the army of the cumberland-第49章

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n　proceeded　to　execute　it。〃　　Wood's　official　report　contains　the　order　written　out　in　full。　　He　says　that　it　was　eleven　o'clock　when　it　reached　him。　　〃General　McCook　was　with　me　when　I　received　it。　　I　informed　him　that　I　would　immediately　carry　it　into　execution；　and　suggested　to　him　that　he　should　close　up　his　command　rapidly　on　my　right；　to　prevent　the　occurrence　of　a　gap　in　the　line。　　He　said　he　would　do　so；　and　immediately　rode　away。〃

McCook　says；　in　reference　to　the　movement　of　Sheridan　to　the　aid　of　Thomas；　which　he　had　just　ordered；　〃Simultaneously　with　this　movement；　and　much　to　my　surprise；　Wood's　division　left　the　position　it　had　in　line　of　battle　on　Davis's　left；　marching　by　the　left　flank；　leaving　a　wide　gap　in　the　line。〃　　Wood　also　says　in　his　official　report　that　when　he　started　to　execute　the　order　he　met　Thomas；　and　told　him　of　his　order。　　He　says；　〃I　exhibited　my　order　to　him；　and　asked　him　whether　he　would　take　the　responsibility　of　changing　it。　　He　replied　he　would；　and　I　then　informed　him　that　I　would　move　my　command　to　the　support　of　General　Baird。〃　　The　first　mention　Thomas　makes　in　his　official　report　of　seeing　Wood　is　when　in　riding　〃toward　the　crest　of　the　hill；〃　coming　from　the　left；　he　met　Wood　on　the　way；　and　directed　him　to　take　position　on　Brannan's　right。　Later；　he　says；　〃About　the　time　that　Wood　took　up　his　position；　General　Gordon　Granger　appeared；〃　etc。　　This　was　over　three　hours　after　what　General　Wood　styles　〃the　disastrous　event　of　the　right〃　occurred。　　It　seems　strange；　if　Wood　was　properly　executing　an　order　from　the　Commanding　General；　that　he　should　try　so　hard　to　shield　his　action　by　the　authority　of　these　two　corps　commanders；　especially　when　he　was　under　the　direct　command　of　neither　of　them。

General　Wood　was　a　graduate　of　West　Point；　had　been　in　the　army　all　his　life；　and　knew　the　full　meaning　of　all　technical　terms　used　to　describe　military　movements。　　The　order　bore　on　its　face　a　direction　to　him　to　make　a　movement　with　his　front　in　line　of　battle；　and　at　the　same　time　to　occupy　a　position　in　the　rear　of　the　division；　on　which　he　was　ordered　to　join　his　left　in　line　on　the　immediate　battle…front。　　He　knew　he　could　not　execute　the　order　literally　as　given；　and　from　the　wording　of　it　must　have　known　that　there　was　some　mistake　about　it。　　Instead　of　sending　a　short　distance　to　the　rear；　or　going　himself　to　Rosecrans　and　finding　out　just　what　was　meant　by　the　order；　he　chose　to　give　it　a　meaning　that　it　was　never　intended　to　convey；　and　moved　to　the　rear　from　the　front　of　battle；　when　he　knew；　as　he　says　in　his　report；　〃although　I　had　not　been　seriously　engaged　at　any　time　during　the　morning；　I　was　well　satisfied　the　enemy　was　in　considerable　force　in　my　immediate　front。〃　Wood　says　in　his　official　report；　〃Reynolds's　division　was　posted　on　the　left　of　Brannan's　division；　which　in　turn　was　on　the　left　of　the　position　I　was　just　quitting；　　I　had　consequently　to　pass　my　command　in　the　rear　of　Brannan's　division　to　close　up　on　and　go　into　the　support　of　Reynolds。〃　　If　〃Reynolds's；　division　was　posted　on　the　left　of　Brannan's　division；〃　then　there　was　no　gap；　and　no　place　for　Wood　to　place　his　division　as　ordered；　and　he　knew　it。　　He　could　support　Reynolds；　but　to　do　this　he　was　compelled　to　disobey　the　first　part　of　his　order；　which　IN　ITS　SPIRIT　AND　INTENT　WAS　TO　KEEP　HIM　ON　THE　LINE　OF　BATTLE；　simply　moving　his　division　to　the　left。　　This　space　by　his　own　official　report　he　shows　was　occupied　by　Brannan's　division；　and　with　this　knowledge　he　undertook　to　execute　an　order　that　directed　him　to　make　an　impossible　movement　rather　than　ask　an　explanation　of　it　from　his　commanding　officer。　No　wonder　he　wanted　to　keep　his　order　safe　where　he　could　produce　it　if　occasion　required。　　Wood；　irritated　at　the　reprimand　of　Rosecrans　earlier　in　the　day；　intent　on　maintaining　his　dignity；　chose　rather　to　undertake　to　carry　out　an　order　in　the　execution　of　which　he　felt　safe；　so　long　as　he　had　it　in　writing　and　where　he　could　produce　it　if　occasion　demanded　it；　than　to　suspend　its　execution　long　enough　to　ride　a　short　distance　to　the　rear；　and　find　out　just　what　the　order　meant；　AND　TO　THIS　EXTENT　HE　IS　RESPONSIBLE　for　the　great　disaster　which　swept　the　right　wing　of　the　Army　of　the　Cumberland　from　the　field　of　battle　on　the　20th。　　That　Wood　must　have　known　that　there　was　a　mistake　in　regard　to　the　order　is　plain；　from　the　fact　that　he　himself　says　that　his　troops　had　not　been　seriously　engaged　that　morning。　　It　was　hardly　possible　that　Reynolds's　division；　which　was　only　a　division　front　from　his；　could　be　so　hardly　pressed　as　to　need　supports；　and　that　his　division　should　〃not　be　seriously　engaged。〃　　In　fact；　when　Wood　undertook　to　carry　out　this　order；　he　says　he　met　Thomas　and　was　told　by　him　that　Reynolds　did　not　need　supports；　and　that　he；　Wood；　〃had　better　move　to　the　support　of　General　Baird；　posted　on　the　extreme　left；　who　needed　assistance；〃　showing　that　the　conflict　had　as　yet　not　reached　down　the　line　to　Reynolds。　　The　spirit　in　which　General　Wood　fought　the　battle　of　Chickamauga　is　shown　by　the　following　extract　from　his　official　report；　where；　in　speaking　of　Garfield's　arrival　on　the　battlefield　later　in　the　afternoon　of　the　20th；　he　says；　〃After　the　disastrous　event　of　the　right；　General　Garfield　made　his　way　back　to　the　battlefield；　showing　thereby　that　the　road　was　open　to　all　who　might　choose　to　follow　it　where　duty　called。〃　After　Wood　reported　to　Thomas　there　was　no　more　splendid　fighting　done　on　that　field　of　terrific　conflict　on　the　20th　than　was　done　by　Thomas　J。　Wood　and　his　division。　　To　the　last　he　aided　Thomas　in　holding　Horseshoe　Ridge；　and　was　one　of　the　last　divisions　to　retire。

