philosophy of right-第39章
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§ 160。
The family is completed in these three phases：
（a） Marriage； the form assumed by the concept of the family in its immediate
phase；
（b） Family Property and Capital （the external embodiment of the concept） and
attention to these；
（c） The Education of Children and the Dissolution of the Family。
A。 Marriage
§ 161。
Marriage； as the immediate type of ethical relationship； contains first； the moment
of physical life； and since marriage is a substantial tie； the life involved in it is life
in its totality； i。e。 as the actuality of the race and its life…process。 But； secondly； in
self…consciousness the natural sexual union…a union purely inward or implicit and
for that very reason existent as purely external …is changed into a union on the
level of mind； into self…conscious love。
Addition： Marriage is in essence an ethical tie。 Formerly； especially in most systems of natural
law； attention was paid only to the physical side of marriage or to its natural character。
Consequently； it was treated only as a sex relationship； and this completely barred the way to its
other characteristics。 This is crude enough； but it is no less so to think of it as only a civil contract；
and even Kant does this。 On this view； the parties are bound by a contract of mutual caprice； and
marriage is thus degraded to the level of a contract for reciprocal use。 A third view of marriage is
that which bases it on love alone； but this must be rejected like the other two； since love is only a
feeling and so is exposed in every respect to contingency； a guise which ethical life may not
assume。 Marriage； therefore； is to be more precisely characterised as ethico…legal （rechtlich
sittliche） love； and this eliminates from marriage the transient； fickle； and purely subjective aspects
of love。
§ 162。
On the subjective side； marriage may have a more obvious source in the
particular inclination of the two persons who are entering upon the marriage tie；
or in the foresight and contrivance of the parents； and so forth。 But its objective
source lies in the free consent of the persons； especially in their consent to make
themselves one person； to renounce their natural and individual personality to this
unity of one with the other。 From this point of view； their union is a
self…restriction； but in fact it is their liberation； because in it they attain their
substantive self…consciousness。
Remark： Our objectively appointed end and so our ethical duty is to enter the married state。
The external origin of any particular marriage is in the lure of the case contingent； and it depends
principally on the extent which reflective thought has been developed。 At one extreme； the step is
that the marriage is arranged by the contrivance of benevolent parents； the appointed end of the
parties is a union of mutual love； their inclination to marry arises from the fact that each grows
acquainted with the other from the first as a destined partner。 At the other extreme； it is the
inclination of the parties which comes first； appearing in them as these two infinitely particularised
individuals。 The more ethical way to matrimony may be taken to be the former extreme or any
way at all whereby the decision to marry comes first and the inclination to do so follows； so that in
the actual wedding both decision and inclination coalesce。 In the latter extreme； it is the uniqueness
of the infinitely particularised which makes good its claims in accordance with the subjective
principle of the modern world （see Remark to § 124）。
But those works of modern art； dramatic and other； in which the love of the sexes is the main
interest； are pervaded by a chill despite the heat of passion they portray； for they associate the
passion with accident throughout and represent the entire dramatic interest as if it rested solely on
the characters as these individuals； what rests on them may indeed be of infinite importance to
them； but is of none whatever in itself。
Addition： Amongst peoples who hold the female sex in scant respect； marriages are arranged
by the parents at will without consulting the young people。 The latter raise no objection； since at
that level of culture the particularity of feeling makes no claims for itself。 For the woman it is only a
matter of getting a husband； for the man； of getting a wife。 In other social conditions；
considerations of wealth； connections； political ends； may be the determining factor。 In such
circumstances； great hardships may arise through making marriage a means to other ends。
Nowadays； however； the subjective origin of marriage； the state of being in love； is regarded as
the only important originating factor。 Here the position is represented to be that a man must wait
until his hour has struck and that he can bestow his love only on one specific individual。
§ 163。
The ethical aspect of marriage consists in the parties' consciousness of this unity
as their substantive aim； and so in their love； trust； and common sharing of their
entire existence as individuals。 When the parties are in this frame of mind and
their union is actual； their physical passion sinks to the level of a physical
moment； destined to vanish in its very satisfaction。 On the other hand； the
spiritual bond of union secures its rights as the substance of marriage and thus
rises； inherently indissoluble； to a plane above the contingency of passion and the
transience of particular caprice。
Remark： It was noted above （in § 75） that marriage； so far as its essential basis is concerned； is
not a contractual relation。 On the contrary； though marriage begins in contract； it is precisely a
contract to transcend the standpoint of contract； the standpoint from which persons are regarded
in their individuality as self…subsistent units。 The identification of personalities； whereby the family
becomes one person and its members become its accidents （though substance is in essence the
relation of accidents to itself）； is the ethical mind。 Taken by itself and stripped of the manifold
externals of which it is possessed owing to its embodiment in these individuals and the interests of
the phenomenal realm； interests limited in time and numerous other ways； this mind emerges in a
shape for representative thinking and has been revered as Penates； &c。； and in general it is in this
mind that the religious character of marriage and the family； or pietas； is grounded。 It is a further
abstraction still to separate the divine； or the substantive； from its body； and then to stamp it；
together with the feeling and consciousness of mental unity； as what is falsely called 'Platonic' love。
This separation is in keeping with the monastic doctrine which characterises the moment of
physical life as purely negative and which； precisely by thus separating the physical from the
mental； endows the former by itself with infinite importance。
Addition： The distinction between marriage and concubinage is that the latter is chiefly a matter
of satisfying natural desire； while this satisfaction is made secondary in the former。 It is for this
reason that physical experiences may be mentioned in married life without a blush； although
outside the marriage tie their mention would produce a sense of shame。 But it is on this account；
too； that marriage must be regarded as in principle indissoluble； for the end of marriage is the
ethical end； an end so lofty that everything else is manifestly powerless against it and made subject
to it。 Marriage is not to be dissolved because of passion； since passion is subordinate to it。 But it is
not indissoluble except in principle； since as Christ says； only 'for the hardness of your heart' is
divorce established。 Since marriage has feeling for one of its moments； it is not absolute but weak
and potentially dissoluble。 Legislators； however； must make its dissolution as difficult as possible
and uphold the right of the ethical order against caprice。
§ 164。
Mere agreement to the stip
