the ethics(part v)-第1章

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The　Ethics　＇Part　5＇







（Ethica　Ordine　Geometrico　Demonstrata）







by　Benedict　de　Spinoza







Translated　by　R。　H。　M。　Elwes





















PART　V：　　Of　the　Power　of　the　Understanding；　or　of　Human　Freedom















PREFACE



At　length　I　pass　to　the　remaining　portion　of　my　Ethics；　which　is　concerned



with　the　way　leading　to　freedom。　I　shall　therefore　treat　therein　of　the



power　of　the　reason；　showing　how　far　the　reason　can　control　the　emotions；



and　what　is　the　nature　of　Mental　Freedom　or　Blessedness；　we　shall　then　be



able　to　see；　how　much　more　powerful　the　wise　man　is　than　the　ignorant。



It　is　no　part　of　my　design　to　point　out　the　method　and　means　whereby　the



understanding　may　be　perfected；　nor　to　show　the　skill　whereby　the　body　may



be　so　tended；　as　to　be　capable　of　the　due　performance　of　its　functions。　The



latter　question　lies　in　the　province　of　Medicine；　the　former　in　the　province



of　Logic。　Here；　therefore；　I　repeat；　I　shall　treat　only　of　the　power　of　the



mind；　or　of　reason；　and　I　shall　mainly　show　the　extent　and　nature　of　its



dominion　over　the　emotions；　for　their　control　and　moderation。　That　we　do



not　possess　absolute　dominion　over　them；　I　have　already　shown。　Yet　the



Stoics　have　thought；　that　the　emotions　depended　absolutely　on　our　will；　and



that　we　could　absolutely　govern　them。　But　these　philosophers　were　compelled；



by　the　protest　of　experience；　not　from　their　own　principles；　to　confess；



that　no　slight　practice　and　zeal　is　needed　to　control　and　moderate　them：



and　this　someone　endeavoured　to　illustrate　by　the　example　（if　I　remember



rightly）　of　two　dogs；　the　one　a　house…dog　and　the　other　a　hunting…dog。　For



by　long　training　it　could　be　brought　about；　that　the　house…dog　should　become



accustomed　to　hunt；　and　the　hunting…dog　to　cease　from　running　after　hares。



To　this　opinion　Descartes　not　a　little　inclines。　For　he　maintained；　that　the



soul　or　mind　is　specially　united　to　a　particular　part　of　the　brain；　namely；



to　that　part　called　the　pineal　gland；　by　the　aid　of　which　the　mind　is



enabled　to　feel　all　the　movements　which　are　set　going　in　the　body；　and　also



external　objects；　and　which　the　mind　by　a　simple　act　of　volition　can　put　in



motion　in　various　ways。　He　asserted；　that　this　gland　is　so　suspended　in　the



midst　of　the　brain；　that　it　could　be　moved　by　the　slightest　motion　of　the



animal　spirits：　further；　that　this　gland　is　suspended　in　the　midst　of　the



brain　in　as　many　different　manners；　as　the　animal　spirits　can　impinge



thereon；　and；　again；　that　as　many　different　marks　are　impressed　on　the　said



gland；　as　there　are　different　external　objects　which　impel　the　animal



spirits　towards　it；　whence　it　follows；　that　if　the　will　of　the　soul　suspends



the　gland　in　a　position；　wherein　it　has　already　been　suspended　once　before



by　the　animal　spirits　driven　in　one　way　or　another；　the　gland　in　its　turn



reacts　on　the　said　spirits；　driving　and　determining　them　to　the　condition



wherein　they　were；　when　repulsed　before　by　a　similar　position　of　the　gland。



He　further　asserted；　that　every　act　of　mental　volition　is　united　in　nature



to　a　certain　given　motion　of　the　gland。　For　instance；　whenever　anyone



desires　to　look　at　a　remote　object；　the　act　of　volition　causes　the　pupil　of



the　eye　to　dilate；　whereas；　if　the　person　in　question　had　only　thought　of



the　dilatation　of　the　pupil；　the　mere　wish　to　dilate　it　would　not　have



brought　about　the　result；　inasmuch　as　the　motion　of　the　gland；　which　serves



to　impel　the　animal　spirits　towards　the　optic　nerve　in　a　way　which　would



dilate　or　contract　the　pupil；　is　not　associated　in　nature　with　the　wish　to



dilate　or　contract　the　pupil；　but　with　the　wish　to　look　at　remote　or　very



near　objects。　Lastly；　he　maintained　that；　although　every　motion　of　the



aforesaid　gland　seems　to　have　been　united　by　nature　to　one　particular



thought　out　of　the　whole　number　of　our　thoughts　from　the　very　beginning　of



