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第55章

history of philosophy-第55章

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physics and natural philosophy; first likewise pertains to thought。

3。 Descartes never reached the third part; the philosophy of Mind; for; while he made a special
study of physics; in the region of ethics he published one tract only; De passionibus。 In this
reference Descartes treats of thought and human freedom。 He proves freedom from the fact of the
soul thinking that the will is unrestrained; and of that constituting the perfection of mankind。 And
this is quite true。 In respect to the freedom of the will he comes across the difficulty of how to
reconcile it with the divine prescience。 As free; man might do what is not ordained of God
beforehand — this would conflict with the omnipotence and omniscience of God; and if everything
is ordained of God; human freedom would thereby be done away with。 Yet he does not solve the
contradiction contained in these two different aspects without falling into difficulty。 But
conformably to the method which he adopts; and which we pointed out above (pp。 238;239); he
says: 〃The human mind is finite; God’s power and predetermination are infinite; we are thus not
capable of judging of the relationship in which the freedom of the human soul stands to the
omnipotence and omniscience of God — but in self…consciousness we have the certainty of it given
us as a fact。 And we must hold only to what is certain。〃(36) When he proceeds further much
appears to him still incapable of explanation; but we see obstinacy and caprice likewise exhibited
in his stopping short at the assertion as to the best of his knowledge。 The method of knowledge as
set forth by Descartes; takes the form of a reasoning of the understanding; and is thus without
special interest。

These; then; are the principal points in the Cartesian system。 Some particular assertions made by
Descartes; which have been specially instrumental in giving him fame; have still to be mentioned —
particular forms which have been formerly considered in metaphysics; and likewise by Wolff。 For
example; in the first place we gather that Descartes regarded animals and other organisms as
machines moved by another; and not possessing the principle of the spontaneity of thought within
them(37) — a mechanical physiology; a cut and dry thought pertaining to the understanding; which
is of no further importance。 In the sharp opposition between thought and extension; the former is
not considered as sensation; so that the latter can isolate itself。 The organic must as body reduce
itself to extension; any further development of this last thus only proves its dependence on the first
determinations。

In the second place; the relation between soul and body now becomes an important question; that
is; the return of the object within itself in such a way that thought posits itself in another; in matter。
As to this; many systems are offered to us in metaphysics。 One of these is the influxus physicus;
that the relation of spirit is of a corporeal nature; that the object is related to mind as bodies are to
one another — a conception like this is very crude。 How does Descartes understand the unity of
soul and body? The former belongs to thought; the latter to extension; and thus because both are
substance; neither requires the Notion of the other; and hence soul and body are independent of
one another and can exercise no direct influence upon one another。 Soul could only influence body
in so far as it required the same; and conversely — that is; in so far as they have actual relation to
one another。 But since each is a totality; neither can bear a real relation to the other。 Descartes
consistently denied the physical influence of one on the other; that would have signified a
mechanical relation between the two。 Descartes thus established the intellectual sphere in
contradistinction to matter; and on it based the independent subsistence of mind; for in his cogito
‘I’ is at first only certain of itself; since I can abstract from all。 Now we find the necessity of a
mediator to bring about a union of the abstract and the external and individual。 Descartes settles
this by placing between the two what constitutes the metaphysical ground of their mutual changes;
God。 He is the intermediate bond of union; in as far as He affords assistance to the soul in what it
cannot through its own freedom accomplish; so that the changes in body and soul may correspond
with one another。(38) If I have desires; an intention; these receive corporeal realization; this
association of soul and body is; according to Descartes; effected through God。 For above (p。
239) we saw that Descartes says of God that He is the Truth of the conception: as long as I think
rightly and consistently; something real corresponds to my thought; and the connecting link is God。
God is hereby the perfect identity of the two opposites; since He is; as Idea; the unity of Notion
and reality。 In the Idea of Spinoza this is worked out and developed in its further moments。
Descartes’ conclusion is quite correct; in finite things this identity is imperfect。 Only the form
employed by Descartes is inadequate; for it implies that in the beginning there are two things;
thought or soul and body; and that then God appears as a third thing; outside both — that He is
not the Notion of unity; nor are the two elements themselves Notion。 We must not however forget
that Descartes says that both those original elements are created substances。 But this expression
‘created’ pertains to the ordinary conception only and is not a determinate thought; it was
Spinoza; therefore; who first accomplished this return to thought。



