the army of the cumberland-第23章

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gainst　the　Federal　right；　which　being　forced　back；　Polk　and　Withers's　and　Cheatham's　divisions　were　then　to　push　the　centre。　　The　movement　made　by　a　steady　wheel　to　the　right　on　the　right　of　Polk's　command　as　a　pivot。　　Bragg's　plan　was　to　drive　our　right　and　centre　back　against　our　left　on　Stone's　River；　seize　our　line　of　communication　with　Nashville；　thus　cutting　us　off　from　our　base　of　operations　and　supplies；　and　ultimately　securing　the　objective　of　his　campaign；　Nashville。　　Bragg's　plan　was　equally　as　bold　as　that　of　his　opponentwhose　command　was　slightly　inferior　in　strength　to　the　rebel　forceand　the　success　of　either　depended　very　largely　on　the　degree　of　diligence　in　opening　the　engagement。　　Rosecrans's　orders　were　for　the　troops　to　breakfast　before　daylight　and　attack　at　seven　o'clock。　　Bragg　issued　orders　to　attack　at　daylight。





Chapter　VIII。




The　Battle　of　Stone's　River。

With　early　light；　on　the　morning　of　the　31st；　the　movement　in　each　army　began。　　Rosecrans　had　established　his　headquarters　in　the　rear　of　the　left；　in　order　to　direct　in　person　the　forward　movement　of　that　portion　of　his　army　which　was　to　cross　Stone's　River；　sweep　all　resistance　before　it；　and　swing　into　Murfreesboro。　　The　command　was　given；　and　at　once　Van　Cleve　advanced　two　brigades；　making　the　crossing　of　the　river　at　the　lower　ford　without　opposition。　　Wood's　division　had　reached　the　river　bank　prepared　to　make　the　crossing　and　support　Van　Cleve。　　Everything　on　the　left　appeared　to　be　working　satisfactorily；　when　the　opening　sounds　of　the　enemy's　attack　on　the　right　reached　the　left。　　This　was　as　intended；　and　went　to　show　that　if　Bragg's　left　was　fully　occupied　he　then　could　give　the　less　attention　to　his　right；　engaged　by　our　army。　　with　high　hopes　the　troops　then　pressing　forward　continued　to　cross　the　river。　　Within　an　hour　after　the　opening　of　the　battle；　one　of　McCook's　staff　officers　reported　to　Rosecrans　that　the　Right　Wing　was　heavily　pressed　and　needed　assistance。　　Rosecrans　was　not　told　of　the　rout　of　Johnson's　division；　nor　of　the　rapid　withdrawal　of　Davis；　made　necessary　thereby。　　Rosecrans；　sending　word　to　McCook　to　make　a　stubborn　fight；　continued　his　own　offensive　movement。　　Everything　was　working　well　as　far　as　he　knew。　　His　strong　force　on　the　left　was　not　yet　engaged。　　This　he　could　hurl　at　the　enemy's　line　of　communications　and　strike　on　the　flank　of　Bragg's　army　that　was　flanking　him。　　Soon　after　another　staff　officer　from　McCook　arrived　and　reported　that　the　entire　Right　Wing　was　being　driven；　a　fact　that　manifested　itself　by　the　troops　from　the　broken　divisions　pouring　forth　from　the　cedars　in　alarming　numbers；　and　by　the　rapid　movement　of　the　noise　of　the　battle　to　the　north。　　Then　Rosecrans　saw　the　necessity　of　abandoning　his　own　movement；　of　recalling　the　left；　and　of　proceeding　at　once　to　the　right　to　save　what　was　left　of　that　corps　as　speedily　as　possible。　　He　ordered　back　his　left　from　across　the　river；　and　calling　on　his　staff　to　mount；　rode　full　gallop　over　to　the　right　to　reform　that　command　on　a　new　line　and　save　his　army。　　Now　that　he　was　on　the　defensive；　after　McCook's　disaster；　it　was　impossible　to　carry　out　his　original　plan　of　battle。

On　the　30th；　McCown　in　posting　his　division　placed　Ector's　and　Rains's　brigades　in　the　first　line；　and　McNair's　brigade　in　the　second。　　Hardee　ordered　McCown　at　once　to　change　this　so　as　to　bring　McNair　on　the　front　line。　　This　order　was　not　obeyed　until　the　morning　of　the　31st；　when　the　movement　was　made；　causing；　however；　some　delay　in　the　advance　of　Hardee's　command　on　our　right。　　At　half　past　six　o'clock；　McCown's　division　in　the　front　line　with　Cleburne's　division　in　the　second　swinging　around　by　a　continuous　change　of　direction　to　the　right；　advanced　on　to　the　right　of　McCook。　McCown　did　not　properly　execute　the　movement　as　intended；　and　was　carried　so　far　west　as　to　leave　a　gap　in　the　rebel　front　between　Withers's　left　and　McCown's　right。　　Into　this　gap　Cleburne　immediately　threw　his　division；　and　advanced；　filling　the　interval　in　the　front　line　between　McCown　and　Polk。　　This　gave　Hardee　double　the　length　of　front　originally　contemplated；　and　made　it　a　single　line　instead　of　a　double　with　division　front。　　These　two　divisions　thus　formed　then　struck　McCook's　right　flankJohnson's　division。　　McCook's　line　was　very　weak　and　poorly　posted。　　It　was　thin　and　light；　without　reserves；　with　neither　the　troops　nor　commanding　officers　in　their　places；　as　they　should　have　been；　under　Rosecrans's　orders　of　the　evening　before。

