philosophy of right-第21章
按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
it will be shown that the substantial basis of family relationships is rather the sacrifice of
personality。） Now it must be obvious that it is perverse treat the right of a specific person in his
particular capacity before the universal right of personality as such。
Kant's jura personalia are the rights issuing from a contract whereby I undertake to give
something or to perform something — the jus ad rem conferred by an obligatio in Roman law。 To
be sure； it is only a person who is required to execute the covenants of a contract； just as it is also
only a person who acquires the right to their execution。 But a right of this sort cannot for this
reason be called a 'personal' right； rights of whatever sort belong to a person alone。 Objectively
considered； a right arising from a contract is never a right over a person； but only a right over
something external to a person or something which he can alienate； always a right over a thing。
A： Property … B： Contract … C： Wrong
Transition from Right to Morality
§ 104。
That is to say； crime； and justice in the form of revenge； display （i） the shape
which the will's development takes when it has passed over into the distinction
between the universal implicit will and the single will explicitly in opposition to the
universal； and （ii） the fact that the universal will； returning into itself through
superseding this opposition； has now itself become actual and explicit。 In this
way； the right； upheld in face of the explicitly independent single will； is and is
recognised as actual on the score of its necessity。 At the same time； however； this
external formation which the will has here is eo ipso a step forward in the inner
determination of the will by the concept。 The will's immanent actualisation in
accordance with its concept is the process whereby it supersedes its implicit state
and the form of immediacy in which it begins and which is the shape it assumes
in abstract right （see Remark to § 21）； this means that it first puts itself in the
opposition between the implicit universal will and the single explicitly independent
will； and then； through the supersession of this opposition （through the negation
of the negation）； it determines itself in its existence as a will； so that it is a free will
not only in itself but for itself also； i。e。 it determines itself as self…related
negativity。 Its personality — and in abstract right the will is personality and no
more — it now has for its object； the infinite subjectivity of freedom； a
subjectivity become explicit in this way； is the principle of the moral standpoint 。
Remark： Let us look back more closely over the moments through which the concept of
freedom develops itself from the will's determinate character as originally abstract to its character
as self…related； and so at this point to its self…determination as subjectivity。 In property this
determinate character is the abstract one； 'mine'； and is therefore found in an external thing。 In
contract； 'mine' is mediated by the wills of the parties and means only something common。 In
wrong the will of the sphere of right has its abstract character of implicit being or immediacy
posited as contingency through the act of a single will； itself a contingent will。 At the moral
standpoint； the abstract determinacy of the will in the sphere of right has been so far overcome that
this contingency itself is； as reflected in upon itself and self…identical； the inward infinite contingency
of the will； i。e。 its subjectivity。
Addition： Truth entails that the concept shall be； and that this existence shall correspond with
the concept。 In the sphere of right； the will is existent in something external； but the next
requirement is that the will should be existent in something inward； in itself。 It must in its own eyes
be subjectivity； and have itself as its own object。 This relation to itself is the moment of affirmation；
but it can attain it only by superseding its immediacy。 The immediacy superseded in crime leads；
then； through punishment； i。e。 through the nullity of this nullity； to affirmation； i。e。 to morality。
Second Part： Morality
§ 105。
The standpoint of morality is the standpoint of the will which is infinite not
merely in itself but for itself （see § 104）。 In contrast with the will's implicit being；
with its immediacy and the determinate characteristics developed within it at that
level； this reflection of the will into itself and its explicit awareness of its identity
makes the person into the subject。
§ 106。
It is as subjectivity that the concept has now been determined； and since
subjectivity is distinct from the concept as such； i。e。 from the implicit principle of
the will； and since furthermore it is at the same time the will of the subject as a
single individual aware of himself （i。e。 still has immediacy in him）； it constitutes
the determinate existence of the concept。 In this way a higher ground has been
assigned to freedom； the Idea's existential aspect； or its moment of reality； is now
the subjectivity of the will。 Only in the Will as subjective can freedom or the
implicit principle of the will be actual。
Remark： The second sphere； — Morality； therefore throughout portrays the real aspect of the
concept of freedom； and the movement of this sphere is as follows： the will； which at the start is
aware only of its independence and which before it is mediated is only implicitly identical with the
universal will or the principle of the will； is raised beyond its ＇explicit＇ difference from the universal
will； beyond this situation in which it sinks deeper and deeper into itself； and is established as
explicitly identical with the principle of the will。； — This process is accordingly the cultivation of the
ground in which freedom is now set； i。e。 subjectivity。 What happens is that subjectivity； which is
abstract at the start； i。e。 distinct from the concept； becomes likened to it； and thereby the Idea
acquires its genuine realisation； The result is that the subjective…will determines itself as objective
too and so as truly concrete。
Addition： So far as right in the strict sense was concerned； it was of no importance what my
intention or my principle was。 This question about the self…determination and motive of the will；
like the question about its purpose； now enters at this point in connection with morality。 Since man
wishes to be judged in accordance with his own self…determined choices； he is free in this relation
to himself whatever the external situation may impose upon him。 No one can break in upon this
inner conviction of mankind； no violence can be done to it； and the moral will； therefore； is
inaccessible。 Man's worth is estimated by reference to his inward action and hence the standpoint
of morality is that of freedom aware of itself。
§ 107。
The self…determination of the will is at the same time a moment in the concept of
the will； and subjectivity is not merely its existential aspect but its own
determinate character （see § 104）。 The will aware of its freedom and determined
as subjective is at the start concept alone； but itself has determinate existence in
order to exist as Idea。 The moral standpoint therefore takes shape as the right of
the subjective Will。 In accordance with this right； the will recognises something
and is something； only in so far as the thing is its own and as the will is present to
itself there as something subjective。
The same process through which the moral attitude develops （see the Remark to
the preceding Paragraph） has from this point of view the form of being the
development of the right of the subjective will； or of the mode of its existence。 In
this process the subjective will further determines what it recognises as its own in
its object （Gegenstand）； so that this object becomes the will's own true concept；
becomes objective （objektiv） as the expression of the will's own universality。
Addition： This entire category of the subjectivity