In　the　tide　that　swept　down　the　Dry　Valley　road；　Rosecrans　was　caught　with　the　members　of　his　staff。　　He　breasted　this　for　a　while；　and　endeavored　to　join　his　left　and　centre　under　Thomas　by　a　direct　route。　　After　riding　along　a　short　distance；　under　the　heavy　fire　of　the　rebels　with　both　artillery　and　musketry；　he　discovered　that　the　road　was　effectually　closed　by　the　enemy　in　strong　force。　　He　then　started　over　the　ridge　to　the　Dry　Valley　road；　and　made　his　way　as　rapidly　as　possible　through　the　swarming　masses　of　broken　troops　from　the　right　of　the　battlefield　to　Rossville；　with　the　intention　of　joining　Thomas　from　that　place　down　the　La　Fayette　road　if　the　left　and　centre　were　not　also　in　rout；　and　on　the　road　to　Chattanooga。　　On　reaching　Rossville；　Rosecrans　and　Garfield　halted　in　the　midst　of　the　driving　masses　of　teamsters；　stragglers；　and　fugitives　from　Thomas's　command；　all　striving　in　hot　haste　to　be　among　the　first　to　reach　Chattanooga。　　Making　inquiry　of　these　men　as　to　the　condition　of　affairs　at　the　front；　they　were　informed　〃that　the　entire　army　was　defeated；　and　in　retreat　to　Chattanooga。〃　〃That　Rosecrans　and　Thomas　were　both　killed；　and　that　McCook　and　Crittenden　were　prisoners。〃　　Asking　a　small　detachment　of　troops　the　command　they　belonged　to；　Rosecrans　was　informed　Negley's　division。　　He　then　asked　as　to　the　whereabouts　of　Negley。　　He　was　informed　that　he　was　a　short　distance　from　Rossville；　though　some　distance　from　the　battlefield；　〃rallying　stragglers；〃　and　that　the　entire　division　〃was　knocked　all　to　pieces。〃　　Knowing　that　one　of　the　last　orders　he　had　given　on　the　battlefield　was　for　Negley's　division　to　report　to　Thomas　to　take　position　on　his　extreme　left；　Rosecrans　was　satisfied　that　if　these　soldiers　reported　truly　the　left　and　centre　were　routed　and　that　the　whole　army　as　a　broken　mass　would　be　back　in　Chattanooga　very　shortly。　　At　this　time　there　was　a　lull　in　the　firing　at　the　front。　　Dismounting　from　their　horses；　Rosecrans　and　Garfield　placing　their　ears　to　the　ground；　endeavored　to　determine　from　the　sound　as　it　reached　them　the　truth　of　the　reported　rout。　　Hearing　no　artillery　firing；　and　detecting　only　what　appeared　to　be　a　scattering　fire　of　musketry；　the　conclusion　was　forced　on　Rosecrans　that　his　army　was　entirely　broken。　　His　information　prior　to　the　battle　led　him　to　believe　that　the　rebels　outnumbered　him　two　to　one；　and　if　this　proved　true；　the　disaster　in　part　could　be　accounted　for。　　Conferring　with　Garfield　as　to　what　was　the　best　thing　to　be　done　under