posterior analytics-第23章

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when　the　extremes　are　past；　future　when　they　are　future；　coming　to



be　when　they　are　coming…to…be；　actually　existent　when　they　are



actually　existent；　and　there　cannot　be　a　middle　term　homogeneous



with　extremes　respectively　past　and　future。　And　it　is　a　further



difficulty　in　this　theory　that　the　time　interval　can　be　neither



indefinite　nor　definite；　since　during　it　the　inference　will　be



false。　We　have　also　to　inquire　what　it　is　that　holds　events　together



so　that　the　coming…to…be　now　occurring　in　actual　things　follows　upon　a



past　event。　It　is　evident；　we　may　suggest；　that　a　past　event　and　a



present　process　cannot　be　'contiguous'；　for　not　even　two　past　events



can　be　'contiguous'。　For　past　events　are　limits　and　atomic；　so　just　as



points　are　not　'contiguous'　neither　are　past　events；　since　both　are



indivisible。　For　the　same　reason　a　past　event　and　a　present　process



cannot　be　'contiguous'；　for　the　process　is　divisible；　the　event



indivisible。　Thus　the　relation　of　present　process　to　past　event　is



analogous　to　that　of　line　to　point；　since　a　process　contains　an



infinity　of　past　events。　These　questions；　however；　must　receive　a　more



explicit　treatment　in　our　general　theory　of　change。



　　The　following　must　suffice　as　an　account　of　the　manner　in　which



the　middle　would　be　identical　with　the　cause　on　the　supposition　that



coming…to…be　is　a　series　of　consecutive　events：　for　in　the　terms　of



such　a　series　too　the　middle　and　major　terms　must　form　an　immediate



premiss；　e。g。　we　argue　that；　since　C　has　occurred；　therefore　A



occurred：　and　C's　occurrence　was　posterior；　A's　prior；　but　C　is　the



source　of　the　inference　because　it　is　nearer　to　the　present　moment；



and　the　starting…point　of　time　is　the　present。　We　next　argue　that；



since　D　has　occurred；　therefore　C　occurred。　Then　we　conclude　that；



since　D　has　occurred；　therefore　A　must　have　occurred；　and　the　cause　is



C；　for　since　D　has　occurred　C　must　have　occurred；　and　since　C　has



occurred　A　must　previously　have　occurred。



　　If　we　get　our　middle　term　in　this　way；　will　the　series　terminate



in　an　immediate　premiss；　or　since；　as　we　said；　no　two　events　are



'contiguous'；　will　a　fresh　middle　term　always　intervene　because



there　is　an　infinity　of　middles？　No：　though　no　two　events　are



'contiguous'；　yet　we　must　start　from　a　premiss　consisting　of　a



middle　and　the　present　event　as　major。　The　like　is　true　of　future



events　too；　since　if　it　is　true　to　say　that　D　will　exist；　it　must　be　a



prior　truth　to　say　that　A　will　exist；　and　the　cause　of　this　conclusion



is　C；　for　if　D　will　exist；　C　will　exist　prior　to　D；　and　if　C　will



exist；　A　will　exist　prior　to　it。　And　here　too　the　same　infinite



divisibility　might　be　urged；　since　future　events　are　not　'contiguous'。



But　here　too　an　immediate　basic　premiss　must　be　assumed。　And　in　the



world　of　fact　this　is　so：　if　a　house　has　been　built；　then　blocks



must　have　been　quarried　and　shaped。　The　reason　is　that　a　house



having　been　built　necessitates　a　foundation　having　been　laid；　and　if　a



foundation　has　been　laid　blocks　must　have　been　shaped　beforehand。



Again；　if　a　house　will　be　built；　blocks　will　similarly　be　shaped



beforehand；　and　proof　is　through　the　middle　in　the　same　way；　for　the



foundation　will　exist　before　the　house。



　　Now　we　observe　in　Nature　a　certain　kind　of　circular　process　of



coming…to…be；　and　this　is　possible　only　if　the　middle　and　extreme



terms　are　reciprocal；　since　conversion　is　conditioned　by　reciprocity



in　the　terms　of　the　proof。　This…the　convertibility　of　conclusions



and　premisses…has　been　proved　in　our　early　chapters；　and　the



circular　process　is　an　instance　of　this。　In　actual　fact　it　is



exemplified　thus：　when　the　earth　had　been　moistened　an　exhalation



was　bound　to　rise；　and　when　an　exhalation　had　risen　cloud　was　bound　to



