philosophy of right-第27章
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thus integrated and attaining their truth； their identity； though in the first instance
still remaining relative to one another； are （a） the good （as the concrete；
absolutely determinate； universal）； and （b） conscience （as infinite subjectivity
inwardly conscious and inwardly determining its content）。
iii Good & Conscience
§ 129。
The good is the Idea as the unity of the concept of the will with the particular
will。 In this unity； abstract right； welfare； the subjectivity of knowing and the
contingency of external fact； have their independent self…subsistence superseded；
though at the same time they are still contained and retained within it in their
essence。 The good is thus freedom realised； the absolute end and aim of the
world。
Addition： Every stage is really the Idea； but the earlier stages contain it only in rather an
abstract form。 Thus for example； even the ego； as personality； is already the Idea； though in its
most abstract shape。 The good； therefore； is the Idea further determined； the unity of the concept
of the will with the particular will。 It is not something abstractly right； but something concrete
whose contents are made up of both right and welfare alike。
§ 130。
In this Idea； welfare has no independent validity as the embodiment of a single
particular will but only as universal welfare and essentially as universal in
principle； i。e。 as according with freedom。 Welfare without right is not a good。
Similarly； right without welfare is not the good； fiat justitia should not be
followed by pereat mundus。 Consequently； since the good must of necessity be
actualised through the particular will and is at the same time its substance； it has
absolute right in contrast with the abstract right of property and the particular
aims of welfare。 If either of these moments becomes distinguished from the good；
it has validity only in so far as it accords with the good and is subordinated to it。
§ 131。
For the subjective will； the good and the good alone is the essential； and the
subjective will has value and dignity only in so far as its insight and intention
accord with the good。 Inasmuch as the good is at this point still only this abstract
Idea of good； the subjective will has not yet been caught up into it and established
as according with it。 Consequently； it stands in a relation to the good； and the
relation is that the good ought to be substantive for it； i。e。 it ought to make the
good its aim and realise it completely； while the good on its side has in the
subjective will its only means of stepping into actuality。
Addition： The good is the truth of the particular will； but the will is only that into which it puts
itself； it is not good by nature but can become what it is only by its own labour。 On the other hand；
the good itself； apart from the subjective will； is only an abstraction without that real existence
which it is to acquire for the first time through the efforts of that will。 Accordingly； the development
of the good has three stages： （i） The good should present itself to my volition as a particular will
and I should know it。 （ii） I should myself say what is good and should develop its particular
specifications。 （iii） Finally； the specification of the good on its own account； the particularisation of
the good as infinite subjectivity aware of itself。 This inward specifying of what good is； is
conscience。
§ 132。
The right of the subjective will is that whatever it is to recognise as valid shall be
seen by it as good； and that an action； as its aim entering upon external
objectivity； shall be imputed to it as right or wrong； good or evil； legal or illegal； in
accordance with its knowledge of the worth which the action has in this
objectivity。
Remark： The good is in principle the essence of the will in its substantiality and universality； i。e。
of the will in its truth； and therefore it exists simply and solely in thinking and by means of thinking。
Hence assertions such as 'man cannot know the truth but has to do only with phenomena'； or
'thinking injures the good will' are dogmas depriving mind not only of intellectual but also of all
ethical worth and dignity。
The right of giving recognition only to what my insight sees as rational is the highest right of the
subject； although owing to its subjective character it remains a formal right； against it the right
which reason qua the objective possesses over the subject remains firmly established。
On account of its formal character； insight is capable equally of being true and of being mere
opinion and error。 The individual's acquisition of this right of insight is； on the principles of the
sphere which is still moral only； part and parcel of his particular subjective education。 I may
demand from myself； and regard it as one of my subjective rights； that my insight into an obligation
shall be based on good reasons； that I shall be convinced of the obligation and even that I shall
apprehend it from its concept and fundamental nature。 But whatever I may claim for the
satisfaction of my conviction about the character of an action as good； permitted； or forbidden；
and so about its imputability in respect of this character； this in no way detracts from the right of
objectivity。
This right of insight into the good is distinct from the right of insight in respect of action as such （see
§ 117） ； the form of the right of objectivity which corresponds to the latter is this； that since action
is an alteration which is to take place in an actual world and so will have recognition in it； it must in
general accord with what has validity there。 Whoever wills to act in this world of actuality has eo
ipso submitted himself to its laws and recognised the right of objectivity。
Similarly； in the state as the objectivity of the concept of reason； legal responsibility cannot be tied
down to what an individual may hold to be or not to be in accordance with his reason； or to his
subjective insight into what is right or wrong； good or evil； or to the demands which he makes for
the satisfaction of his conviction。 In this objective field； the right of insight is valid as insight into the
legal or illegal； qua into what is recognised as right； and it is restricted to its elementary meaning；
i。e。 to knowledge in the sense of acquaintance with what is legal and to that extent obligatory。 By
means of the publicity of the laws and the universality of manners； the state removes from the right
of insight its formal aspect and the contingency which it still retains for the subject at the level of
morality。 The subject's right to know action in its specific character as good or evil； legal or illegal；
has the result of diminishing or cancelling in this respect too the responsibility of children； imbeciles；
and lunatics； although it is impossible to delimit precisely either childhood； imbecility； &c。； or their
degree of irresponsibility。 But to turn momentary blindness； the goad of passion； intoxication； or； in
a word； what is called the strength of sensual impulse （excluding impulses which are the basis of
the right of distress … see § 127） into reasons when the imputation； specific character； and
culpability of a crime are in question； and to look 。 upon such circumstances as if they took away
the criminal's guilt； again means （compare § 100 and the Remark to § 120） failing to treat the
criminal。 in accordance with the right and honour due to him as a man； for the nature of man
consists precisely in the fact that he is essentially something universal； not a being whose
knowledge is an abstractly momentary and piecemeal affair。
Just as what the incendiary really sets on fire is not the isolated square inch of wooden surface to
which he applies his torch； but the universal in that square inch； e。g。 the house as a whole； so； as
subject； he is neither the single existent of this moment of time nor this isolated hot feeling of
revenge。 If he were； he would be an animal which would have to be knocked on the head as
dangerous and u
