history of philosophy-第70章

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contains　nothing　more　nor　less。

When　Locke　starts　by　saying　that　everything　is　experience　and　we　abstract　for　ourselves　from　this
experience　general　conceptions　regarding　objects　and　their　qualities；　he　makes　a　distinction　in
respect　of　external　qualities　which　was　before　this　made　by　Aristotle　（De　anima；　II。　6）；　and　which
we　likewise　met　with　in　Descartes　（supra；　pp。　245；　246）。　That　is　to　say；　Locke　distinguishes
between　primary　and　secondary　qualities；　the　first　pertain　to　the　objects　themselves　in　truth；　the
others　are　not　real　qualities；　but　are　founded　on　the　nature　of　the　organs　of　sensation。　Primary
qualities　are　mechanical；　like　extension；　solidity；　figure；　movement；　rest；　these　are　qualities　of　the
corporeal；　just　as　thought　is　the　quality　of　the　spiritual。　But　the　determinations　of　our　individual
feelings　such　as　colours；　sounds；　smells；　taste；　etc。；　are　not　primary。”（15）　In　Descartes'　case　this
distinction　has　however　another　form；　for　the　second　class　of　these　determinations　is　defined　by
him　in　such　a　way　as　that　they　do　not　constitute　the　essence　of　body；　while　Locke　says　that　they
exist　for　sensation；　or　fall　within　existence　as　it　is　for　consciousness。　Locke；　however；　no　doubt
reckons　figure；　etc。；　as　still　pertaining　to　reality；　but　by　so　doing　nothing　is　ascertained　as　to　the
nature　of　body。　In　Locke　a　difference　here　appears　between　the　implicit　and　being　'for　another；'　in
which　he　declares　the　moment　of　'for　another'　to　be　unreal　…　and　yet　he　sees　all　truth　in　the　relation
of　'for　another'　only。

c。　Since　the　universal　as　such；　the　idea　of　species；　is；　according；　to　Locke；　merely　a　product　of
our　mind；　which　is　not　itself　objective；　but　relates　merely　to　objects　which　are　germane　to　it；　and
from　which　the　particular　of　qualities；　conditions；　time；　place；　etc。；　are　separated；　Locke
distinguishes　essences　into　real　essences　and　nominal　essences；　the　former　of　these　express　the
true　essence　of　things；　while　species　on　the　other　hand　are　mere　nominal　essences　which　no　doubt
express　something　which　is　present　in　the　objects；　but　which　do　not　exhaust　these　objects。　They
serve　to　distinguish　species　for　our　knowledge；　but　the　real　essence　of　nature　we　do　not
know。（16）　Locke　gives　good　reasons　for　species　being　nothing　in　themselves　…　for　their　not　being
in　nature；　or　absolutely　determined　…　instancing　in　exemplification　the　production　of　monstrosities
（Bk。　III。　chap。　iii。　§　17）：　were　species　absolute　no　monster　would　be　born。　But　he　overlooks　the
fact　that　since　it　pertains　to　species　to　exist；　it　thereby　likewise　enters　into　relationship　with　other
determinations；　thus　that　is　the　sphere　in　which　individual　things　operate　upon　one　another；　and
may；　hence　be　detrimental　to　the　existence　of　the　species。　Locke　thus　argues　just　as　one　would
who　wished　to　prove　that　the　good　does　not　exist　in　itself；　because　there　are　likewise　evil　men；
that　the　circle　does　not　exist　absolutely　in　nature；　because　the　circumference　of　a　tree；　for　example；
represents　a　very　irregular　circle；　or　because　I　draw　a　circle　badly。　Nature　just　signifies　the　lack　of
power　to　be　perfectly　adequate　to　the　Notion；　it　is　only　in　spirit　that　the　Notion　has　its　true
existence。　To　say　that　species　are　nothing　in　themselves；　that　the　universal　is　not　the　essential
reality　of　nature；　that　its　implicit　existence　is　not　the　object　of　thought；　is　tantamount　to　saying　that
we　do　not　know　real　existence：　it　is　the　same　litany　which　has　since　been　so　constantly　repeated
that　we　are　tired　of　listening　to　it：

　　　　　Das　Innere　der　Natur　kennt　kein　erschaffener　Geist；

and　which　goes　on　until　we　have　perceived　that　Being…for…another；　perception；　is　not　implicit；　a
point　of　view　which　has　not　made　its　way　to　the　positive　position　that　the　implicit　is　the　universal。
Locke　is　far　back　in　the　nature　of　knowledge；　further　back　than　Plato；　because　of　his　insistence　on
Being…for…another。

