history of philosophy-第31章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


bliss；　and　in　a　potentially　existent　world　of　the　ideal；　which　is　yet　unreal　because　the　whole　only
exists　in　the　element　of　universality。　This　world　still　lacks　individuality　as　such；　which　is　an　essential
moment　in　the　Notion；　actuality　demands　that　in　the　identity　of　both　sides　of　the　Idea；　the
independent　totality　shall　be　also　posited　as　negative。　Through　this　self…existent　negation；　which　is
absolute　subjectivity；　the　Idea　is　first　raised　into　Mind。　Mind　is　the　subjectivity　of　self…knowledge；
but　it　is　only　Mind　inasmuch　as　it　knows　what　is　object　to　itself；　and　that　is　itself；　as　a　totality；　and
is　for　itself　a　totality。　That　is　to　say；　the　two　triangles　which　are　above　and　below　in　the　prism　must
not　be　two　in　the　sense　of　being　doubled；　but　they　must　be　one　intermingled　unity。　Or；　in　the　case
of　body；　the　difference　arises　between　the　centre　and　the　peripheral　parts。　This　opposition　of　real
corporeality　and　centre　as　the　simple　existence；　now　makes　its　appearance；　and　the　totality　is　the
union　of　the　centre　and　the　substantial…not；　however；　the　simple　union；　but　a　union　such　that　the
subjective　knows　itself　as　subjective　in　relation　to　the　objective　and　substantial。　Hence　the　Idea　is
this　totality；　and　the　Idea　which　knows　itself　is　essentially　different　from　the　substantial；　the　former
manifests　itself　independently；　but　in　such　a　manner　that　as　such　it　is　considered　to　be　for　itself
substantial。　The　subjective　Idea　is　at　first　only　formal；　but　it　is　the　real　possibility　of　the　substantial
and　of　the　potentially　universal；　its　end　is　to　realize　itself　and　to　identify　itself　with　substance。
Through　this　subjectivity　and　negative　unity；　and　through　this　absolute　negativity；　the　ideal　becomes
no　longer　our　object　merely；　but　object　to　itself；　and　this　principle　has　taken　effect　in　the　world　of
Christianity。　Thus　in　the　modern　point　of　view　the　subject　is　for　itself　free；　man　is　free　as　man；　and
from　this　comes　the　idea　that　because　he　is　Mind　he　has　from　his　very　nature　the　eternal　quality　of
being　substantial。　God　becomes　known　as　Mind　which　appears　to　itself　as　double；　yet　removes
the　difference　that　it　may　in　it　be　for　and　at　home　with　itself。　The　business　of　the　world；　taking　it　as
a　whole；　is　to　become　reconciled　with　Mind；　recognizing　itself　therein；　and　this　business　is　assigned
to　the　Teutonic　world。

The　first　beginning　of　this　undertaking　is　found　in　the　Religion　which　is　the　contemplation　of　and
faith　in　this　principle　as　in　an　actual　existence　before　a　knowledge　of　the　principle　has　been　arrived
at。　In　the　Christian　Religion　this　principle　is　found　more　as　feeling　and　idea；　in　it　man　as　man　is
destined　to　everlasting　bliss；　and　is　an　object　of　divine　grace；　pity　and　interest；　which　is　as　much　as
saying　that　man　has　an　absolute　and　infinite　value。　We　find　it　further　in　that　dogma　revealed　through
Christ　to　men；　of　the　unity　of　the　divine　and　human　nature；　according　to　which　the　subjective　and
the　objective　Idea…man　and　God　are　one。　This；　in　another　form；　is　found　in　the　old　story　of　the
Fall；　in　which　the　serpent　did　not　delude　man；　for　God　said；　〃Behold；　Adam　has　become　as　one　of
us；　to　know　good　and　evil。〃　We　have　to　deal　with　this　unity　of　subjective　principle　and　of
substance；　it　constitutes　the　process　of　Mind　that　this　individual　one　or　independent　existence　of
subject　should　put　aside　its　immediate　character　and　bring　itself　forth　as　identical　with　the
substantial。　Such　an　aim　is　pronounced　to　be　the　highest　end　attainable　by　man。　We　see　from　this
that　religious　ideas　and　speculation　are　not　so　far　asunder　as　was　at　first　believed；　and　I　maintain
these　ideas　in　order　that　we　may　not　be　ashamed　of　them；　seeing　that　we　still　belong　to　them；　and
so　that　if　we　do　get　beyond　them；　we　may　not　be　ashamed　of　our　progenitors　of　the　early
Christian　times；　who　held　these　ideas　in　such　high　esteem。

