the writings-5-第62章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！



On　the　5th　of　March　（the　present　incumbent's　first　full　day　in

office）；　a　letter　of　Major　Anderson；　commanding　at　Fort　Sumter；

written　on　the　28th　of　February　and　received　at　the　War　Department　on

the　4th　of　March；　was　by　that　department　placed　in　his　hands。　　This

letter　expressed　the　professional　opinion　of　the　writer　that

reinforcements　could　not　be　thrown　into　that　fort　within　the　time　for

his　relief；　rendered　necessary　by　the　limited　supply　of　provisions；

and　with　a　view　of　holding　possession　of　the　same；　with　a　force　of

less　than　twenty　thousand　good　and　well…disciplined　men。　　This

opinion　was　concurred　in　by　all　the　officers　of　his　command；　and

their　memoranda　on　the　subject　were　made　inclosures　of　Major

Anderson's　letter。　　The　whole　was　immediately　laid　before

Lieutenant…General　Scott；　who　at　once　concurred　with　Major　Anderson

in　opinion。　　On　reflection；　however；　he　took　full　time；　consulting

with　other　officers；　both　of　the　army　and　the　navy；　and　at　the　end　of

four　days　came　reluctantly　but　decidedly　to　the　same　conclusion　as

before。　　He　also　stated　at　the　same　time　that　no　such　sufficient

force　was　then　at　the　control　of　the　government；　or　could　be　raised

and　brought　to　the　ground　within　the　time　when　the　provisions　in　the

fort　would　be　exhausted。　　In　a　purely　military　point　of　view；　this

reduced　the　duty　of　the　administration　in　the　case　to　the　mere　matter

of　getting　the　garrison　safely　out　of　the　fort。



It　was　believed；　however；　that　to　so　abandon　that　position；　under　the

circumstances；　would　be　utterly　ruinous；　that　the　necessity　under

which　it　was　to　be　done　would　not　be　fully　understood；　that　by　many

it　would　be　construed　as　a　part　of　a　voluntary　policy；　that　at　home

it　would　discourage　the　friends　of　the　Union；　embolden　its

adversaries；　and　go　far　to　insure　to　the　latter　a　recognition　abroad；

that　in　fact；　it　would　be　our　national　destruction　consummated。　　This

could　not　be　allowed。　　Starvation　was　not　yet　upon　the　garrison；　and

ere　it　would　be　reached　Fort　Pickens　might　be　reinforced。　　This　last

would　be　a　clear　indication　of　policy；　and　would　better　enable　the

country　to　accept　the　evacuation　of　Fort　Sumter　as　a　military

necessity。　　An　order　was　at　once　directed　to　be　sent　for　the　landing

of　the　troops　from　the　steamship　Brooklyn　into　Fort　Pickens。　　This

order　could　not　go　by　land；　but　must　take　the　longer　and　slower　route

by　sea。　　The　first　return　news　from　the　order　was　received　just　one

week　before　the　fall　of　Fort　Sumter。　　The　news　itself　was　that　the

officer　commanding　the　Sabine；　to　which　vessel　the　troops　had　been

transferred　from　the　Brooklyn；　acting　upon　some　quasi　armistice　of

the　late　administration　（and　of　the　existence　of　which　the　present

administration；　up　to　the　time　the　order　was　despatched；　had　only　too

vague　and　uncertain　rumors　to　fix　attention）；　had　refused　to　land　the

troops。　　To　now　reinforce　Fort　Pickens　before　a　crisis　would　be

reached　at　Fort　Sumter　was　impossiblerendered　so　by　the　near

exhaustion　of　provisions　in　the　latter…named　fort。　　In　precaution

against　such　a　conjuncture；　the　government　had；　a　few　days　before；

commenced　preparing　an　expedition　as　well　adapted　as　might　be　to

relieve　Fort　Sumter；　which　expedition　was　intended　to　be　ultimately

used；　or　not；　according　to　circumstances。　　The　strongest　anticipated

case　for　using　it　was　now　presented；　and　it　was　resolved　to　send　it

forward。　　As　had　been　intended　in　this　contingency；　it　was　also

resolved　to　notify　the　governor　of　South　Carolina　that　he　might

expect　an　attempt　would　be　made　to　provision　the　fort；　and　that；　if

the　attempt　should　not　be　resisted；　there　would　be　no　effort　to　throw

in　men；　arms；　or　ammunition；　without　further　notice；　or　in　case　of　an

attack　upon　the　fort。　　This　notice　was　accordingly　given；　whereupon

the　fort　was　attacked　and　bombarded　to　its　fall；　without　even

awaiting　the　arrival　of　the　provisioning　expedition。



