philosophy of right-第15章
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character never reaches a volition。 The reason for hesitation may lie in a sensitiveness； which is
aware that in determining itself it is engaged with what is finite； is assigning itself a limit； and
abandoning its infinity ； it may thus hold to its decision not to renounce the totality which it intends。
Such a feeling is dead； even when it aims to be something beautiful。 〃Who will be great；〃 says
Goethe； 〃must be able to limit himself。〃 By volition alone man enters actuality； however distasteful
it may be to him； for indolence will not desert its own self…brooding； in which it clings to a universal
possibility。 But possibility is not yet actuality。 Hence the will； which is secure simply of itself； does
not as yet lose itself in any definite reality。
§ 14。
The finite will； which has merely from the standpoint of form doubled itself back
upon itself； and has become the infinite and self…secluded I （§ 5）； stands above
its content of different impulses and also above the several ways by which they
are realised and satisfied。 At the same time； as it is only formally infinite； it is
confined to this very content as the decisive feature of its nature and external
actuality； although it is undetermined and not confined to one content rather than
another （§§ 6； 11）。 As to the return of the I into itself such a will is only a
possible will； which may or may not be mine； and the I is only the possibility of
deputing itself to this or that object。 Hence amongst these definite phases； which
in this light are for the I external； the will chooses。
§ 15。
Freedom of the will is； in this view of it； caprice； in which are contained both a
reflection； which is free and abstracted from everything and a dependence upon a
content or matter either internally or externally provided。 Since the content is in
itself or implicitly necessary as all end； and in opposition to this reflection is a
definite possibility； caprice； when it is will； is in its nature contingent。
Remark： The； usual idea of freedom is that of caprice。 It is a midway stage of reflection
between the will as merely natural impulse and the will as free absolutely。 When it is said that
freedom as a； general thing consists in doing what one likes； such an idea must be taken to imply
an utter lack of developed thought； containing as yet not even the suspicion of what is meant by
the absolutely free will； right； the ethical system； etc。 Reflection； being the formal universality and I
unity of self…consciousness； is the will's abstract certitude of its freedom； but it is not yet the truth
of it； because it has not as yet itself for content and end； the subjective side is still different from the
objective。 Thus the content in such a case remains purely and completely finite。 Caprice； instead of
being will in its truth； is rather will in its contradiction。
In the controversy carried on； especially at the time of the metaphysic of Wolf； as to whether the
will is really free or our consciousness of its freedom is a delusion； it was this caprice； which was in
the minds of both parties。 Against the certitude of abstract self…direction； determinism rightly
opposed a content； which was externally presented； and not being contained in this certitude came
from without。 It did not matter whether this 〃without〃 were impulse； imagination； or in general a
consciousness so filled that the content was not the peculiar possession of the self…activity as such。
Since only the formal element of free self…direction is immanent in caprice； while the other element
is something given to it from without； to take caprice as freedom may fairly be named a delusion。
Freedom in every philosophy of reflection； whether it be the Kantian or the Friesian； which is the
Kantian superficialised； is nothing more than this formal self…activity。
Addition。 Since I have the possibility of determining himself in this or that way； since I have the
power of choice； possess caprice； or what is commonly called freedom。 This choice is due to the
universality of the will； enabling me to make my own this thing or another。 This possession is a
particular content； which is therefore not adequate to me； but separated from me； and is mine only
in possibility； just as I am the possibility of bringing myself into coincidence with it。 Hence choice is
due to the indeterminateness of the I； and to the determinateness of a content。 But as to this
content the will is not free； although it has in itself formally the side of infinitude。 No such content
corresponds to will ； in no content can it truly find itself。 In caprice it is involved that the content is
not formed by the nature of my will； but by contingency。 I am dependent upon this content。 This is
the contradiction contained in caprice。 Ordinary man believes that he is free； when lie is allowed to
act capriciously； but precisely in caprice is it inherent that he is not free。 When I will the rational； I
do not act as a particular individual but according to the conception of ethical life in general。 In an
ethical act I establish not myself but the thing。 A man； who acts perversely； exhibits particularity。
The rational is the highway on which every one travels； and no one is specially marked。 When a
great artist finishes a work we say： 〃It must be so。〃 The particularity of the； artist has wholly
disappeared and the work shows no mannerism。 Phidias has no mannerism； the statue itself lives
and moves。 But the poorer is the artist； the more easily we discern himself； his particularity all
caprice。 If we adhere to the consideration that in caprice a man can will what he pleases； we have
certainly freedom of a kind； but again； if we hold to the view that the content is given； then man
must be determined by it； and in this light is no longer free。
§ 16。
What is resolved upon and chosen （§ 14） the will may again give up （§ 5）。 Yet；
even with the possibility of transcending any other content which it may
substitute； and of proceeding in this way ad infinitum； the will does not advance
beyond finitude； because every content in turn is different from the form and is
finite。 The opposite aspect； namely indeterminateness； irresolution or abstraction；
is also one…sided。
§ 17。
Since the contradiction involved in caprice （§ 15） is the dialectic of the impulses
and inclinations； it is manifested in their mutual antagonism。 The satisfaction of
one demands the subjection and sacrifice of the satisfaction of another。 Since an
impulse is merely the simple tendency of its own essential nature； and has no
measure in itself； to subject or sacrifice the satisfaction of any impulse is a
contingent decision of caprice。 In such a case caprice may act upon the
calculation as to which impulse will bring the greater satisfaction； or may have
some other similar purpose。
Addition。 Impulses and inclinations are in the first instance the content of will； and only
reflection transcends them。 But these impulses are self…directing； crowding upon and jostling one
another； and all seeking to be satisfied。 To set all but one in the background； and put myself into
this one； is to limit and distort myself； since I； in so doing； renounce my universality； which is a
system of the impulses。 Just as little help is found in a mere subordination of them； a course usually
followed by the understanding。 There is available no criterion by which to make such an
arrangement； and hence the demand for a subordination is usually sustained by tedious and
irrelevant allusions to general savings。
§ 18。
With regard to the moral estimate of impulses； dialectic appears in this form。 The
phases of the direct or natural will are immanent and positive； and thus good。
Hence man is by nature good。 But natural characteristics； since they are opposed
to freedom and the conception of the spirit； and are； hence； negative； must be
eradicated。 Thus man is by nature evil。 To decide for either view is a matter of
subjective caprice。
Addition。 The Christian doctrine th