our　life；　yet　it　can　nevertheless　become　through　habituation　associated　with



other　thoughts；　this　he　endeavours　to　prove　in　the　Passions　de　l'ame；　I。　50。



He　thence　concludes；　that　there　is　no　soul　so　weak；　that　it　cannot；　under



proper　direction；　acquire　absolute　power　over　its　passions。　For　passions　as



defined　by　him　are　〃perceptions；　or　feelings；　or　disturbances　of　the　soul；



which　are　referred　to　the　soul　as　species；　and　which　（mark　the　expression）



are　produced；　preserved；　and　strengthened　through　some　movement　of　the



spirits。〃　（Passion　del　l'ame；I。27。）　But；　seeing　that　we　can　join　any　motion



of　the　gland；　or　consequently　of　the　spirits；　to　any　volition；　the



determination　of　the　will　depends　entirely　on　our　own　powers；　if；　therefore；



we　determine　our　will　with　sure　and　firm　decisions　in　the　direction　to　which



we　wish　our　actions　to　tend；　and　associate　the　motions　of　the　passions　which



we　wish　to　acquire　with　the　said　decisions；　we　shall　acquire　an　absolute



dominion　over　our　passions。　Such　is　the　doctrine　of　this　illustrious



philosopher　（in　so　far　as　I　gather　it　from　his　own　words）；　it　is　one



which；　had　it　been　less　ingenious；　I　could　hardly　believe　to　have　proceeded



from　so　great　a　man。　Indeed；　I　am　lost　in　wonder；　that　a　philosopher；　who



had　stoutly　asserted；　that　he　would　draw　no　conclusions　which　do　not　follow



from　self…evident　premisses；　and　would　affirm　nothing　which　he　did　not



clearly　and　distinctly　perceive；　and　who　had　so　often　taken　to　task　the



scholastics　for　wishing　to　explain　obscurities　through　occult　qualities；



could　maintain　a　hypothesis；　beside　which　occult　qualities　are　commonplace。



What　does　he　understand；　I　ask；　by　the　union　of　the　mind　and　the　body？　What



clear　and　distinct　conception　has　he　got　of　thought　in　most　intimate　union



with　a　certain　particle　of　extended　matter？　Truly　I　should　like　him　to



explain　this　union　through　its　proximate　cause。　What　clear　and　distinct



conception　has　he　got　of　thought　in　most　intimate　union　with　a　certain



particle　of　extended　matter？　What　clear　and　distinct　conception　has　he　got



of　thought　in　most　intimate　union　with　a　certain　particle　of　extended



matter？　But　he　had　so　distinct　a　conception　of　mind　being　distinct　from



body；　that　he　could　not　assign　any　particular　cause　of　the　union　between　the



two；　or　of　the　mind　itself；　but　was　obliged　to　have　recourse　to　the　cause　of



the　whole　universe；　that　is　to　God。　Further；　I　should　much　like　to　know；



what　degree　of　motion　the　mind　can　impart　to　this　pineal　gland；　and　with



what　force　can　it　hold　it　suspended？　For　I　am　in　ignorance；　whether　this



gland　can　be　agitated　more　slowly　or　more　quickly　by　the　mind　than　by　the



animal　spirits；　and　whether　the　motions　of　the　passions；　which　we　have



closely　united　with　firm　decisions；　cannot　be　again　disjoined　therefrom　by



physical　causes；　in　which　case　it　would　follow　that；　although　the　mind



firmly　intended　to　face　a　given　danger；　and　had　united　to　this　decision　the



motions　of　boldness；　yet　at　the　sight　of　the　danger　the　gland　might　become



suspended　in　a　way；　which　would　preclude　the　mind　thinking　of　anything



except　running　away。　In　truth；　as　there　is　no　common　standard　of　volition



and　motion；　so　is　there　no　comparison　possible　between　the　powers　of　the



mind　and　the　power　or　strength　of　the　body；　consequently　the　strength　of　one



cannot　in　any　wise　be　determined　by　the　strength　of　the　other。　We　may　also



add；　that　there　is　no　gland　discoverable　in　the　midst　of　the　brain；　so



placed　that　it　can　thus　easily　be　set　in　motion　in　so　many　ways；　and　also



that　all　the　nerves　are　not　prolonged　so　far　as　the　cavities　of　the　brain。



Lastly；　I　omit　all　the　assertions　which　he　makes　concerning　the　will　and　its



freedom；　inasmuch　as　I　have　abundantly　proved　that　his　premisses　are　false。



Therefore；　since　the　power　of　the　mind；　as　I　have　shown　above；　is　defined　by



the　understanding　only；　we