             

1。 Brucker。 Hist。 crit。 phil。 T。 IV。 P。 II。 pp。 203…217; Cartes。 De Methodo; I…II (Amstelod。 1672;
4); pp。 2…7 (Euvres complètes de Descartes publiées par Victor Cousin; T。 I。 pp。 125…133;
Notes sur l'éloge de Descartes par Thomas (Euvres de Descartes publiées par Cousin; T。 I); p。
83; et suiv。; Tennemann; Vol。 X。 pp。 210…216。
2。 Spinoza: Principia philosophi? Cartesian? (Bendicti de Spinoza Opera; ed。 Paulus。 Jen?;
1802; T。I。); p。 2。
3。 Cartes。 Principia philosophi?; P。 I。 § 1…6 (Amstelod。 1672; 4); pp。 1; 2 (Euvres; T。 III。 pp。
63…66); cf。 Meditationes de prima philosophia; I。 (Amstelod。 1685; 4); pp。 5…8 (Euvres; T。 I。 pp。
235…245); De Methodo; IV。 p。 20 (pp。 156…158)。
4。 Cares。 Principia philosophi?; P。 I。 § 7; 8; p。 2 (pp。 66; 67)。
5。 Cartes。 De Methodo。 IV。 pp。 20; 21 (p。 158); Spinoza: Principia philosophi? Cartes; p。 14。
6。 Cartes。 De Methodo; IV。 p。 21 (p。 159); Epistol。 T。 I。 ep。 118 (Amstelod。 1682; 4); p。 379
(Euvres; T。 IX。 pp。 442; 443)。
7。 Cartes。 Responsiones ad sec。 objectiones; adjunct? Meditationibus de prima philosophia; p。
74 (p。 427); Spinoza: Principia philosophi? Cartes。; pp。 4; 5。
8。 Appendix ad Cartes。 Meditationes; continens objectiones quint。 p。 4 (Euvres; T。 II。 pp。 92;
93)。
9。 Cartes。 Principia philosophi?; P。 I。 § 9; pp。 2; 3 (pp。 67; 68)。
10。 Ibid。 P。 I。 § 11; p。 3 (pp。 69; 70)。
11。 Cartes。 Respons。 ad sec。 object。: Rationes more geometr。 dispos。; Postulata; p。 86 (pp。 454;
455); Spinoza: Principai philosophi?; Cartes。; p。 13。
12。 Cartes。 Princip。 philos。; P。 IV。 § 196; pp。 215; 216 (pp。 507…509); Meditation。 VI。 p。 38
(pp。 329; 330); Spinoza: Principa philos。 Cartes。; pp。 2; 3。
13。 Cartes。 Respons。 ad sec。 object。: Rat。 more geom。 dispos。; Axiomata V。; VI。 p。 86 (p。 453);
et Propositio IV。 p。 91 (pp。 464; 465); Meditationes; II。 pp。 9…14 (pp。 246…262)。
14。 Cartes。 De Methodo; IV。 p。 21 (pp。 158; 159); Spinoza: Principia philosoph。 Cartes。; p。 14。
15。 Cartes。 Principia philosophi?; P。 I。 § 13; pp。 3; 4 (pp。 71; 72)。
16。 Cartes。 Respons。 ad sec。 object: Rationes more geom。 dispos。; Def。 I。 p。 85 (pp。 451; 452);
et Proposit。 IV。 p。 91 (pp。 464; 465); Meditationes; III。 pp。 15…17 (pp。 263…268)。
17。 Cartes。 Principia philos。; P。 I。 § 20; p。 6 (pp。 76; 77); Meditationes; III。 pp。 17…25 (pp。
268…292); De Methodo; IV。 pp。 21; 22 (pp。 159…162); Spinoza: Principia philos。 Cartes。; p。 10。
18。 Cartes。 Principia philos。 P。 I。; § 14; p。 4 (pp。 72; 73)。
19。 Cartes。 Resp。 ad sec。 obj。: Rat。 more geom。 disp。; Ax。 III…VI。; X。; Prop。 I。 pp。 88; 89 (pp。
458…461); Spinoza: Princ。 phil。 

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