It　is　further　noteworthy　that　from　the　sound　understanding　Locke　argues　（Vol。　111。　Bk。　IV。　chap。
vii。　§　8…11）　against　universal　propositions　or　axioms　such　as　that　A=A；　i。e。；　if　anything　is　A　it
cannot　be　B。　He　says　they　are　superfluous；　of　very　little　use　or　of　no　use　at　all；　for　nobody　yet　has
built　up　a　science　on　a　proposition　which　asserts　a　contradiction。　From　such　the　true　may　be
proved　as　easily　as　the　false；　they　are　tautological。　What　Locke　has　further　achieved　in　respect　of
education；　toleration；　natural　rights　or　universal　state…right；　does　not　concern　us　here；　but　has　to　do
with　general　culture。

This　is　the　philosophy　of　Locke；　in　which　there　is　no　trace　of　speculation。　The　great　end　of
Philosophy；　which　is　to　know　the　truth；　is　in　it　sought　to　be　attained　in　an　empiric　way；　it　thus
indeed　serves　to　draw　attention　to　general　determinations。　But　such　a　philosophy　not　only
represents　the　standpoint　of　ordinary　consciousness；　to　which　all　the　determinations　of　its　thought
appear　as　if　given；　humble　as　it　is　in　the　oblivion　of　its　activity；　but　in　this　method　of　derivation　and
psychological　origination　that　which　alone　concerns　Philosophy；　the　question　of　whether　those
thoughts　and　relationships　have　truth　in　and　for　themselves；　is　not　present　at　all；　inasmuch　as　the
only　object　aimed　at　is　to　describe　the　manner　in　which　thought　accepts　what　is　given　to　it。　It　may
be　held　with　Wolff　that　it　is　arbitrary　to　begin　with　concrete　conceptions；　as　when　our　conception
of　identity　is　made　to　take　its　origin　from　such　things　as　blue　flowers　and　the　blue　heavens。　One
can　better　begin　directly　from　universal　conceptions　and　say　that　we　find　in　our　consciousness　the
conceptions　of　time；　cause　and　effect　these　are　the　later　facts　of　consciousness。　This　method　forms
the　basis　of　the　Wolffian　system　of　reasoning；　only　here　we　must　still　distinguish　amongst　the
different　conceptions　those　that　are　to　be　regarded　as　most　essential；　in　Locke's　philosophy；　this
distinction　cannot　really　be　said　to　come　under　consideration。　From　this　time；　according　to　Locke；
or　in　this　particular　aspect　of　Philosophy；　there　is　a　complete　and　entire　change　in　the　point　of　view
adopted；　the　whole　interest　is　limited　to　the　form　in　which　the　objective；　or　individual　sensations；
pass　into　the　form　of　conceptions。　In　the　case　of　Spinoza　and　Malebranche；　we　undoubtedly
likewise　saw　that　it　was　made　a　matter　of　importance　to　recognize　this　relation　of　thought　to　what
is　sensuously　perceived；　and　thus　to　know　it　as　falling　into　relation；　as　passing　into　the　relative；　the
main　question　hence　was：　How　are　the　two　related？　But　the　question　was　answered　to　the　effect
that　it　is　only　this　relation　for　itself　that　constitutes　the　point　of　interest；　and　this　relation　itself　as
absolute　substance　is　thus　identity；　the　true；　God；　it　is　not　the　related　parts。　The　interest　does　not
lie　in　the　related　parts；　the　related　parts　as　one…sided　are　not　the　existent；　presupposed　and
permanently　established；　they　are　accidental　merely。　But　here　the　related　sides；　the　things　and　the
subject；　have　their　proper　va1ue；　and　they　are　presupposed　as　having　this　value。　Locke's
reasoning　is　quite　shallow；　it　keeps　entirely　to　the　phenomenal；　to　that　which　is；　and　not　to　that
which　is　true。

There　is　another　question　however：　Are　these　general　determinations　absolutely　true？　And　whence
come　they　not　alone　into　my　consciousness；　into　my　mind　and　understanding；　but　into　the　things
themselves？　Space；　cause；　effect；　etc。；　are　categories。　How　do　these　categories　come　into　the
particular？　How　does　universal　space　arrive　at　determining　itself？　This　point　of　view；　the　question
whether　these　determinations　of　the　infinite；　of　substance；　etc。；　are　in　and　for　themselves　true；　is
quite　lost　sight　of。　Plato　investigated　the　infinite　and　the　finite；　Being　and　the　determinate；　etc。；　and
pronounced　that　neither　of　these　opposites　is　of　itself　true；　they　are　so　only　as　together　constituting
an　identity；　wherever　the　truth　of　this　content　may　come　from。　But　here　the　truth　as　it　is　in　and　for
itself　is　entirely　set　aside　and　the　nature　of　the　content　itself　is　made　the　main　point。　It　does　not
matter　whether　the　understanding　or　experience　is　its　source；　for　the　question　is　whet