philosophy of right-第30章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


of　freedom）；　the　mystery　whereby　freedom　of　necessity　arises　out　of　the　natural　level　of　the　will
and　is　something　inward　in　comparison　with　that　level。　It　is　this　natural　level　of　the　will　which
comes　into　existence　as　a　self…contradiction；　as　incompatible　with　itself　in　this　opposition；　and　so　it
is　just　this　particularity　of　the　will　which　later　makes　itself　evil。　That　is　to　say；　particularity　is　always
duality；　here　it　is　the　opposition　of　the　natural　level　and　the　inwardness　of　the　will。　In　this
opposition；　the　latter　is　only　a　relative　and　abstract　subjectivity　which　can　draw　its　content　only
from　the　determinate　content　of　the　natural　will；　from　desire；　impulse；　inclination；　&c。　Now　it　is
said　of　these　desires；　impulses；　&c。；　that　they　may　be　either　good　or　evil。　But　since　the　will　here
makes　into　a　determinant　of　its　content　both　these　impulses　in　this　contingent　character　which　they
possess　as　natural；　and　also；　therefore；　the　form　which　it　has　at　this　point；　the　form　of　particularity
itself；　it　follows　that　it　is　set　in　opposition　to　the　universal　as　inner　objectivity；　to　the　good；　which
comes　on　the　scene　as　the　opposite　extreme　to　immediate　objectivity；　the　natural　pure　and　simple；
as　soon　as　the　will　is　reflected　into　itself　and　consciousness　is　a　knowing　consciousness。　It　is　in　this
opposition　that　this　inwardness　of　the　will　is　evil。　Man　is　therefore　evil　by　a　conjunction　between
his　natural　or　undeveloped　character　and　his　reflection　into　himself；　and　therefore　evil　belongs
neither　to　nature　as　such　by　itself　…　unless　nature　were　supposed　to　be　the　natural　character　of　the
will　which　rests　in　its　particular　content　…　nor　to　introverted　reflection　by　itself；　i。e。　cognition　in
general；　unless　this　were　to　maintain　itself　in　that　opposition　to　the　universal。　

With　this　facet　of　evil；　its　necessity；　there　is　inevitably　combined　the　fact　that　this　same　evil　is
condemned　to　be　that　which　of　necessity　ought　not　to　be；　i。e。　the　fact　that　evil　ought　to　be
annulled。　It　is　not　that　there　ought　never　to　be　a　diremption　of　any　sort　in　the　will　…　on　the　contrary；
it　is　just　this　level　of　diremption　which　distinguishes　man　from　the　unreasoning　animal；　the　point　is
that　the　will　should　not　rest　at　that　level　and　cling　to　the　particular　as　if　that　and　not　the　universal
were　the　essential　thing；　it　should　overcome　the　diremption　as　a　nullity。　Further；　as　to　this　necessity
of　evil；　it　is　subjectivity；　as　infinite　self…reflection；　which　is　present　in　and　confronted　by　this
opposition　of　universal　and　particular；　if　it　rests　in　this　opposition；　i。e。　if　it　is　evil；　then　it　is　eo　ipso
independent；　regarding　itself　as　isolated；　and　is　itself　this　Self…Will。　Therefore　if　the　individual
subject　as　such　does　evil；　the　evil　is　purely　and　simply　his　own　responsibility。　

Addition：　The　abstract　self…certainty　which　knows　itself　as　the　basis　of　everything　has　in　it　the
potentiality　either　of　willing　the　universality　of　the　concept　or　alternatively　of　taking　a　particular
content　as　a　principle　and　realising　that。　The　second　alternative　is　evil；　which　therefore　always
includes　the　abstraction　of　self…certainty。　It　is　only　man　who　is　good；　and　he　is　good　only　because
he　can　also　be　evil。　Good　and　evil　are　inseparable；　and　their　inseparability　is　rooted　in　the　fact　that
the　concept　becomes　an　object　to　itself；　and　as　object　it　eo　ipso　acquires　the　character　of
difference。　The　evil　will　wills　something　opposed　to　the　universality　of　the　will；　while　the　good　will
acts　in　accordance　with　its　true　concept。　

