the army of the cumberland-第34章

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　from　Washington　intimated　that　he　was　unnecessarily　delaying　his　advance　upon　Bragg　in　his　works　at　Shelbyville　and　Tullahoma。　　Grant；　on　his　Vicksburg　campaign；　became　very　anxious　for　the　advance　of　the　Army　of　the　Cumberland；　to　engage　Bragg　and　prevent　reinforcements　being　sent　from　him　to　Pemberton　or　Johnston；　operating　on　his　front　and　rear；　and　urged　Rosecrans　to　move；　and　wrote　to　Halleck；　requesting　him　to　direct　an　advance　of　the　Army　of　the　Cumberland　on　Bragg's　position。　Rosecrans　regarded　it　for　the　best　interest　of　the　country　for　his　army　to　remain　constantly　threatening　Bragg；　in　order　to　hold　the　entire　army　of　the　latter　in　his　immediate　front；　and　also　in　the　event　of　the　defeat　of　Grant；　and　a　concentration　of　the　enemy　on　Rosecrans's　position；　that　he　should　be　close　to　his　base；　his　army　being　then　the　reserve。　　If　an　advance　succeeded　in　driving　Bragg　from　Tullahoma；　a　greater　danger　than　his　remaining　inactive　on　our　front　might　ensue。　　To　Bragg；　the　occupancy　of　Middle　Tennessee　was　of　sufficient　importance　to　justify　him　in　remaining　inactive　with　his　entire　command；　waiting　for　the　advance　of　Rosecrans　some　six　months。　　If　driven　from　Tennessee；　his　troops　were　ready　to　unite　with　the　command　in　Mississippi　and　defeat　Grant's　movements。　If　Bragg　could　be　held　in　Tennessee　after　until　after　Grant's　success　was　assured；　then；　by　waiting　at　Murfreesboro　with　his　army　quiet；　Rosecrans　could　render　better　service　than　by　moving　on　the　enemy。　This　was　a　matter　of　military　judgment；　on　one　side　espoused　by　Rosecrans　and　all　his　corps　and　division　commanders；　who　were　on　the　ground；　and　on　the　other　by　Halleck；　Stanton；　and　Grant；　and　this　question　served　to　increase　the　feeling　against　Rosecrans　in　those　quarters。　　Bragg　also　considered　that　his　presence　on　the　front　of　the　Federal　army　would　prevent　any　troops　from　it　being　sent　to　aid　Grant。　　And　thus　the　year　wore　away　until　early　summer。　Still　another　consideration　with　Rosecrans；　was　the　character　of　the　soil　in　Tennessee　from　a　short　distance　south　of　Murfreesboro　to　the　foot　of　the　Cumberland　Mountains。　　This　was　a　light　sandy　loam；　that　in　winter　and　spring；　during　the　rains　of　those　seasons；　became　like　quicksand；　allowing　the　artillery　and　wagon　to　sink　almost　to　the　hub；　and　rendering　the　rapid　movement　of　a　large　army　absolutely　impossible。

During　the　early　part　of　June；　Rosecrans　commenced　placing　his　troops　in　position；　preparatory　to　a　general　advance。　　He　ordered　the　brigade　that　had　been　encamped　at　Gallatin；　under　General　Ward；　to　Lavergne；　and　despatched　Gordon　Granger　to　take　post　at　Triune；　moving　his　command　from　Franklin　up　to　that　place。　　Crook　was　ordered　from　Carthage　to　report　to　Murfreesboro；　and　on　his　arrival；　was　placed　in　Reynolds's　division。　　Rosecrans　organized　a　reserve　corps；　consisting　of　three　divisions　designated　as　First；　Second；　and　Third；　under　Baird；　J。　D。　Morgan；　and　R。　S。　Granger；　respectively；　and　he　assigned　Gordon　Granger　to　the　command　of　this　corps。

Early　in　June；　Garfield；　then　Chief…of…Staff　of　the　General　commanding；　urged　Rosecrans　to　make　an　advance　movement；　both　as　a　military　and　political　measure　with　reference　to　the　sentiment　of　the　North。　　General　Rosecrans　had　matured　his　plans　for　an　advance；　but　decided　to　refer　the　question　to　his　general　officers　in　command　of　corps　and　divisions。　　The　matter　being　submitted　to　them；　the　universal　sentiment　of　these　officers　was　that　the　movement　should　be　further　delayed。　　However；　on　the　23rd　of　June；　Rosecrans　having　made　all　necessary　arrangements　for　his　command；　according　to　his　plans；　and　learning　of　the　favorable　prospects　at　Vicksburg；　and　of　the　movement　of　the　force　under　Burnside　into　East　Tennessee　to　take　and　hold　Knoxville；　issued　the　necessary　orders　for　the　advance　of　his　army　on　that　of　the　enemy。