form；　and　from　the　formation　of　cloud　rain　necessarily　resulted　and　by



the　fall　of　rain　the　earth　was　necessarily　moistened：　but　this　was　the



starting…point；　so　that　a　circle　is　completed；　for　posit　any　one　of



the　terms　and　another　follows　from　it；　and　from　that　another；　and　from



that　again　the　first。



　　Some　occurrences　are　universal　（for　they　are；　or　come…to…be　what



they　are；　always　and　in　ever　case）；　others　again　are　not　always　what



they　are　but　only　as　a　general　rule：　for　instance；　not　every　man　can



grow　a　beard；　but　it　is　the　general　rule。　In　the　case　of　such



connexions　the　middle　term　too　must　be　a　general　rule。　For　if　A　is



predicated　universally　of　B　and　B　of　C；　A　too　must　be　predicated



always　and　in　every　instance　of　C；　since　to　hold　in　every　instance　and



always　is　of　the　nature　of　the　universal。　But　we　have　assumed　a



connexion　which　is　a　general　rule；　consequently　the　middle　term　B　must



also　be　a　general　rule。　So　connexions　which　embody　a　general　rule…i。e。



which　exist　or　come　to　be　as　a　general　rule…will　also　derive　from



immediate　basic　premisses。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　13







　　We　have　already　explained　how　essential　nature　is　set　out　in　the



terms　of　a　demonstration；　and　the　sense　in　which　it　is　or　is　not



demonstrable　or　definable；　so　let　us　now　discuss　the　method　to　be



adopted　in　tracing　the　elements　predicated　as　constituting　the



definable　form。



　　Now　of　the　attributes　which　inhere　always　in　each　several　thing



there　are　some　which　are　wider　in　extent　than　it　but　not　wider　than



its　genus　（by　attributes　of　wider　extent　mean　all　such　as　are



universal　attributes　of　each　several　subject；　but　in　their　application



are　not　confined　to　that　subject）。　while　an　attribute　may　inhere　in



every　triad；　yet　also　in　a　subject　not　a　triad…as　being　inheres　in



triad　but　also　in　subjects　not　numbers　at　all…odd　on　the　other　hand　is



an　attribute　inhering　in　every　triad　and　of　wider　application



（inhering　as　it　does　also　in　pentad）；　but　which　does　not　extend　beyond



the　genus　of　triad；　for　pentad　is　a　number；　but　nothing　outside　number



is　odd。　It　is　such　attributes　which　we　have　to　select；　up　to　the　exact



point　at　which　they　are　severally　of　wider　extent　than　the　subject　but



collectively　coextensive　with　it；　for　this　synthesis　must　be　the



substance　of　the　thing。　For　example　every　triad　possesses　the



attributes　number；　odd；　and　prime　in　both　senses；　i。e。　not　only　as



possessing　no　divisors；　but　also　as　not　being　a　sum　of　numbers。



This；　then；　is　precisely　what　triad　is；　viz。　a　number；　odd；　and



prime　in　the　former　and　also　the　latter　sense　of　the　term：　for　these



attributes　taken　severally　apply；　the　first　two　to　all　odd　numbers；



the　last　to　the　dyad　also　as　well　as　to　the　triad；　but；　taken



collectively；　to　no　other　subject。　Now　since　we　have　shown　above'　that



attributes　predicated　as　belonging　to　the　essential　nature　are



necessary　and　that　universals　are　necessary；　and　since　the



attributes　which　we　select　as　inhering　in　triad；　or　in　any　other



subject　whose　attributes　we　select　in　this　way；　are　predicated　as



belonging　to　its　essential　nature；　triad　will　thus　possess　these



attributes　necessarily。　Further；　that　the　synthesis　of　them



constitutes　the　substance　of　triad　is　shown　by　the　following　argument。



If　it　is　not　identical　with　the　being　of　triad；　it　must　be　related



to　triad　as　a　genus　named　or　nameless。　It　will　then　be　of　wider　extent



than　triad…assuming　that　wider　potential　extent　is　the　character　of



a　genus。　If　on　the　other　hand　this　synthesis　is　applicable　to　no



subject　other　than　the　individual　triads；　it　will　be　identical　with



the　being　of　triad；　because　we　make　the　further　assumption　that　the



substance　of　each　subject　is　the　predication　of　elements　in　its



essential　nature　down　to