The　difficulty　of　the　question　as　to　how　the　will　can　be　evil　as　well　as　good　usually　arises　because
we　think　of　the　will　as　related　to　itself　purely　positively　and　because　we　represent　its　volition　as
something　determinate　confronting　it；　as　the　good。　But　the　problem　of　the　origin　of　evil　may　be
more　precisely　put　in　the　form：　'How　does　the　negative　come　into　the　positive？'　If　we　begin　by
presupposing　that　in　the　creation　of　the　world　God　is　the　absolutely　positive；　then；　turn　where　we
will；　we　shall　never　discover　the　negative　within　that　positive；　since　to　talk　of　God's　'Permitting'　evil
is　to　ascribe　to　him　a　passive　relation　to　evil　which　is　unsatisfactory　and　meaningless。　In　the
representative　thinking　of　religious　mythology　there　is　no　comprehension　of　the　origin　of　evil；　i。e。
the　positive　and　the　negative　are　not　discovered　in　one　another；　there　is　only　a　representation　of
their　succession　and　juxtaposition；　so　that　it　is　from　outside　that　the　negative　comes　to　the　positive。
But　this　cannot　satisfy　thought；　which　demands　a　reason　and　a　necessity　and　insists　on
apprehending　the　negative　as　itself　rooted　in　the　positive。　Now　the　solution　of　the　problem；　the
way　the　concept　treats　the　matter；　is　already　contained　in　the　concept；　since　the　concept；　or　to
speak　more　concretely；　the　Idea；　has　it　in　its　essence　to　differentiate　itself　and　to　posit　itself
negatively。　If　we　adhere　to　the　purely　positive；　i。e。　if　we　rest　in　the　unmixed　good　which　is
supposed　to　be　good　at　its　source；　then　we　are　accepting　an　empty　category　of　the　Understanding
which　clings　to　abstractions　and　one…sided　categories　of　this　kind　and　by　the　very　asking　of　this
question　makes　it　a　difficult　one。　If　we　begin　with　the　standpoint　of　the　concept；　however；　we
apprehend　the　positive　as　activity　and　as　self…distinction。　Evil　and　good　alike　have　their　origin　in　the
will　and　the　will　in　its　concept　is　both　good　and　evil。　

The　natural　will　is　implicitly　the　contradiction　of　self…distinction；　of　being　both　inwardness　and　also
self…awareness。　To　maintain　then　that　evil　implies　the　further　point　that　man　is　evil　in　so　far　as　his
will　is　natural　would　be　to　contradict　the　usual　idea　that　it　is　just　the　natural　will　which　is　guiltless
and　good。　But　the　natural　will　stands　in　opposition　to　the　content　of　freedom；　and　the　child　and　the
uneducated　man；　whose　wills　are　only　natural；　are　for　that　very　reason　liable　to　be　called　to
account　for　their　actions　only　in　a　less　degree。　Now　when　we　speak　of　man；　we　mean　not　the　child
but　the　self…conscious　adult；　and　when　we　speak　of　good；　we　mean　the　knowledge　of　it。　It　is
doubtless　true　that　the　natural　is　inherently　innocent；　neither　good　nor　bad；　but　when　it　is　drawn
into　the　orbit　of　the　will　which　is　free　and　knows　that　it　is　free；　it　acquires　the　character　of　not　being
free　and　is　therefore　evil。　When　man　wills　the　natural；　it　is　no　longer　merely　natural；　but　the
negative　opposed　to　the　good；　i。e。　to　the　concept　of　the　will。　

On　the　other　hand；　if　it　is　now　objected　that　since　evil　is　rooted　in　the　concept　and　inevitable；　man
would　be　guiltless　if　he　committed　it；　our　reply　must　be　that　a　man's　decision　is　his　own　act；　and　his
own　act　is　freely　chosen　and　his　own　responsibility。　In　the　religious　legend　it　is　said　that　man　is　as
God　when　he　knows　good　and　evil；　and　it　is　true　that　this　likeness　to　God　is　present　in　such
knowledge　in　that　the　inevitability　here　is　no　natural　inevitability　since　on　the　contrary　the　decision
is　really　the　transcendence　of　this　duality　of　good　and　evil。　When　both　good　and　evil　are　placed
before　me；　I　have　a　choice　between　the　two；　I　can　decide　between　them　and　endow　my
subjective　character　with　either。　Thus　the　nature　of　evil　is　that　man　may　will　it　but　need　not。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　140。　

In　every　end　of　a　self…conscious　subject；　there　is　a　positive　aspect　（see　§　135）
necessarily　present　because　the　end　is　what　is　purposed　in　an　actual　concrete
action。　This　aspect　he　knows　how　to　elicit　and　emphasise；　and　he　may　then
proceed　to　regard　it　as　a　duty　or　a　fine　intention。　By　so　interpreting　it；　he　is
enabled　to　pass　off　his　action　as　good　in　the　eyes　both　of　himself　and　others；
despite　the　fact　that；　owing　to　his　reflective　character　and　his　knowledge　of　the
universal　aspect　of　the　will；　he　is　aware　of　the　contrast　between　this　aspect　and
the　essentially　negative　content　of　his　action。　To　impose　in　this　way　on　others　is
hypocrisy；　while　to　impose　on　oneself　is　a　stage　beyond　hypocrisy；　a　stage　at
which　subjectivity　claims　to　be　absolute。　

Remark：　This　final；　most　abstruse；　form　of　evil；　whereby　evil　is　perv