he　appeals　to　the　practice　of　different　nations；　and

of　the　different　Hellenic　tribes；　in　confirmation　of　his　view。　　Socrates

asks；　whether　the　things　differ　as　the　words　which　represent　them　differ：

Are　we　to　maintain　with　Protagoras；　that　what　appears　is？　　Hermogenes　has

always　been　puzzled　about　this；　but　acknowledges；　when　he　is　pressed　by

Socrates；　that　there　are　a　few　very　good　men　in　the　world；　and　a　great　many

very　bad；　and　the　very　good　are　the　wise；　and　the　very　bad　are　the　foolish；

and　this　is　not　mere　appearance　but　reality。　　Nor　is　he　disposed　to　say

with　Euthydemus；　that　all　things　equally　and　always　belong　to　all　men；　in

that　case；　again；　there　would　be　no　distinction　between　bad　and　good　men。　

But　then；　the　only　remaining　possibility　is；　that　all　things　have　their

several　distinct　natures；　and　are　independent　of　our　notions　about　them。　

And　not　only　things；　but　actions；　have　distinct　natures；　and　are　done　by

different　processes。　　There　is　a　natural　way　of　cutting　or　burning；　and　a

natural　instrument　with　which　men　cut　or　burn；　and　any　other　way　will

fail；this　is　true　of　all　actions。　　And　speaking　is　a　kind　of　action；　and

naming　is　a　kind　of　speaking；　and　we　must　name　according　to　a　natural

process；　and　with　a　proper　instrument。　　We　cut　with　a　knife；　we　pierce　with

an　awl；　we　weave　with　a　shuttle；　we　name　with　a　name。　　And　as　a　shuttle

separates　the　warp　from　the　woof；　so　a　name　distinguishes　the　natures　of

things。　　The　weaver　will　use　the　shuttle　well；that　is；　like　a　weaver；　and

the　teacher　will　use　the　name　well；that　is；　like　a　teacher。　　The　shuttle

will　be　made　by　the　carpenter；　the　awl　by　the　smith　or　skilled　person。　　But

who　makes　a　name？　　Does　not　the　law　give　names；　and　does　not　the　teacher

receive　them　from　the　legislator？　　He　is　the　skilled　person　who　makes　them；

and　of　all　skilled　workmen　he　is　the　rarest。　　But　how　does　the　carpenter

make　or　repair　the　shuttle；　and　to　what　will　he　look？　　Will　he　not　look　at

the　ideal　which　he　has　in　his　mind？　　And　as　the　different　kinds　of　work

differ；　so　ought　the　instruments　which　make　them　to　differ。　　The　several

kinds　of　shuttles　ought　to　answer　in　material　and　form　to　the　several　kinds

of　webs。　　And　the　legislator　ought　to　know　the　different　materials　and

forms　of　which　names　are　made　in　Hellas　and　other　countries。　　But　who　is　to

be　the　judge　of　the　proper　form？　　The　judge　of　shuttles　is　the　weaver　who

uses　them；　the　judge　of　lyres　is　the　player　of　the　lyre；　the　judge　of　ships

is　the　pilot。　　And　will　not　the　judge　who　is　able　to　direct　the　legislator

in　his　work　of　naming；　be　he　who　knows　how　to　use　the　nameshe　who　can　ask

and　answer　questionsin　short；　the　dialectician？　　The　pilot　directs　the

carpenter　how　to　make　the　rudder；　and　the　dialectician　directs　the

legislator　how　he　is　to　impose　names；　for　to　express　the　ideal　forms　of

things　in　syllables　and　letters　is　not　the　easy　task；　Hermogenes；　which　you

imagine。



'I　should　be　more　readily　persuaded；　if　you　would　show　me　this　natural

correctness　of　names。'



Indeed　I　cannot；　but　I　see　that　you　have　advanced；　for　you　now　admit　that

there　is　a　correctness　of　names；　and　that　not　every　one　can　give　a　name。　

But　what　is　the　nature　of　this　correctness　or　truth；　you　must　learn　from

the　Sophists；　of　whom　your　brother　Callias　has　bought　his　reputation　for

wisdom　rather　dearly；　and　since　they　require　to　be　paid；　you；　having　no

money；　had　better　learn　from　him　at　second…hand。　　'Well；　but　I　have　just

given　up　Protagoras；　and　I　should　be　inconsistent　in　going　to　learn　of

him。'　　Then　if　you　reject　him　you　may　learn　of　the　poets；　and　in　particular

of　Homer；　who　distinguishes　the　names　given　by　Gods　and　men　to　the　same

things；　as　in　the　verse　about　the　river　God　who　fought　with　Hephaestus；

'whom　the　Gods　call　Xanthus；　and　men　call　Scamander；'　or　in　the　lines　in

which　he　mentions　the　bird　which　the　Gods　call　'Chalcis；'　and　men

'Cymindis；'　or　the　hill　which　men　call　'Batieia；'　and　the　Gods　'Myrinna's