history of the impeachment of andrew johnson-第59章

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s　unquestionably　a　wise　provision。　The　natural　tendency　of　the　most　patriotic　of　men；　in　the　exercise　of　power　in　great　public　emergencies；　is　to　overstep　the　line　of　absolute　safety；　in　the　conscientious　conviction　that　a　departure　from　strict　constitutional　or　legal　limitations　is　demanded　by　the　public　welfare。

The　danger　in　such　departures；　even　upon　apparent　necessity；　if　condoned　or　permitted　by　public　judgment　is　in　the　establishment　of　precedents　whereby　greater　and　more　dangerous　infractions　of　organic　law　may　be　invited；　tolerated；　and　justified；　till　government　takes　on　a　form　of　absolutism　in　one　form　or　another；　fatal　to　free　institutions；　fatal　to　a　government　of　law；　and　fatal　to　popular　liberty。

On　the　other　hand；　a　too　ready　resort　to　the　power　of　impeachment　as　a　remedial　agentthe　deposition　of　a　public　officer　in　the　absence　of　proof　of　the　most　positive　and　convincing　character　of　the　impeachability　of　the　offense　alledged；　naturally　tends　to　the　other　extreme；　till　public　officers　may　become　by　common　consent　removable　by　impeachment　upon　insufficient　though　popular　chargeseven　upon　partisan　differences　and　on　sharply　contested　questions　of　public　administration。

The　power　of　impeachment　and　removal　becomes；　therefore；　a　two…edged　sword；　which　must　be　handled　with　consummate　judgment　and　skill；　and　resort　thereto　had　only　in　the　gravest　emergencies　and　for　causes　so　clearly　manifest　as　to　preclude　the　possibility　of　partisan　divisions　or　partisan　judgments　thereon。　Otherwise；　too　ready　resort　to　impeachment　must　inevitably　establish　and　bring　into　common　use　a　new　and　dangerous　remedy　for　the　cure　of　assumed　political　ills　which　have　their　origin　only　in　partisan　differences　as　to　methods　of　administration。　It　would　become　an　engine　of　partisan　intolerance　for　the　punishment　and　ostracism　of　political　opponents；　under　the　operation　of　which　the　great　office　of　Chief　Magistrate　must　inevitably　lose　its　dignity；　and　decline　from　its　Constitutional　rank　as　a　co…ordinate　department　of　the　Government；　and　its　occupant　no　longer　the　political　head　and　Chief　Executive　of　the　Nation；　except　in　name。

It　was　in　that　sense；　and　to　a　pointed　degree；　that　in　the　impeachment　and　trial　of　Andrew　Johnson　the　quality　of　coordination　of　the　three　great　Departments　of　Governmentthe　Executive；　Legislative；　and　Judicialwas　directly　involvedthe　House　of　Representatives　as　prosecutorthe　President　as　defendantthe　Senate　sitting　as　the　trial　court　in　which　the　Chief　Justice　represented　the　judicial　department　as　presiding　officer。

The　anomaly　of　the　situation　was　increased　and　its　gravity　intensified；　by　the　fact　that　the　President　pro　tempore　of　the　Senate；　who　stood　first　in　the　line　of　succession　to　the　Presidency　in　case　of　conviction；　was　permitted；　in　a　measure；　indeed；　forced　by　his　pro…impeachment　colleagues；　on　a　partisan　division　of　the　Senate；　to　sit　and　vote　as　such　President　pro　tempore　for　the　impeachment　and　removal　of　the　President　whom　he　was　to　succeed。

These　facts　of　condition　attending　and　characterizing　the　trial　of　President　Johnson；　pointedly　accentuate　the　danger　to　our　composite　form　of　government　which　the　country　then　faced。　That　danger；　as　it　had　found　frequent　illustration　in　the　debates　in　the　House　of　Representatives　on　the　several　propositions　for　the　President's　impeachment　preceding　the　bringing　of　the　indictment；　lay　in　the　claim　of　superiority　of　political　function　for　the　Legislative　branch　over　the　Executive。　The　quality　of　co…ordination　of　these　departments　was　repeatedly　and　emphatically　denied　by　conspicuous　and　influential　members　of　that　body　during　the　initial　proceedings　of　the　impeachment　movement；　and　even　on　the　floor　of　the　Senate　by　the　managers　of　the　impeachment。　To　illustrate：

Mr。　Bingham；　in　the　House；　Feb。　22nd；　1868；　announced　the　extraordinary　doctrine　that　〃there　is　no　power　to　review　the　action　of　Congress。〃　Again；　speaking　of　the　action　of　the　Senate　on　the　21st　of　February；　on　the　President's　message　announcing　the　removal　of　Mr。　Stanton；　he　said：　〃Neither　the　Supreme　Court　nor　any　other　Court　can　question　or　review　this　judgment　of　the　Senate。〃

The　declaration　was　made　by　Messrs。　Stevens　and　Boutwell　in　the　House；　that　the　Senate　was　its　own　judge　of　the　validity　of　its　own　acts。