Chapter　X。




The　Advance　on　Tullahoma。

At　the　time　of　the　advance　of　the　Army　of　the　Cumberland；　Polk's　corps　of　Bragg's　army　occupied　the　main　position　at　Shelbyville；　strongly　intrenched　behind　heavy　works　thrown　up　during　the　six　months　of　waiting。　　These　added　to　the　natural　strength　of　the　position；　and　extended　from　Horse　Mountain　on　the　east；　to　Duck　River　on　the　west；　and　were　covered　by　a　line　of　abattis。　　The　town　was　noted　for　the　strong　Union　sentiment　of　its　inhabitants；　of　which　fact　the　rebels　took　full　advantage　to　the　loss　and　distress　of　the　people。　　It　is　situated　about　twenty…five　miles　south　of　Murfreesboro；　and　some　twenty　miles　North　of　Tullahoma；　on　a　branch　railroad　from　the　main　Nashville　line；　starting　west　from　Wartrace。　Bragg's　right　was　posted　at　Wartrace；　with　Hardee's　corps　occupying　the　passes　at　Liberty；　Hoover；　and　Bellbuckle　Gaps。　　These　gaps　were　all　held　by　strong　forces　of　the　enemy；　supported　by　the　main　command。　　Polk　had　an　advance　in　Guy's　Gap　with　his　entire　command　in　supporting　distance。　　Bragg's　extreme　right　was　protected　by　cavalry　with　headquarters　at　McMinnville；　while　his　cavalry　on　the　left；　under　Forrest；　had　headquarters　at　Columbia；　threatening　Franklin。

At　this　time　the　main　base　of　supplies　of　the　enemy　was　at　Chattanooga；　to　which　the　entire　country　south　of　Duck　River　had　been　made　tributary。　　From　Duck　River；　south；　the　country　is　rough；　with　rocky　ranges　of　hills；　which　divide　the　〃barrens〃　from　the　fertile　parts　of　Middle　Tennessee。　　These　〃barrens〃　constitute　a　high　rolling　plateau　of　ground　between　the　ranges　of　hills　at　Duck　River　and　the　Cumberland　Mountains。　　It　is　here　that　the　soil　during　a　rainy　season　offers　the　greatest　obstacle　to　active　campaigning。　Situated　on　the　〃barrens；〃　at　the　junction　of　the　McMinnville　branch　with　the　Nashville　and　Chattanooga　Railroad；　was　Tullahoma；　a　small　straggling　village；　where　Bragg　had　established　his　main　depot　and　made　a　large　intrenched　camp。　　The　defiles　of　Duck　River；　a　deep；　narrow　stream　with　but　few　fords　or　bridges；　covered　its　front；　with　a　rough　rocky　range　of　hills　immediately　south　of　the　river。　　The　principal　roads　as　they　passed　through　these　hills　bore　southwardly　toward　the　line　of　the　enemy's　communications　and　Tullahoma。　　The　Manchester　pike　passed　through　Hoover's　Gap　and　reached　the　〃barrens〃　by　ascending　a　long；　difficult　canon　called　Matt's　Hollow。　　The　Wartrace　road　passed　through　Liberty　Gap；　and　from　there　it　ran　into　the　road　along　the　railroad　through　Bellbuckle　Gap。　　The　direct　road　to　Shelbyville　goes　through　Guy's　Gap。

Rosecrans　was　satisfied　from　the　information　he　had　received　that　Bragg　intended　to　fight　in　his　intrenchments　at　Shelbyville；　in　the　event　of　the　army　advancing　in　that　direction。　　The　〃effective　total　present；〃　as　reported　by　Bragg　as　the　strength　of　his　army　on　June　20；　1863；　at　Shelbyville；　was　43；089；　of　all　arms。　　If　he　were　attacked　at　Shelbyville　and　beaten；　he　would　then　be　in　good　position　to　retreat　to　his　strong　intrenchments　at　Tullahoma；　and　on　his　retreat　could　so　retard　Rosecrans's　advance　through　the　narrow　winding　roads　leading　up　to　the　〃barrens；〃　as　to　fully　protect　his　own　line　of　retreat　and　inflict　severe　loss　on　the　advancing　force　without　exposing　his　own　troops。　　Rosecrans's　plan　of　campaign　was　to　render　useless　Bragg's　intrenchments　by　turning　his　right；　and　then　if　possible　secure　his　line　of　retreat　by　moving　on　the　railroad　bridge　at　Elk　River。　　Bragg　by　this　means　would　either　be　forced　to　accept　battle　on　ground　chose　by　Rosecrans；　or　be　compelled　to　beat　a　retreat　on　a　disadvantageous　line；　neither　as　direct　nor　by　as　good　roads　as　he　would　have　from　Shelbyville　and　Tullahoma　due　south。　　To　carry　out　this　plan　it　was　necessary　to　impress　Bragg　with　the　idea　that　our　advance　would　be　in　force　on　Shelbyville；　and；　if　possible；　to　keep　up　this　impression　until　the　main　body　of　our　army　reached　Manchester。　　The　success　of　this　would　keep　Bragg's　attention　on　the　movement　on　his　front　at　Shelbyville；　and　enable　our　army　to　pass　through　the　dangerous　defile　of　Hoover's　Gap；　a　narrow　passage…way　three　miles　long；　between　two　hills；　and　so　on　through　Matt's　Hollow；　an　equally　dangerous　defile；　being　a　gorge　two　miles　long　with　hardly　room　anywhere　for　wagons　to　pass　each　other。　　These　passes　were　only　eight　miles　from　Hardee's　headquarters　and