e8东的信 _作者: 美 沃伦·巴菲特-第97章
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If my universe of business possibilities was limited； say； to private panies in Omaha； I would； first； try to assess the long…term economic characteristics of each business； second； assess the quality of the people in charge of running it； and； third； try to buy into a few of the best operations at a sensible price。 I certainly would not wish to own an equal part of every business in town。 Why； then； should Berkshire take a different tack when dealing with the larger universe of public panies？ And since finding great businesses and outstanding managers is so difficult； why should we discard proven products？ （I was tempted to say 〃the real thing。〃） Our motto is： 〃If at first you do succeed； quit trying。〃
今天假设我的投资天地仅限于比如说奥玛哈地区的私人企业，那么首先我们仔细地评估每家企业长期的竞争力，第二我会再评估经营者的特质，之后再以合理的价格买进一小部份的股权，既然我不可能雨露均沾地去买镇上所有公司的股权，那么为什么Berkshire在面对全美一大堆上市大公司时，就要采取不同的态度，也因为要找到好的事业并加上好的经理人是如此的困难，那么为什么我们要拋弃那些已经被证明过的投资对象呢？ （通常我喜欢把它们称做是狠角色），我们的座右铭是如果你第一次就成功了，那就不要费力再去试别的了。
John Maynard Keynes； whose brilliance as a practicing investor matched his brilliance in thought； wrote a letter to a business associate； F。 C。 Scott； on August 15； 1934 that says it all： 〃As time goes on； I get more and more convinced that the right method in investment is to put fairly large sums into enterprises which one thinks one knows something about and in the management of which one thoroughly believes。 It is a mistake to think that one limits one's risk by spreading too much between enterprises about which one knows little and has no reason for special confidence。 。 。 。 One's knowledge and experience are definitely limited and there are seldom more than two or three enterprises at any given time in which I personally feel myself entitled to put full confidence。〃
著名经济学家凯恩斯，他的投资绩效跟他的理论思想一样杰出，在1934年8月15日他曾经写了一封信给生意伙伴Scott上面写到，随着时光的流逝，我越来越相信正确的投资方式是将大部分的资金投入在自己认为了解且相信的事业之上，而不是将资金分散到自己不懂且没有特别信心的一大堆公司，每个人的知识与经验一定有其限度，就我本身而言，我很难同时有两三家以上的公司可以让我感到完全的放心。
Mistake Du Jour实时供应的错误
In the 1989 annual report I wrote about 〃Mistakes of the First 25 Years〃 and promised you an update in 2015。 My experiences in the first few years of this second 〃semester〃 indicate that my backlog of matters to be discussed will bee unmanageable if I stick to my original plan。 Therefore； I will occasionally unburden myself in these pages in the hope that public confession may deter further bumblings。 （Post…mortems prove useful for hospitals and football teams； why not for businesses and investors？）
在1989年的年报中，我曾经写过Berkshire头25所犯的错误，而且承诺在2015年还会再有更新的报告，但是第二阶段的头几年让我觉得若是坚持原来的计画的话，可能让这些记录多到难以管理，因此我决定每隔一段时间会在这里丢出一点东西，所谓自首无罪，抓到双倍，希望我公开的忏悔能够免于大家继续对我的轰炸（不管是医院的死后验尸或是足球队常常用到的事后检讨，我想应该也能够适用在企业与投资人之上）。
Typically； our most egregious mistakes fall in the omission； rather than the mission； category。 That may spare Charlie and me some embarrassment； since you don't see these errors； but their invisibility does not reduce their cost。 In this mea culpa； I am not talking about missing out on some pany that depends upon an esoteric invention （such as Xerox）； high…technology （Apple）； or even brilliant merchandising （Wal…Mart）。 We will never develop the petence to spot such businesses early。 Instead I refer to business situations that Charlie and I can understand and that seem clearly attractive … but in which we nevertheless end up sucking our thumbs rather than buying。