Mr。　Butler；　in　his　opening　speech　to　the　Senate；　at　the　beginning　of　the　trial；　used　this　language：

A　Constitutional　tribunal　solely；　you　are　bound　by　no　law；　either　Statute　or　Common；　which　may　limit　your　constitutional　prerogative。　You　consult　no　precedents　save　those　of　the　law　and　custom　of　parliamentary　bodies。　You　are　a　law　unto　yourselves；　bound　only　by　the　natural　principles　of　equity　and　justice；　and　salus　populi　suprema　est　lex。

Feb。　24；　1868；　Mr。　Stevens　said　in　the　House：

Neither　the　Executive　nor　the　Judiciary　had　any　right　to　interfere　with　it　（Reconstruction）　except　so　far　as　was　necessary　to　control　it　by　military　rule　until　the　sovereign　power　of　the　Nation　had　provided　for　its　civil　administration。　NO　POWER　BUT　CONGRESS　HAD　ANY　RIGHT　TO　SAY　WHETHER　EVER；　OR　WHEN；　they　（the　rebel　States）；　should　be　admitted　to　the　Union　as　States　and　entitled　to　the　privileges　of　the　Constitution　of　the　United　States。〃　*　*　*　〃I　trust　that　when　we　come　to　vote　upon　this　question　we　shall　remember　that　although　it　is　the　duty　of　the　President　to　see　that　the　laws　be　executed；　THE　SOVEREIGN　POWER　OF　THE　NATION　RESTS　IN　CONGRESS。

Mr。　Butler；　the　leading　spirit　of　the　impeachment　enterprise；　went　so　far　as　to　make　the　revolutionary　suggestion　of　the　abrogation　of　the　Presidential　office　in　the　event　of　final　failure　to　convict　the　Presidentset　out　in　the　8th　Chapter。

Mr。　Sumner　insisted　that　in　no　judicial　sense　was　the　Senate　a　Court；　and　therefore　not　bound　by　the　rules　of　judicial　procedure：

If　the　Senate　is　a　Court　bound　to　judicial　forms　on　the　expulsion　of　the　President；　must　it　not　be　the　same　in　the　expulsion　of　a　Senator？　But　nobody　attributes　to　it　any　such　strictures　in　the　latter　case。　*　*　In　the　case　of　Blount；　which　is　the　first　in　our　history；　the　expulsion　was　on　the　report　of　a　committee　declaring　him　guilty　of　a　high　misdemeanor。　At　least　one　Senator　has　been　expelled　on　simple　formal　motion。　Others　have　been　expelled　without　any　formal　allegations　or　formal　proofs。　*　*　*　The　Constitution　provides　that　〃Each　House　shall　determine　its　rules　of　proceeding。〃　The　Senate　on　the　expulsion　of　its　own　members　has　already　done。　this　practically　and　set　an　example　of　simplicity。　But　it　has　the　same　power　over　　its　rules　of　proceeding〃　on　the　expulsion　of　the　President；　and　there　can　be　no　reason　for　simplicity　in　the　one　case　not　equally　applicable　in　the　other。　Technicality　is　as　little　consonant　with　the　one　as　with　the　other。　Each　has　for　its　object　the　PUBLIC　SAFETY。　For　this　a　Senator　is　expelled；　for　this；　also；　the　President　is　expelled。　Salus　Populi　Suprema　Lex。　The　proceedings　in　each　case　must　be　in　subordination　to　this　rule。〃

Thus；　Mr。　Sumner　would　have　removed　the　President　by　an　ordinary　concurrent　resolution　of　Congress。

The　purpose　of　all　this　was　apparentthat　the　President　was　in　effect；　to　be　tried　and　judged　before　a　Court　of　Public　Opinion；　and　not　before　the　Senate　sitting　as　a　High　Court　of　Impeachment；　but　BY　the　Senate　sitting　in　its　legislative　capacityto　create　the　impression　in　the　minds　of　Senators　that　in　this　high　judicial　procedure　they　were　still　acting　as　a　legislative　bodysimply　as　Senators；　and　not　in　a　judicial　capacity；　as　judges　and　jurors；　and　therefore　not　bound　specifically　by　their　oaths　as　such；　to　convict　only　for　crime　denounced　by　the　law；　or　for　manifest　high　political　misdemeanors；　but　could　take　cognizance　of　and　convict　on　alleged　partisan　offenses　and　allegations　based　on　differences　of　opinion　and　partisan　prejudices　and　partisan　predilectionsthat　it　was　not　essential　that　the　judgment　of　Senators　should　be　confined　to　the　specific　allegations　of　the　indictment；　but　that　the　whole　range　of　alleged　political　and　partisan　misdemeanors　and　delinquencies　could　be　taken　into　account　in　seeking　a　pretext　for　Mr。　Johnson's　conviction。

The　superiority　of　the　Legislative　branch　was　thus　openly。　advocated