Every　soldier　on　that　field　knew　when　the　sun　went　down　on　the　30th　that　on　the　following　day　he　would　be　engaged　in　a　struggle　unto　death；　and　the　air　was　full　of　tokens　that　one　of　the　most　desperate　of　battles　was　to　be　fought。　　In　the　face　of　all　this；　Johnson；　the　commander　of　the　First　Division　on　the　right；　was　not　on　the　line　nor　near　enough　to　his　troops　to　give　orders　to　them；　his　headquarters　being　a　mile　and　a　half　in　the　rear。　　General　Willich　the　commander　of　the　Second　Brigade；　which　had　been　posted　for　the　express　purpose　of　protecting　the　extreme　right　of　our　army；　was　absent　from　his　command　at　division　headquarters。　　His　brigade　was　not　even　in　line；　as　they　had　been　ordered　to　get　their　breakfast。　　The　batteries　of　the　division　were　not　properly　posted；　and　in　some　cases　the　horses　were　away　from　the　guns　to　the　rear　for　water。　　All　this　was　criminal　negligencea　failure　in　the　performance　of　dutyfor　which　some　one　should　have　suffered。　　To　the　faulty　position　of　the　line　and　to　the　unprepared　condition　of　the　troops　is　to　be　attributed　the　almost　overwhelming　disaster　that　overtook　our　army　on　that　day。　As　the　two　divisions　of　the　enemy　advanced；　Kirk　threw　forward　the　Forty…fourth　Illinois　to　support　the　skirmish　line；　and　called　on　Willich's　brigade　for　help。　　This　brigade　being　without　an　immediate　commander；　no　effort　was　made　to　support　Kirk。　　The　contest　was　too　unequal　to　be　maintained　for　any　great　length　of　time；　and　Johnson's　division；　after　a　sharp　and　spirited　but　fruitless　contest；　crumbling　to　pieces；　was　driven　back　with　a　loss　of　eleven　guns。　Kirk　was　mortally　wounded　and　Willich　was　captured；　returning　to　his　command　as　it　was　driven　back。　　Kirk's　brigade　lost　473　killed　and　wounded；　and　had　342　captured。　　Willich's　brigade　had　a　few　less　killed　and　wounded；　but　more　than　twice　that　number　captured。

Baldwin　in　reserve　near　headquarters　was　too　far　from　the　front　to　aid　in　supporting　either　of　the　other　brigades　of　Johnson's　division。　　Stragglers　from　Kirk's　and　Willich's　brigades　gave　the　first　information　to　Baldwin　of　the　disaster　on　the　right。　　Hastily　forming　his　troops；　he　had　barely　time　to　post　them　in　line　of　battle　before　the　enemy　in　immense　masses　appeared　on　his　front　at　short　range；　their　left　extending　far　beyond　the　extreme　right　of　his　line。　　Opening　at　once　a　destructive　fire　upon　their　dense　masses　with　his　infantry　and　artillery；　Baldwin　succeeded　in　checking　their　advance　in　his　front；　but　their　left　continued　to　swing　around　on　his　right。　　Here　four　pieces　of　Simonson's　battery　posted　near　the　woods　in　the　rear　of　the　first　position　opened　with　terrible　effect。　　The　enemy　came　on　in　such　overwhelming　numbers；　that　after　half　an　hour's　stubborn　resistance　Baldwin　was　compelled　to　retire；　not　however　until　the　enemy　had　flanked　his　right　and　were　pouring　in　an　enfilading　fire。　　As　it　was　he　barely　made　his　escape；　since　in　a　moment　longer　his　entire　command　would　have　been　surrounded　and　captured。　　At　the　edge　of　the　woods　Baldwin　endeavored　to　make　another　stand；　but　before　he　could　form　his　line　he　was　again　forced　back。　　Retiring　slowly；　with　several　halts　in　the　cedars；　Baldwin　with　his　brigade　reached　the　railroad　where　the　rest　of　the　division　was　being　reformed。

The　right　flank　being　driven　from　its　position　by　the　left　of　the　enemy；　Davis's　division　then　felt　the　full　force　of　the　victorious　sweep　of　the　rebel　troops；　flushed　with　success　and　aided　by　the　forces　immediately　in　his　front。　　Davis；　as　soon　as　the　disaster　on　his　right　had　fully　developed；　at　once　changed　front　and　formed　a　new　line；　with　his　right　brigade　under　Post　nearly　at　right　angles　to　its　former　positio