philosophy of right-第24章
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volition and my will is therefore finite； or rather； since my will is finite； it has a presupposition of this
kind。 As soon as my thinking and willing is rational； I am no longer at this level of finitude； since the
object on which I act is no longer an 'other' to me。 Finitude； however； implies fixed limits and
restrictions。 I have confronting me an 'other' which is only contingent； something necessary in a
purely external way； its path and mine may meet or diverge。 Nevertheless； I am nothing except in
relation to my freedom； and my will is responsible for the deed only in so far as I know what I am
doing。 Oedipus； who killed his father without knowing it； cannot be accused of parricide。 The
ancient penal codes； however； attached less weight to the subjective side of action； to imputability；
than we do nowadays。 That is why sanctuaries were instituted in ancient times for harbouring and
protecting the fugitive from vengeance。
§ 118。
Further； action is translated into external fact； and external fact has connections in
the field of external necessity through which it develops itself in all directions。
Hence action has a multitude of consequences。 These consequences are the
outward form whose inner soul is the aim of the action； and thus they are the
consequences of the action； they belong to the action。 At the same time；
however； the action； as the aim posited in the external world； has become the
prey of external forces which attach to it something totally different from what it
is explicitly and drive it on into alien and distant consequences。 Thus the will has
the right to repudiate the imputation of all consequences except the first； since it
alone was purposed。
Remark： To determine which results are accidental and which necessary is impossible； because
the necessity implicit in the finite comes into determinate existence as an external necessity； as a
relation of single things to one another； things which as self…subsistent are conjoined in indifference
to one another and externally。 The maxim： 'Ignore the consequences of actions' and the other：
'Judge actions by their consequences and make these the criterion of right and good' are both alike
maxims of the abstract Understanding。 The consequences； as the shape proper to the action and
immanent within it； exhibit nothing but its nature and are simply the action itself； therefore the action
can neither disavow nor ignore them。 On the other hand； however； among the consequences there
is also comprised something interposed from without and introduced by chance； and this is quite
unrelated to the nature of the action itself。
The development in the external world of the contradiction involved in the necessity of the finite is
just the conversion of necessity into contingency and vice versa。 From this point of view； therefore；
acting means surrendering oneself to this law。 It is because of this that it is to the advantage of the
criminal if his action has comparatively few bad consequences （while a good action must be
content to have had no consequences or very few）； and that the full developed consequences of a
crime are counted as part of the crime。
The self…consciousness of heroes （like that of Oedipus and others in Greek tragedy） had not
advanced out of its primitive simplicity either to reflection on the distinction between act and
action； between the external event and the purpose and knowledge of the circumstances； or to the
subdivision of consequences。 On the contrary； they accepted responsibility for the whole compass
of the deed。
Addition： The transition to intention depends on the fact that I accept responsibility only for
what my idea of the situation was。 That is to say； there can be imputed to me only what I knew of
the circumstances。 On the other hand； there are inevitable consequences linked with every action；
even if I am only bringing about some single； immediate； state of affairs。 The consequences in such
a case represent the universal implicit within that state of affairs。 Of course I cannot foresee the
consequences … they might be preventable … but I must be aware of the universal character of any
isolated act。 The important point here is not the isolated thing but the whole； and that depends not
on the differentia of the particular action； but on its universal nature。 Now the transition from
purpose to intention lies in the fact that I ought to be aware not simply of my single action but also
of the universal which is conjoined with it。 The universal which comes on the scene here in this way
is what I have willed； my intention。
ii Intention & Welfare
§ 119。
An action as an external event。 is a complex of connected parts which may be
regarded as divided into units ad infinitum； and the action may be treated as
having touched in the first instance only one of these units。 The truth of the
single； however； is the universal； and what explicitly gives action its specific
character is not an isolated content limited to an external unit； but a universal
content； comprising in itself the complex of connected parts。 Purpose； as issuing
from a thinker； comprises more than the mere unit； essentially it comprises that
universal side of the action； i。e。 the intention。
Remark： Etymologically； Absicht （intention） implies abstraction； either the form of universality
or the extraction of a particular aspect of the concrete thing。 The endeavour to justify an action by
the intention behind it involves the isolation of one or other of its single aspects which is alleged to
be the essence of the action on its subjective side。
To judge an action as an external deed without yet determining its rightness or wrongness is simply
to bestow on it a universal predicate； i。e。 to describe it as burning； killing； &c。
The discrete character of the external world shows what the nature of that world is； namely a chain
of external relations。 Actuality is touched in the first instance only at a single point （arson； for
instance； directly concerns only a tiny section of the firewood； i。e。 is describable in a proposition；
not a judgment）； but the universal nature of this point entails its expansion。 In a living thing； the
single part is there in its immediacy not as a mere part； but as an organ in which the universal is
really present as the universal； hence in murder； it is not a piece of flesh； as something isolated；
which is injured； but life itself which is injured in that piece of flesh。 It is subjective reflection；
ignorant of the logical nature of the single and the universal； which indulges ad libitum in the
subdivision of single parts and consequences； and yet it is the nature of the finite deed itself to
contain such separable contingencies。 The device of dolus indirectus has its basis in these
considerations。
Addition： It happens of course that circumstances may make an action miscarry to a greater or
lesser degree。 In a case of arson； for instance； the fire may not catch or alternatively it may take
hold further than the incendiary intended。 In spite of this； however； we must not make this a
distinction between good and bad luck； since in acting a man must lay his account with externality。
The old Proverb is correct： 'A flung stone is the devil's。' To act is to expose oneself to bad luck。
Thus bad luck has a right over me and is an embodiment of my own willing。
§ 120。
The right of intention is that the universal quality of the action shall not merely be
implicit but shall be known by the agent； and so shall have lain from the start in
his subjective will。 Vice versa； what may be called the right of the objectivity of
action is the right of the action to evince itself as known and willed by the subject
as a thinker。
Remark： This right to insight of this kind entails the complete； or almost complete；
irresponsibility of children； imbeciles； lunatics； &c。； for their actions。 But just as actions on their
external side as events include accidental consequences； so there is involved in the subjective
agent an indeterminacy whose degree depends on th
