philosophy of right-第13章
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§ 6。
＇b＇ The I is also the transition from blank indefiniteness to the distinct and
definite establishment of a definite content and object； whether this content be
given by nature or produced out of the conception of spirit。 Through this
establishment of itself as a definite thing the I becomes a reality。 This is the
absolute element of the finitude or specialisation of the I。
Remark： This second element in the characterisation of the I is just as negative as the first； since
it annuls and replaces the first abstract negativity。 As the particular is contained in the universal； so
this second phase is contained already in the first； and is only an establishing of what the first is
implicitly。 The first phase； if taken independents； is not the true infinitude； i。e。； the concrete
universal； or the conception； but limited and one…sided。 In that it is the abstraction from all definite
character； it has a definite character。 Its abstract and one…sided nature constitutes its definite
character； its defect and finitude。
The distinct characterisation of these two phases of the I is found in the philosophy of Fichte as
also in that of Kant。 Only； in the exposition of Fichte the I； when taken as unlimited； as it is in the
first proposition of his Wissenschaftslehre； is merely positive。 It is the universality and identity
made by the understanding。 Hence this abstract I is in its independence to be taken as the truth； to
which by way of mere addition comes in the second proposition； the limitation； or the negative in
general； whether it be in the form of a given external limit or of an activity of the I。 To apprehend
the negative as immanent in the universal or self…identical； and also as in the I； was the next step；
which speculative philosophy had to make。 Of this want they have no presentiment； who like
Fichte never apprehend that the infinite and finite are； if separated； abstract； and must be seen as
immanent one in the other。
Addition。 This second element makes its appearance as the opposite of the first ； it is to be
understood in its general form： it belongs to freedom but does not constitute the whole of it。 Here
the I passes over from blank indeterminateness to the distinct establishment of a specific character
as a content or object。 I do not will merely； but I will something。 Such a will； as is analysed in the
preceding paragraph； wills only the abstract universal； and therefore wills nothing。 Hence it is not a
will。 The particular thing； which the will wills is a limitation； since the will； in order to be a will； must
in general limit itself。 Limit or negation consists in the will willing something Particularising is thus as
a rule named finitude。 Ordinary reflection holds the first element； that of the indefinite； for the
absolute and higher。 and the limited for a mere negation of this indefiniteness。 But this indefiniteness
is itself only a negation； in contrast with the definite and finite。 The I is solitude and absolute
negation。 The indefinite will is thus quite as much one…sided as the will； which continues merely in
the definite。
§ 7。
＇c＇ The will is the unity of these two elements。 It is particularity turned back
within itself and thus led back to universality； it is individuality； it is the
self…direction of the I。 Thus at one and the same time it establishes itself as its
own negation； that is to say； as definite and limited； and it also abides by itself； in
its self…identity and universality； and in this position remains purely self…enclosed。
The I determines itself in so far as it is the reference of negativity to itself ； and
yet in this self…reference it is indifferent to its own definite character。 This it
knows as its own； that is； as an ideal or a mere possibility； by which it is not
bound； but rather exists in it merely because it establishes itself there。 This is the
freedom of the will； constituting its conception or substantive reality。 It is its
gravity； as it were； just as gravity is the substantive reality of a body。
Remark： Every self…consciousness knows itself as at once universal； or the possibility of
abstracting itself from everything definite； and as particular； with a fixed object； content or aim。
These two elements； however； are only abstractions。 The concrete and true； and all that is true is
concrete； is the universality； to which the particular is at first opposed； but； when it has been turned
back into itself； is in the end made equal。 This unity is individuality； but it is not a simple unit as is
the individuality of imaginative thought； but a unit in terms of the conception （Encyclopaedia of
the Philosophical Sciences； §§ 112…114）。 In other words； this individuality is properly nothing
else than the conception。 The first two elements of the will； that it can abstract itself from
everything； and that it is definite through either its own activity or something else； are easily
admitted and comprehended； because in their separation they are untrue； and characteristic of the
mere understanding。 But into the third； the true and speculative … and all truth； as far as it is
conceived； must be thought speculatively … the understanding declines to venture； always calling
the conception the inconceivable。 The proof and more detailed explanation of this inmost reserve
of speculation； of infinitude as the negativity which refers itself to itself； and of this ultimate source
of all activity； life and consciousness； belong to logic； as the purely speculative philosophy。 Here it
can be noticed only in passing that； in the sentences； 〃The will is universal。 。。。 The will directs
itself；〃 the will is already regarded as presupposed subject or substratum； but it is not something
finished and universal before it determines itself； nor yet before this determination is superseded
and idealised。 It is will only when its activity is self…occasioned； and it has returned into itself。
Addition。 What we properly call will contains the two above…mentioned elements。 The I is； first
of all； as such； pure activity； the universal which is by itself。 Next this universal determines itself；
and so far is no longer by itself； but establishes itself as another； and ceases to be the universal。
The third step is that the will； while in this limitation； i。e。； in this other； is by itself。 While it limits
itself； it yet remains with itself； and does not lose its hold of the universal。 This is； then； the concrete
conception of freedom； while the other two elements have been thoroughly abstract and
one…sided。 But this concrete freedom we already have in the form of perception； as in friendship
and love； Here a man is not one…sided； but limits himself willingly in reference to another； and yet
in this limitation knows himself as himself。 In this determination he does not feel himself determined；
but in the contemplation of the other as another has the feeling of himself。 Freedom also lies neither
in indeterminateness nor in determinateness； but in both。 。 The wilful man has a will which limits
itself wholly to a particular object； and if he has not this will； be supposes himself not to be free。
But the will is not bound to a particular object； but must go further； for the nature of the will is not
to be one…sided and confined。 Free will consists in willing a definite object； but in so doing to be
by itself and to return again into the universal。
§ 8。
If we define this particularising （＇b＇ § 6） further； we reach a distinction in the
forms of the will。 （a） In so far as the definite character of the will consists in the
formal opposition of the subjective to the objective or external direct existence；
we have the formal will as a self consciousness which finds an outer world before
it。 The process by which individuality turns back in its definiteness into itself； is
the translation of the subjective end； through the intervention of an activity and a
means； into objectivity。 In the absolute spirit； in which all definite character is
thoroughly its own and true （Encyclopaedia。 § 363）； consciousness is only one
side； na
