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股票期货突破技术分析(英文原版)-第31章

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solely on the SOIR above the established 
1。00 parameter。 Also; the shares。did move briefly below the 40…week。moving average in August 2004; although not on a weekly closing basis。 Again; there would have been the potential for a shakeout; but nonetheless at a very hefty profit level。 
Immeasurable* 
The put/call open interest ratio (SOIR) is。one of a number of ways。of slicing and dicing the information a trader can glean from the ebb and flow of option activity。 A put/call open interest ratio that's。a consistent outlier may indicate tradable extremes。in sentiment on a particular equity; but there are limitations。to the scope of what the ratio can measure。 
The SOIR is。calculated using a ratio of put to call open interest for the three front expiration months。 A stock。may exhibit a very。high SOIR; but if the level of option activity on that stock。is。modest—relative to average trading volume or to share float—the significance of a high ratio of put to call open interest is。radically diminished and may in many cases。be of zero consequence。 This。option activity would be described as。being of 〃low intensity。〃 
Option pricing would be yet another measure of the intensity of option activity。 Options are priced based on a probabilistic。model whose major inputs。include the share price; the strike price of the option; the time remaining until option expiration; and the assumed future volatility of the underlying stock。 Within a group of on…the…money options。(options for which the stock。price equals。the strike price) on various nondividend…paying stocks。with a mon expiration date; the differences。in option pricing levels。can be explained almost entirely by。the differing assumptions。for future volatility。 
Although the assumed volatility (known as。implied volatility。among options traders) does。not coincide precisely with the recent volatility of each stock; it is。usually close enough so that the following example of how option prices。can vary more than suffices。 Hansen Natural (HANS) is。an energy drink。manufacturer whose stock。has。alternated between very。hot and very cold。 The wild gyrations。in the share price translate at this。stage into an annual volatility of about 70 percent。 
Cisco Systems。(CSCO); on the other hand; has。bee a steadily growing blue…chip pany in the technology。space with a market capitalization in excess。of 150 billion。 It is widely covered on Wall Street and widely held by institutional investors。 So it should be no surprise that the annual volatility of Cisco shares is。modest and in the neighborhood of 25 percent。 
How do these varying volatilities。translate into the pricing of Hansen and Cisco options? A three…month; on…the…money call option on Hansen would trade at approximately。14 percent of the share price; a similar option on Cisco would trade at approximately 5 percent of the share price。 In other words; the options。are priced in direct proportion to the assumed volatility of the underlying stock。 
The Fear Factor 
But volatility。assumptions。are constantly changing for even optionable stock。 Sometimes。this。is。simply the result of a change in the recent volatility of the stock。 Sometimes。it's。in anticipation of an uping event—such as。an earnings。report—that is expected to result in increased share volatility。 And sometimes。it's。the result of intense option buying prompted by greed or; more often; fear。 Fear is。a potentially strong directional clue for the trader。 At Schaeffer’s。Investment Research; an 〃equity VIX〃 is。calculated for every optionable stock。in order to sharpen the focus。on such situations。 
Most traders。are probably familiar with the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX); calculated by the Chicago Board Options。Exchange to measure the implied volatility。of the options。on the S&P 500 Index (SPX)。 The VIX is。often referred to as。a “fear gauge” because a rising VIX is almost always associated with increased demand for index put options。due to increased investor fear of a market decline。 In fact; major spikes。in the VIX have been associated with major market bottoms; as。extremes。in fear invariably indicate massive investor capitulation and liquidation; which denotes。that the selling pressure has。lifted。 Of course; the difficulty。lies。in determining when the fear level has。reached a true extreme; because taking a bullish position before the fear has。truly peaked is。extremely risky and potentially disastrous。 
The equity VIX calculated at Schaeffer's。is designed to focus。attention on stocks experiencing unusual swings。in the implied volatility of their options; and; just as。with the CBOE VIX; spikes。in volatility are of particular interest as。a directional indicator for stocks。 No stock。in recent years。has。provided traders。with more in the way。of volatility spikes。than General Motors。(GM)。 


The next major spike in GM option volatility occurred in the second quarter of 2005; as seriousncerns。about the pany's。financial viability。began to reverberate through Wall Street。 Huge positions。in long…term GM puts were being accumulated; some as。outright bets on the pany's。demise and some as part of hedged positions。with GM debt。 Acpanying this。volatility spike was。a pullback。in GM shares to the 25 area; a level not seen since the major bottom in the second half of 1992 (see Figure 7。6)。 The stock。lifted off these long…standing support levels; and by July 2005; it had rallied by about 50 percent to just shy of 38。 
Thisbination of a pullback。to a well…defined support level and an extreme in investor fear as。evidenced by a major volatility spike created a good buying opportunity for nimble contrarian traders。 
In terms。of the bigger picture; the GM story illustrates。the pitfall of trading oil sentiment extremes—that is; taking a bullish position before the true peak in fear。 Figure 7。6 shows that GM's。share price proceeded to get cut in half during the six months。following July 2005; to a low of 18。33 by year…end 2005; while a spike in the VIX for GM fortably exceeded the second…quarter 2005 spike (sec。Figure 7。5)。 By the start of 2006; the chances。of a GM bankruptcy had reached coin flip levels; according to many analysts。 
By February 2006; a mind…boggling three million put contracts。had been accumulated on GM; equal to 300 million shares; or more than half the pany's。outstanding shares。 Of course; most of these options。were out of the money so thisparison is。somewhat misleading。 Still; the sentiment on GM in the options。market was。extremely bearish; whether measured by put/call ratios; the intensity of put open interest; or by option volatility levels。 
The Contrarians Weigh。In 
But sometimes。the strongest confirming evidence that the bottom is。truly in place es。from outside the quantitative world。 From a contrarian perspective; this。evidence arrived in the form of a cover story on GM in Fortune magazine by Carol Loomis in the issue dated February 20; 2006。 Below is。an excerpt from my mentary of February 13; 2006; on SchaeffersResearch regarding thisver story: 
It is。the instinctive wish of most American businesspeople; even those unlikely to be directly。affected; that General Motors。not go bankrupt。 True; some people will say; 〃They had it ing to them;〃 But the majority will be more practical; telling themselves。that the pany is。so central to the economy; so sprawling in itsmercial reach; that bankruptcy—〃going into chapter〃 as。restructuring folks say—is。ominous。almost beyond contemplation。 And yet the evidence points; with increasing certitude; to bankruptcy。 Rick。Wagoner; GM's。53…year…old chairman and CEO; may say; as。he did in a January interview with Fortune in his。aerie of an office high above the Detroit Rivet; 〃I know that things。will turn around;〃 But he cannot know that。 He may not; deep down; even believe it himself; 
— (“The Tragedy of General Motors;” Fortune; February 20; 2000) 
Schaeffer's。addendum (February 13; 2006): The words quoted above were emblazoned on the cover of one of Americas。most popular business publications。 It is。the second major negative piece on General Motors。from Fortune in less。than a month (〃Detroit's。Endless Winter;” January 30; 2006)。 
I point this。pattern out not to proclaim that GM does。not have the problems。that have been well documented in the

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