贝壳电子书 > 英文原著电子书 > the ethics(part iv) >

第1章

the ethics(part iv)-第1章

小说: the ethics(part iv) 字数: 每页4000字

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页,按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页,按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部!
————未阅读完?加入书签已便下次继续阅读!











The Ethics 'Part 4'







(Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata)







by Benedict de Spinoza







Translated by R。 H。 M。 Elwes





















PART IV:  Of Human Bondage; or the Strength of the Emotions



















PREFACE







Human infirmity in moderating and checking the emotions I name bondage: 



for; when a man is a prey to his emotions; he is not his own master; but 



lies at the mercy of fortune: so much so; that he is often compelled; 



while seeing that which is better for him; to follow that which is worse。 



Why this is so; and what is good or evil in the emotions; I propose to 



show in this part of my treatise。 But; before I begin; it would be well 



to make a few prefatory observations on perfection and imperfection; 



good and evil。 







When a man has purposed to make a given thing; and has brought it 



to perfection; his work will be pronounced perfect; not only by 



himself; but by everyone who rightly knows; or thinks that he knows; 



the intention and aim of its author。 For instance; suppose anyone sees a 



work (which I assume to be not yet completed); and knows that the aim 



of the author of that work is to build a house; he will call the work 



imperfect; he will; on the other hand; call it perfect; as soon as he 



sees that it is carried through to the end; which its author had purposed 



for it。 But if a man sees a work; the like whereof he has never seen 



before; and if he knows not the intention of the artificer; he plainly 



cannot know; whether that work be perfect or imperfect。 Such seems to 



be the primary meaning of these terms。







But; after men began to form general ideas; to think out types of 



houses; buildings; towers; &c。; and to prefer certain types to others; 



it came about; that each man called perfect that which he saw agree 



with the general idea he had formed of the thing in question; and called 



imperfect that which he saw agree less with his own preconceived type; 



even though it had evidently been completed in accordance with the idea 



of its artificer。  This seems to be the only reason for calling natural 



phenomena; which; indeed; are not made with human hands; perfect or 



imperfect: for men are wont to form general ideas of things natural; no 



less than of things artificial; and such ideas they hold as types; 



believing that Nature (who they think does nothing without an object) 



has them in view; and has set them as types before herself。 Therefore; 



when they behold something in Nature; which does not wholly conform to 



the preconceived type which they have formed of the thing in question; 



they say that Nature has fallen short or has blundered; and has left 



her work incomplete。 Thus we see that men are wont to style natural 



phenomena perfect or imperfect rather from their own prejudices; than 



from true knowledge of what they pronounce upon。







Now we showed in the Appendix to Part I。; that Nature does not work 



with an end in view。 For the eternal and infinite Being; which we call 



God or Nature; acts by the same necessity as that whereby it exists。 For 



we have shown; that by the same necessity of its nature; whereby it 



exists; it likewise works (I:xvi。)。 The reason or cause why God or Nature 



exists; and the reason why he acts; are one and the same。  Therefore; 



as he does not exist for the sake of an end; so neither does he act for 



the sake of an end; of his existence and of his action there is neither 



origin nor end。 Wherefore; a cause which is called final is nothing else 



but human desire; in so far as it is considered as the origin or cause 



of anything。 For example; when we say that to be inhabited is the final 



cause of this or that house; we mean nothing more than that a man; 



conceiving the conveniences of household life; had a desire to build a 



house。 Wherefore; the being inhabited; in so far as it is regarded as 



a final cause; is nothing else but this particular desire; which is 



really the efficient cause; it is regarded as the primary cause; 



because men are generally ignorant of the causes of their desires。 



They are; as I have often said already; conscious of their own actions 



and appetites; but ignorant of the causes whereby they are determined 



to any particular desire。 Therefore; the common saying that Nature 



sometimes falls short; or blunders; and produces things which are 



imperfect; I set down among the glosses treated of in the Appendix to 



Part 1。  Perfection and imperfection; then; are in reality merely modes 



of thinking; or notions which we form from a comparison among one 



another of individuals of the same species; hence I said above 



(II:Def。vi。); that by reality and perfection I mean the same thing。 



For we are wont to refer all the individual things in nature to one 



genus; which is called the highest genus; namely; to the category of 



Being; whereto absolutely all individuals in nature belong。 Thus; in 



so far as we refer the individuals in nature to this category; and 



comparing them one with another; find that some possess more of being or 



reality than others; we; to this extent; say that some are more perfect 



than others。 Again; in so far as we attribute to them anything implying 



negation … as term; end; infirmity; etc。; we; to this extent; call them 



imperfect; because they do not affect our mind so much as the things 



which we call perfect; not because they have any intrinsic deficiency; 



or because Nature has blundered。 For nothing lies within the scope of a 



thing's nature; save that which follows from the necessity of the nature 



of its efficient cause; and whatsoever follows from the necessity of the 



nature of its efficient cause necessarily comes to pass。







As for the terms good and bad; they indicate no positive quality in 



things regarded in themselves; but are merely modes of thinking; or 



notions which we form from the comparison of things one with another。 



Thus one and the same thing can be at the same time good; bad; and 



indifferent。 For instance; music is good for him that is melancholy; 



bad for him that mourns; for him that is deaf; it is neither good nor 



bad。







Nevertheless; though this be so; the terms should still be retained。 



For; inasmuch as we desire to form an idea of man as a type of human 



nature which we may hold in view; it will be useful for us to retain 



the terms in question; in the sense I have indicated。







In what follows; then; I shall mean by; 〃good〃 that; which we 



certainly know to be a means of approaching more nearly to the type 



of human nature; which we have set before ourselves; by 〃bad;〃 that 



which we certainly know to be a hindrance to us in approaching the 



said type。  Again; we shall that men are more perfect; or more imperfect; 



in proportion as they approach more or less nearly to the said type。 



For it must be specially remarked that; when I say that a man passes 



from a lesser to a greater perfection; or vice versa; I do not mean 



that he is changed from one essence or reality to another; for instance; 



a horse would be as completely destroyed by being changed into a man; 



as by being changed into an insect。 What I mean is; that we conceive the 



thing's power of action; in so far as this is understood by its nature; 



to be increased or diminished。 Lastly; by perfection in general I shall; 



as I have said; mean reality in other words; each thing's essence; in so 



far as it exists; and operates in a particular manner; and without paying 



any regard to its duration。 For no given thing can be said to be more 



perfect; because it has passed a longer time in existence。 The duration 



of things cannot be determined by their essence; for the essence of 



things involves no fixed and definite pe

返回目录 下一页 回到顶部 1 0

你可能喜欢的