The　first　principle　of　that　Philosophy　which　has　taken　its　place　in　Christendom　is　thus　found　in　the
existence　of　two　totalities。　This　is　a　reduplication　of　substance　which　now；　however；　is
characterized　by　the　fact　that　the　two　totalities　are　no　longer　external　to　one　another；　but　are
clearly　both　required　through　their　relation　to　one　another。　If　formerly　Stoicism　and　Epicureanism；
whose　negativity　was　Scepticism；　came　forth　as　independent；　and　if　finally　the　implicitly　existent
universality　of　both　was　established；　these　moments　are　now　known　as　separate　totalities；　and　yet
in　their　opposition　they　have　to　be　thought　of　as　one。　We　have　here　the　true　speculative　Idea；　the
Notion　in　its　determinations；　each　of　which　is　brought　into　a　totality　and　clearly　relates　to　the　other。
We　thus　have　really　two　Ideas；　the　subjective　Idea　as　knowledge；　and　then　the　substantial　and
concrete　Idea；　and　the　development　and　perfection　of　this　principle　and　its　coming　to　the
consciousness　of　Thought；　is　the　subject　treated　by　modern　Philosophy。　Thus　the　determinations
are　in　it　more　concrete　than　with　the　ancients。　This　opposition　in　which　the　two　sides　culminate；
grasped　in　its　widest　significance；　is　the　opposition　between　Thought　and　Being；　individuality　and
substance；　so　that　in　the　subject　himself　his　freedom　stands　once　more　within　the　bounds　of
necessity；　it　is　the　opposition　between　subject　and　object；　and　between　Nature　and　Mind；　in　so　far
as　this　last　as　finite　stands　in　opposition　to　Nature。

The　Greek　Philosophy　is　free　from　restraint　because　it　does　not　yet　have　regard　to　the　opposition
between　Being　and　Thought；　but　proceeds　from　the　unconscious　presupposition　that　Thought　is
also　Being。　Certainly　certain　stages　in　the　Greek　Philosophy　are　laid　hold　of　which　seem　to　stand
on　the　same　platform　as　the　Christian　philosophies。　Thus　when　we　see；　for　instance；　in　the
Philosophy　of　the　Sophists；　the　new　Academics；　and　the　Sceptics；　that　they　maintain　the　doctrine
that　the　truth　is　not　capable　of　being　known；　they　might　appear　to　accord　with　the　later　subjective
philosophies　in　asserting　that　all　thought…determinations　were　only　subjective　in　character；　and　that
hence　from　these　no　conclusions　could　be　arrived　at　as　regards　what　is　objective。　But　there　is
really　a　difference。　In　the　case　of　ancient　philosophies；　which　said　that　we　know　only　the
phenomenal；　everything　is　confined　to　that；　it　is　as　regards　practical　life　that　the　new　Academy　and
the　Sceptics　also　admitted　the　possibility　of　conducting　oneself　rightly；　morally　and　rationally；　when
one　adopts　the　phenomenal　as　one's　rule　and　guide　in　life。　But　though　it　is　the　phenomenal　that　lies
at　the　foundation　of　things；　it　is　not　asserted　that　there　is　likewise　a　knowledge　of　the　true　and
existent；　as　in　the　case　of　the　merely　subjective　idealists　of　a　more　modern　day。　Those　last　still
keep　in　the　background　a　potentiality；　a　beyond　which　cannot　be　known　through　thought　or
through　conception。　This　other　knowledge　is　an　immediate　knowledge…a　faith　in；　a　view　of；　and　a
yearning　after；　the　beyond　such　as　was　evinced　by　Jacobi。　The　ancients　have　no　such　yearning：　on
the　contrary；　they　have　perfect　satisfaction　and　rest　in　the　certitude　that　only　that　which　appears　is
for　Knowledge。

Thus　it　is　necessary　in　this　respect　to　keep　strictly　to　the　point　of　view　from　which　we　start；　else
through　the　similarity　of　the　results；　we　come　to　see　in　that　old　Philosophy　all　the　determinate
character　of　modern　subjectivity。　Since　in　the　simplicity　of　ancient　philosophy　the　phenomenal　was
itself　the　only　sphere；　doubts　as　to　objective　thought　were　not　present　to　it。

The　opposition　defined；　the　two　sides　of　which　are　in　modern　times　really　related　to　one　another
as　totalities；　also　has　the　form　of　an　opposition　between　reason　and　faith；　between　individual
perception　and　the　objective　truth　which　must　be　taken　without　reason　of　one's　own；　and　even
with　a　complete　disregard　for　such　reason。　This　is　faith　as　understood　by　the　church；　or　faith　in　the
modern　sense；　i。e。　a　rejection　of　reason　in　favour　of　an　inward　revelation；　called　a　direct　certainty
or　perception；　or　an　implicit　and　intuitive　feeling。　The　opposition　between　this　knowledge；　which
has　first　of　all　to　develop　itself；　and　that　knowledge　which　has　already　de