philosophy of right-第36章
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is actual。 Right exists only as a branch of a whole or like the ivy which twines itself round a tree
firmly rooted on its own account。
Third Part： Ethical Life
§ 142。
Ethical life is the Idea of freedom in that on the one hand it is the good become
alive — the good endowed in self…consciousness with knowing and willing and
actualised by self…conscious action — while on the other hand self…consciousness
has in the ethical realm its absolute foundation and the end which actuates its
effort。 Thus ethical life is the concept of freedom developed into the existing
world and the nature of self…consciousness。
§ 143。
Since this unity of the concept of the will with its embodiment — i。e。 the particular
will — is knowing； consciousness of the distinction between these two moments
of the Idea is present； but present in such a way that now each of these moments
is in its own eyes the totality of the Idea and has that totality as its foundation and
content。
§ 144。
＇a＇ The objective ethical order； which comes on the scene in place of good in the
abstract； is substance made concrete by subjectivity as infinite form。 Hence it
posits within itself distinctions whose specific character is thereby determined by
the concept； and which endow the ethical order with a stable content
independently necessary and subsistent in exaltation above subjective opinion and
caprice。 These distinctions are absolutely valid laws and institutions。
Addition： Throughout ethical life the objective and subjective moments are alike present； but
both of them are only its forms。 Its substance is the good； i。e。 the objective is filled with
subjectivity。 If we consider ethical life from the objective standpoint； we may say that in it we are
ethical unselfconsciously。 In this sense； Antigone proclaims that 'no one knows whence the laws
come； they are everlasting'； i。e。 their determinate character is absolute and has its source in the
nature of the thing。 None the less； however； the substance of ethical life has a consciousness also；
though the status of this consciousness is never higher than that of being one moment。
§ 145。
It is the fact that the ethical order is the system of these specific determinations of
the Idea which constitutes its rationality。 Hence the ethical order is freedom or the
absolute will as what is objective； a circle of necessity whose moments are the
ethical powers which regulate the life of individuals。 To these powers individuals
are related as accidents to substance； and it is in individuals that these powers are
represented； have the shape of appearance； and become actualised。
Addition： Since the laws and institutions of the ethical order make up the concept of freedom；
they are the substance or universal essence of individuals； who are thus related to them as
accidents only。 Whether the individual exists or not is all one to the objective ethical order。 It alone
is permanent and is the power regulating the life of individuals。 Thus the ethical order has been
represented by mankind as eternal justice； as gods absolutely existent； in contrast with which the
empty business of individuals is only a game of see…saw。
§ 146。
＇b＇ The substantial order； in the self…consciousness which it has thus actually
attained in individuals； knows itself and so is an object of knowledge。 This ethical
substance and its laws and powers are on the one hand an object over against the
subject； and from his point of view they are — are in the highest sense of
self…subsistent being。 This is an absolute authority and power infinitely more
firmly established than the being of nature。
Remark： The sun； the moon； mountains； rivers； and the natural objects of all kinds by which we
are surrounded； are。 For consciousness they have the authority not only of mere being but also of
possessing a particular nature which it accepts and to which it adjusts itself in dealing with them；
using them； or in being otherwise concerned with them。 The authority of ethical laws is infinitely
higher； because natural objects conceal rationality under the cloak of contingency and exhibit it
only in their utterly external and disconnected way。
§ 147。
On the other hand； they are not something alien to the subject。 On the contrary；
his spirit bears witness to them as to its own essence； the essence in which he has
a feeling of his selfhood； and in which he lives as in his own element which is not
distinguished from himself。 The subject is thus directly linked to the ethical order
by a relation which is more like an identity than even the relation of faith or trust。
Remark： Faith and trust emerge along with reflection； they presuppose the power of forming
ideas and making distinctions。 For example； it is one thing to be a pagan； a different thing to
believe in a pagan religion。 This relation or rather this absence of relation； this identity in which the
ethical order is the actual living soul of self…consciousness； can no doubt pass over into a relation
of faith and conviction and into a relation produced by means of further reflection； i。e。 into an
insight due to reasoning starting perhaps from some particular purposes interests； and
considerations； from fear or hope； or from historical conditions。 But adequate knowledge of this
identity depends on thinking in terms of the concept。
§ 148。
As substantive in character； these laws and institutions are duties binding on the
will of the individual； because as subjective； as inherently undetermined； or
determined as particular； he distinguishes himself from them and hence stands
related to them as to the substance of his own being。
Remark： The 'doctrine of duties' in moral philosophy （I mean the objective doctrine； not that
which is supposed to be contained in the empty principle of moral subjectivity； because that
principle determines nothing — （see § 134） is therefore comprised in the systematic development
of the circle of ethical necessity which follows in this Third Part。 The difference between the
exposition in this book and the form of a 'doctrine of duties' lies solely in the fact that； in what
follows； the specific types of ethical life turn up as necessary relationships； there the exposition
ends； without being supplemented in each case by the addition that 'therefore men have a duty to
conform to this institution'。
A 'doctrine of duties' which is other than a philosophical science takes its material from existing
relationships and shows its connection with the moralist's personal notions or with principles and
thoughts； purposes； impulses； feelings； &c。； that are forthcoming everywhere； and as reasons for
accepting each duty in turn； it may tack on its further consequences in their bearing on the other
ethical relationships or on welfare and opinion。 But an immanent and logical 'doctrine of duties' can
be nothing except the serial exposition of the relationships which are necessitated by the Idea of
freedom and are therefore actual in their entirety； to within the state。
§ 149。
The bond of duty can appear as a restriction only on indeterminate subjectivity or
abstract freedom； and on the impulses either of the natural will or of the moral
will which determines its indeterminate good arbitrarily。 The truth is； however；
that in duty the individual finds his liberation； first； liberation from dependence on
mere natural impulse and from the depression which as a particular subject he
cannot escape in his moral reflections on what ought to be and what might be；
secondly； liberation from the indeterminate subjectivity which； never reaching
reality or the objective determinacy of action； remains self…enclosed and devoid of
actuality。 In duty the individual acquires his substantive freedom。
Addition： Duty is a restriction only on the self…will of subjectivity。 It stands in the way only of
that abstract good to which subjecti