It　is　thus　seen　that　the　assault　upon　and　reduction　of　Fort　Sumter

was　in　no　sense　a　matter　of　self…defense　on　the　part　of　the

assailants。　　They　well　knew　that　the　garrison　in　the　fort　could　by　no

possibility　commit　aggression　upon　them。　　They　knewthey　were

expressly　notifiedthat　the　giving　of　bread　to　the　few　brave　and

hungry　men　of　the　garrison　was　all　which　would　on　that　occasion　be

attempted；　unless　themselves；　by　resisting　so　much；　should　provoke

more。　　They　knew　that　this　government　desired　to　keep　the　garrison　in

the　fort；　not　to　assail　them；　but　merely　to　maintain　visible

possession；　and　thus　to　preserve　the　Union　from　actual　and　immediate

dissolutiontrusting；　as　hereinbefore　stated；　to　time；　discussion；

and　the　ballot…box　for　final　adjustment；　and　they　assailed　and

reduced　the　fort　for　precisely　the　reverse　objectto　drive　out　the

visible　authority　of　the　Federal　Union；　and　thus　force　it　to

immediate　dissolution。　　That　this　was　their　object　the　executive　well

understood；　and　having　said　to　them　in　the　inaugural　address；　〃You

can　have　no　conflict　without　being　yourselves　the　aggressors；〃　he

took　pains　not　only　to　keep　this　declaration　good；　but　also　to　keep

the　case　so　free　from　the　power　of　ingenious　sophistry　that　the　world

should　not　be　able　to　misunderstand　it。　　By　the　affair　at　Fort

Sumter；　with　its　surrounding　circumstances；　that　point　was　reached。

Then　and　thereby　the　assailants　of　the　government　began　the　conflict

of　arms；　without　a　gun　in　sight　or　in　expectancy　to　return　their

fire；　save　only　the　few　in　the　fort　sent　to　that　harbor　years　before

for　their　own　protection；　and　still　ready　to　give　that　protection　in

whatever　was　lawful。　　In　this　act；　discarding　all　else；　they　have

forced　upon　the　country　the　distinct　issue；　〃immediate　dissolution　or

blood。〃



And　this　issue　embraces　more　than　the　fate　of　these　United　States。

It　presents　to　the　whole　family　of　man　the　question　whether　a

constitutional　republic　or　democracya　government　of　the　people　by

the　same　peoplecan　or　cannot　maintain　its　territorial　integrity

against　its　own　domestic　foes。　　It　presents　the　question　whether

discontented　individuals；　too　few　in　numbers　to　control

administration　according　to　organic　law　in　any　case；　can　always；　upon

the　pretenses　made　in　this　case；　or　on　any　other　pretenses；　or

arbitrarily　without　any　pretense；　break　up　their　government；　and　thus

practically　put　an　end　to　free　government　upon　the　earth。　　It　forces

us　to　ask：　Is　there　in　all　republics　this　inherent　and　fatal

weakness？　　Must　a　government；　of　necessity；　be　too　strong　for　the

liberties　of　its　own　people；　or　too　weak　to　maintain　its　own

existence？



So　viewing　the　issue；　no　choice　was　left　but　to　call　out　the　war

power　of　the　government；　and　so　to　resist　force　employed　for　its

destruction　by　force　for　its　preservation。



The　call　was　made；　and　the　response　of　the　country　was　most

gratifying；　surpassing　in　unanimity　and　spirit　the　most　sanguine

expectation。　　Yet　none　of　the　States　commonly　called　slave　States；

except　Delaware；　gave　a　regiment　through　regular　State　organization。

A　few　regiments　have　been　organized　within　some　others　of　those

States　by　individual　enterprise；　and　received　into　the　government

service。　　Of　course　the　seceded　States；　so　called　（and　to　which　Texas

had　been　joined　about　the　time　of　the　inauguration）；　gave　no　troops

to　the　cause　of　the　Union。



The　border　States；　so　called；　were　not　uniform　in　their　action；　some

of　them　being　almost　for　the　Union；　while　in　othersas　Virginia；

North　Carolina；　Tennessee；　and　Arkansasthe　Union　sentiment　was

nearly　repressed　and　silenced。　　The　course　taken　in　Virginia　was　the

most　remarkableperhaps　the　most　important。　　A　convention　elected　by

the　people　of　that　State　to　consider　this　very　question　of　disrupting

the　Federal　Union　was　in　session　at　the　capital　of　Virginia　when　Fort

Sumter　fell。　　To　this　body　the　people　had　chosen　a　large　majority　of

professed　Union　men。　　Almost　immediately　after　the　fall　of　Sumter；

many　me