philosophy of right-第32章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


however；　is　the　good　known　to　me　in　the　action；　i。e。　it　is　my　good　intention　（see　§　114）。　Thus
there　arises　a　contradiction　between　descriptions：　according　to　one　the　action　is　good；　according
to　the　other　it　is　criminal。　Hence　also　there　seems　to　arise；　in　connection　with　a　concrete　action；　the
question　whether　in　such　circumstances　the　intention　behind　it　is　actually　good。　It　may　generally　be
the　case　that　the　good　is　what　is　actually　intended；　but　this　in　fact　must　always　be　the　case　if　it　is
held　that　good　in　the　abstract　is　the　subject's　determining　motive。　Where　wrong　is　done　through　an
action　which　is　well　intentioned　but　in　other　respects　criminal　and　bad；　the　wrong　so　done　must；　of
course；　also　be　good；　and　the　important　question　would　seem　to　be：　which　of　these　sides　of　the
action　is　really　the　essential　one？　This　objective　question；　however；　is　here　out　of　place；　or　rather　it
is　the　subjective　consciousness　alone　whose　decision　constitutes　objectivity　at　this　point。　Besides；
'essential'　and　'good'　mean　the　same　thing；　one　is　just　as　much　an　abstraction　as　the　other。　Good　is
that　which　is　essential　in　respect　of　the　will；　and　the　essential　in　this　respect　should　be　precisely
this；　that　my　action　be　characterised　as　good　in　my　eyes。　But　the　subsumption　under　the　good　of
any　content　one　pleases　is　the　direct　and　explicit　result　of　the　fact　that　this　abstract　good　is　totally
devoid　of　content　and　so　is　simply　reduced　to　meaning　anything　positive；　i。e。　to　something　which　is
valid　from　some　single　point　of　view　and　which　in　its　immediate　character　may　even　be　valid　as　an
essential　end；　as　for　example　to　do　good　to　the　poor；　to　take　thought　for　myself；　my　life；　my
family；　and　so　forth。　Further；　just　as　the　good　is　the　abstract；　so　the　bad　too　must　be　without
content　and　derive　its　specification　from　my　subjectivity；　and　it　is　in　this　way　also　that　there　arises
the　moral　end　of　hating　and　uprooting　the　bad；　the　nature　of　the　bad　being　left　unspecified。　

Theft；　cowardice；　murder；　and　so　forth；　as　actions；　i。e。　as　achievements　of　a　subjective　will；　have
the　immediate　character　of　being　satisfactions　of　such　a　will　and　therefore　of　being　something
positive。　In　order　to　make　the　action　a　good　one；　it　is　only　a　question　of　recognising　this　positive
aspect　of　the　action　as　my　intention；　and　this　then　becomes　the　essential　aspect　in　virtue　of　which
the　action　is　made　good；　simply　because　I　recognise　it　as　the　good　in　my　intention。　Theft　in　order
to　do　good　to　the　poor；　theft　or　flight　from　battle　for　the　sake　of　fulfilling　one's　duty　to　care　for
one's　life　or　one's　family　（a　poor　family　perhaps　into　the　bargain）；　murder　out　of　hate　or　revenge
（i。e。　in　order　to　satisfy　one's　sense　of　one's　own　rights　or　of　right　in　general；　or　one's　sense　of
another's　wickedness；　of　wrong　done　by　him　to　oneself　or　to　others　or　to　the　world　or　the　nation
at　large；　by　extirpating　this　wicked　individual　who　is　wickedness　incarnate；　and　thereby
contributing　at　least　one's　quota　to　the　project　of　uprooting　the　bad）　…　all　these　actions　are　made
well　intentioned　and　therefore　good　by　this　method　of　taking　account　of　the　positive　aspect　of　their
content。　Only　the　bare　minimum　of　intelligence　is　required　to　discover　in　any　action；　as　those
learned　theologians　can；　a　positive　side　and　so　a　good　reason　for　it　and　a　good　intention　behind　it。
Hence　it　has　been　said　that　in　the　strict　sense　there　are　no　wicked　men；　since　no　one　wills　evil　for
the　sake　of　evil；　i。e。　no　one　wills　a　pure　negative　as　such。　On　the　contrary；　everyone　always　wills
something　positive；　and　therefore；　on　the　view　we　are　considering；　something　good。　In　this
abstract　good　the　distinction　between　good　and　evil　has　vanished　together　with　all　concrete　duties；
for　this　reason；　simply　to　will　the　good　and　to　have　a　good　intention　in　acting　is　more　like　evil　than
good；　because　the　good　willed　is　only　this　abstract　form　of　good　and　therefore　to　make　it　concrete
devolves　on　the　arbitrary　Will　of　the　subject。　

To　this　context　there　also　belongs　the　notorious　maxim：　'The　end　justifies　the　means。'　In　itself　and
prima　facie　this　expression　is　trivial　and　pointless。　Quite　so；　one　may　retort　in　terms　equally
general；　a　just　end　of　course　justifies　the　means；　while　an　unjust　end　does　not。　The　phrase：　so　'If
the　end　is　right；　so　is　the　means'　is　a　tautology；　since　the　means　is　precisely　that　which　is　nothing　in
itself　but　is　for　the　sake　of　something　else；　and　therein；　i。e。　in　the　end；　has　its　purpose　and　worth　…
provided　of　course　it　be　truly　a　means。　

But　when　someone　says　that　the　end　justifies　the　means；　his　purport　is　not　confined　to　this　bare
tautology；　he　understands　by　the　words　something　more　specific；　namely　that　to　use　as　means　to　a
good　end　something　which　in　itself　is　simply　not　a　means　at　all；　to　violate　something　in　itself
sacrosanct；　in　short　to　commit　a　crime　as　a　means　to　a　good　end；　is　permissible　and　even　one's
bounden　duty。　（i）　There　floats　before　the　minds　of　those　who　say　that　the　end　justifies　the　means　a
vague　consciousness　of　the　dialectic　of　the　aforesaid　'positive'　element　in　isolated　legal　or　ethical
principles；　or　of　such　equally　vague　general　maxims　as：　'Thou　shalt　not　kill'；　or　'Thou　shalt　take
thought　for　thy　welfare　and　the　welfare　of　thy　family'。　Executioners　and　soldiers　have　not　merely
the　right　but　the　duty　to　kill　men；　though　there　it　has　been　precisely　laid　down　what　kind　of　men
and　what　circumstances　make　the　killing　permissible　and　obligatory。　So　also　my　welfare　and　the
welfare　of　my　family　must　be　subordinated　to　higher　ends　and　so　reduced　to　means　to　their
attainment。　（ii）　And　yet　what　bears　the　mark　of　crime　is　not　a　general　maxim　of　that　kind；　left
vague　and　still　subject　to　a　dialectic；　on　the　contrary；　its　specific　character　is　already　objectively
fixed。　Now　what　is　set　up　against　such　a　determinate　crime；　what　is　supposed　to　have　deprived
the　crime　of　its　criminal　nature；　is　the　justifying　end；　and　this　is　simply　subjective　opinion　about
what　is　good　and　better。　What　happens　here　is　the　same　as　what　happens　when　the　will　stops　at
willing　good　in　the　abstract；　i。e。　the　absolute　and　valid　determinate　character　assigned　to　good　and
evil；　right　and　wrong；　is　entirely　swept　away　and　the　determination　of　them　is　ascribed　instead　to
the　individual's　feeling；　imagination；　and　caprice。　

（e）　Subjective　opinion　is　at　last　expressly　given　out　as　the　measuring…rod　of　right　and　duty　and　it　is
supposed　that　the　conviction　which　holds　something　to　be　right　is　to　decide　the　ethical　character　of
an　action。　Since　the　good　we　will　to　do　is　here　still　without　content；　the　principle　of　conviction　only
adds　the　information　that　the　subsumption　of　an　action　under　the　category　of　good　is　purely　a
personal　matter。　If　this　be　so；　the　very　pretence　of　an　ethical　objectivity　has　totally　disappeared。　A
doctrine　like　this　is　directly　connected　with　the　self…styled　philosophy；　often　mentioned　already；
which　denies　that　the　truth　is　knowable　…　and　the　truth　of　mind　qua　will；　the　rationality　of　mind　in　its
self…actualising　process；　is　the　laws　of　ethics。　Asserting；　as　such　philosophising　does；　that　the
knowledge　of　the　true　is　an　empty　vanity；　transcending　the　territory　of　science　（which　is　supposed
to　be　mere　appearance）；　it　must　in　the　matter　of　action　at　once　find　its　principle　also　in　the
apparent；　thereby　ethics　is　reduced　to　the　special　theory　of　life　held　by　the　individual　and　to　his
private　conviction：　The　degradation　into　which　philosophy　has　thus　sunk　appears　doubtless　at　a
first　glance　to　be　only　an　affair　of　supreme　indifference；　an　occurrence　confined　to　the　trivial　field
of　academic　futilities；　but　the　view　necessarily　makes　itself　a　home　in　ethics；　an　essential　part　of
philosophy；　and　it　is　then　that　the　true　meaning　of　these　theories　makes　its　first　appearance　in　and
is　apprehended　by　the　world　of　actuality。　

The　result　of　the　dissemination　of　the　view　that　subjective　conviction；　and　it　alone；　decides　the
ethical　character　of　an　action　is　that　the　charge　of　hypocrisy；　once　so　frequent；　is　now　rarely　heard；
you　can　only　qualify　wickedness　as　hypocrisy　on　the　assumption　that　certain　actions　a