通常我们很多重大的错误不是发生在我们已经做的部份，而是在于我们没有去做的那部份，虽然因为各位看不到这些失误，所以查理跟我可以少一点难堪，但看不到不代表我们就不必付出代价，而这些我公开承认的错误，并不是指我错过了某些革命性的新发明（就像是全录像印技术）、高科技（像是苹果计算机）或是更优秀的通路零售商（像是威名百货），我们永远不可能拥有在早期发掘这些优秀公司的能力，反而我指的是那些查理跟我可以很容易就了解且很明显对我们有吸引力的公司，无奈在当时我们只是不断地咬着指甲犹豫不决，就是不能下定决心把他们买下来。
Every writer knows it helps to use striking examples； but I wish the one I now present wasn't quite so dramatic： In early 1988； we decided to buy 30 million shares （adjusted for a subsequent split） of Federal National Mortgage Association （Fannie Mae）； which would have been a 350…400 million investment。 We had owned the stock some years earlier and understood the pany's business。 Furthermore； it was clear to us that David Maxwell； Fannie Mae's CEO； had dealt superbly with some problems that he had inherited and had established the pany as a financial powerhouse … with the best yet to e。 I visited David in Washington and confirmed that he would not be unfortable if we were to take a large position。
每位作者都知道，要让读者了解其意思最好的方式就是举个例子，不过希望我现在举的例子不会过于极端，回顾1988年当时我们决定以3。5亿到4亿美元之间，买进3；000万股（经过事后的分割调整）的联邦国家贷款协会，简称Fannie Mae，我们之前曾经拥有过这家公司的股份，也对其所处的产业相当了解，另外很显然的，也很清楚David Maxwell也就是Fannie Mae的总裁，有能力处理他所接下的一堆问题，同时进一步将公司建立成为一个金融巨擘，一切可说是前景看好，为此我还特地到华盛顿拜访David，确认他对于我们持有该公司一大部分的股权不会感到任何的不愉快。
After we bought about 7 million shares； the price began to climb。 In frustration； I stopped buying （a mistake that； thankfully； I did not repeat when Coca…Cola stock rose similarly during our purchase program）。 In an even sillier move； I surrendered to my distaste for holding small positions and sold the 7 million shares we owned。
只不过当我们开始买进不到700万股时，该公司股价就开始上涨，失望之余，我立刻停止买进（事后回想还好我没有在买进可口可乐时犯下相同的错误），更有甚者，我觉得区区700万股对我们来说实在是没有太大的意义，所以之后又把持有的700万股全部卖掉。
I wish I could give you a halfway rational explanation for my amateurish behavior vis…a…vis Fannie Mae。 But there isn't one。 What I can give you is an estimate as of yearend 1991 of the approximate gain that Berkshire didn't make because of your Chairman's mistake： about 1。4 billion。
我期盼对于我这样不具职业水准的投资行为可以给各位一个稍微合理一点的解释，不过我实在是编不出来，不过我倒是可以跟各位报告因为本人的这项错误，大概使得Berkshire在1991年少赚了14亿美元。
Fixed…Ine Securities固定收益证券
We made several significant changes in our fixed…ine portfolio during 1991。 As I noted earlier； our Gillette preferred was called for redemption； which forced us to convert to mon stock； we eliminated our holdings of an RJR Nabisco issue that was subject to an exchange offer and subsequent call； and we purchased fixed…ine securities of American Express and First Empire State Corp。； a Buffalo…based bank holding pany。 We also added to a small position in ACF Industries that we had established in late 1990。 Our largest holdings at yearend were：
1991年我们在固定收益证券这方面的投资有很大的变动，如同先前曾提到的我们的吉列可转换特别股被强制赎回，使得我们必须将之转换为普通股，另外我们也出清了RJR Nabisco的债券，因为它在被转换后赎回，在另一方面我们也买进美国运通与第一帝国…一家水牛城的银行控股公司的固定收益证券，此外还在1990年底买进了一些ACF工业的债券，以下是截至年底我们持有的主要部位：
（000s omitted） Cost of Preferreds andIssuer Amortized Value of Bonds Market
ACF Industries American Express Champion International First Empire State RJR Nabisco Salomon USAir Washington Public Power Systems
93；918（2） 300；000 300；000（2） 40；000 222；148（2） 700；000（2） 358；000（2） 158；553（2）
118；683 263；265（1）（2） 300；000（1） 50；000（1）（2） 285；683 714；000（1） 232；700（1） 203；071
（1）Fair value as determined by Charlie and me （1）公平价值�
