philosophy of right-第22章
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Addition： This entire category of the subjectivity of the will is once again a whole which； as
subjectivity； must also have objectivity。 It is in a subject that freedom can first be realised； since
the subjective is the true material for this realisation。 But this embodiment of the will which we have
called subjectivity is different from the will which has developed all its potentialities to actuality。
That is to say； the will must free itself from this second one…sidedness of pure subjectivity in order
to become the fully actualised will。 In morality； it is man's private interest that comes into question；
and the high worth of this interest consists precisely in the fact that man knows himself as absolute
and is self…determined。 The uneducated man allows himself to be constrained in everything by
brute force and natural factors； children have no moral will but leave their parents to decide things
for them。 The educated man； however； develops an inner life and wills that he himself shall be in
everything he does。
§ 108。
The subjective will； directly aware of itself； and distinguished from the principle
of the will （see Remark to § 106）； is therefore abstract； restricted； and formal。
But not merely is subjectivity itself formal； in addition； as the infinite
self…determination of the will； it constitutes the form of all willing。 In this； its first
appearance in the single will； this form has not yet been established as identical
with the concept of the will； and therefore the moral point of view is that of
relation； of ought…to…be； or demand。 And since the self…difference of subjectivity
involves at the same time the character of being opposed to objectivity as external
fact； it follows that the point of view of consciousness comes on the scene here
too （see § 8）。 The general point of view here is that of the will's self…difference；
finitude； and appearance。
Remark： The moral is not characterised primarily by its having already been opposed to the
immoral； nor is right directly characterised by its opposition to wrong。 The point is rather that the
general characteristics of morality and immorality alike rest on the subjectivity of the will。
Addition： In morality； self…determination is to be thought of as the pure restlessness and activity
which can never arrive at anything that is。 It is in the sphere of ethical life that the will is for the first
time identical with the concept of the will and has this concept alone as its content。 In the moral
sphere the will still relates itself to its implicit principle and consequently its position is that of
difference。 The process through which this position develops is that whereby the subjective will
becomes identified with its concept。 Therefore the 'ought…to…be' which is never absent from the
moral sphere becomes an 'is' only in ethical life。 Further； this 'other' in relation to which the
subjective will stands is two…sided： first； it is what is substantive； the concept； secondly； it is
external fact。 Even if the good were posited in the subjective will； that still would not give it
complete realisation。
§ 109。
This form of all willing primarily involves in accordance with its general character
（a） the opposition of subjectivity and objectivity； and （b） the activity （see § 8）
related to this opposition。 Now existence and specific determinacy are identical in
the concept of the will （see § 104）； and the will as subjective is itself this concept
。 Hence the moments of this activity consist more precisely in （a） distinguishing
between objectivity and subjectivity and even ascribing independence to。 them
both； and （b） establishing them as identical。 In the will which is self…determining；
＇a＇ its specific determinacy is in the first place established in the will itself by
itself as its inner particularisation； as a content which it gives to itself。 This is
the first negation； and the formal limitation （Grenze） of this negation is that
of being only something posited； something subjective。
＇b＇ As infinitely reflected into itself； this limitation exists for the will； and the
will is the struggle to transcend this barrier （Schranke）； i。e。 it is the activity
of translating this content in some way or other from subjectivity into
objectivity； into an immediate existence。
＇c＇ The simple identity of the will with itself in this opposition is the content
which remains self…identical in both these opposites and indifferent to this
formal distinction of opposition。 In short； it is my aim ＇the purpose willed＇。
§ 110。
But； at the standpoint of morality； where the will is aware of its freedom； of this
identity of the will with itself （see § 105）； this identity of content acquires the
more particularised character appropriate to itself。
（a） The content as 'mine' has for me this character： by virtue of its identity in
subject and object it enshrines for me my subjectivity； not merely as my inner
purpose； but also inasmuch as it has acquired outward existence。
Addition： The content of the subjective or moral will has a specific character of its own； i。e。
even if it has acquired the form of objectivity； it must still continue to enshrine my subjectivity； and
my act is to count as mine only if on its inward side it has been determined by me； if it was my
purpose； my intention。 Beyond what lay in my subjective will I recognise nothing in its expression
as mine。 What I wish to see in my deed is my subjective consciousness over again。
§ 111。
（b） Though the content does have in it something particular； whencesoever it may
be derived； still it is the content of the will reflected into itself in its determinacy
and thus of the self…identical and universal will； and therefore：
＇a＇ the content is inwardly characterised as adequate to the principle of the
will or as possessing the objectivity of the concept；
＇b＇ since the subjective will； as aware of itself； is at the same time still
formal （see § 108）； the content's adequacy to the concept is still only
something demanded； and hence this entails the possibility that the content
may not be adequate to the concept。
§ 112。
（c） Since in carrying out my aims I retain my subjectivity （see § 110）； during this
process of objectifying them I simultaneously supersede the immediacy of this
subjectivity as well as its character as this my individual subjectivity。 But the
external subjectivity which is thus identical with me is the will of others （see §
73）。 The will's ground of existence is now subjectivity （see § 106） and the will of
others is that existence which I give to my aim and which is at the same time to
me an other。 The achievement of my aim； therefore； implies this identity of my
will with the will of others； it has a positive bearing on the will of others。
Remark： The objectivity of the aim achieved thus involves three meanings； or rather it has three
moments present within it at once； it is：
＇a＇ something existing externally and immediately （see § 106）；
＇b＇ adequate to the concept （see § 111）；
＇c＇ universal subjectivity。
The subjectivity which maintains itself in this objectivity consists：
＇a＇ in the fact that the objective aim is mine； so that in it I maintain myself as this individual
（see § 110）；
＇b＇ and ＇c＇； in moments which coincide with the moments ＇b＇ and ＇c＇ above。
At the standpoint of morality； subjectivity and objectivity are distinct from one another； or united
only by their mutual contradiction； it is this fact more particularly which constitutes the finitude of
this sphere or its character as mere appearance （see § 108）； and the development of this
standpoint is the development of these contradictions and their resolutions； resolutions； however；
which within this field can be no more than relative。
Addition： In dealing with formal right； I said ＇see § 38＇ that it contained prohibitions only； th
