philosophy of right-第45章
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strength of the particulars in the way described； for instance； in Plato’s Republic。 But this； too； is
only an illusion； since both universal and particular turn into one another and exist only for and by
means of one another。 If I further my ends； I further the ends of the universal； and this in turn
furthers my end。
§ 185。
Particularity by itself； given free rein in every direction to satisfy its needs；
accidental caprices； and subjective desires； destroys itself and its substantive
concept in this process of gratification。 At the same time； the satisfaction of need；
necessary and accidental alike； is accidental because it breeds new desires without
end； is in thoroughgoing dependence on caprice and external accident； and is held
in check by the power of universality。 In these contrasts and their complexity；
civil society affords a spectacle of extravagance and want as well as of the
physical and ethical degeneration common to them both。
Remark： The development of particularity to self…subsistence （compare Remark to § 124） is
the moment which appeared in the ancient world as an invasion of ethical corruption and as the
ultimate cause of that world’s downfall。 Some of these ancient states were built on the patriarchal
and religious principle； others on the principle of an ethical order which was more explicitly
intellectual； though still comparatively simple； in either case they rested on primitive unsophisticated
intuition。 Hence they could not withstand the disruption of this state of mind when
self…consciousness was infinitely reflected into itself； when this reflection began to emerge； they
succumbed to it； first in spirit and then in substance； because the simple principle underlying them
lacked the truly infinite power to be found only in that unity which allows both sides of the
antithesis of reason to develop themselves separately in all their strength and which has so
overcome the antithesis that it maintains itself in it and integrates it in itself。
In his Republic； Plato displays the substance of ethical life in its ideal beauty and truth； but he
could only cope with the principle of self…subsistent particularity； which in his day had forced its
way into Greek ethical life； by setting up in opposition to it his purely substantial state。 He
absolutely excluded it from his state； even in its very beginnings in private property （see Remark to
§ 46） and the family； as well as in its more mature form as the subjective will； the choice of a
social position； and so forth。 ； It is this defect which is responsible both for the misunderstanding of
the deep and substantial truth of Plato’s state and also for the usual view of it as a dream of
abstract thinking； as what is often called a ‘mere ideal’。 The principle of the self…subsistent
inherently infinite personality of the individual； the principle of subjective freedom； is denied its right
in the purely substantial form which Plato gave to mind in its actuality。 This principle dawned in an
inward form in the Christian religion and in an external form （and therefore in one linked with
abstract universality） in the Roman world。 It is historically subsequent to the Greek world； and the
philosophic reflection which descends to its depth is likewise subsequent to the substantial Idea of
Greek philosophy。
Addition： Particularity by itself is measureless excess； and the forms of this excess are
themselves measureless。 By means of his ideas and reflections man expands his desires； which are
not a closed circle like animal instinct； and carries them on to the false infinite。 At the other end of
the scale； however； want and destitution are measureless too； and the discord of this situation can
be brought into a harmony only by the state which has powers over it。 Plato wished to exclude
particularity from his state； but this is no help； since help on these lines would contravene the
infinite right of the Idea to allow freedom to the particular。
It was in the Christian religion in the first place that the right of subjectivity arose； together with the
infinity of self…awareness； and while granting this right； the whole order must at the same time retain
strength enough to put particularity in harmony with the unity of ethical life。
§ 186。
But in developing itself independently to totality； the principle of particularity
passes over into universality； and only there does it attain its truth and the right to
which its positive actuality is entitled。 This unity is not the identity which the
ethical order requires； because at this level； that of division （see § 184）； both
principles are self…subsistent。 It follows that this unity is present here not as
freedom but as necessity； since it is by compulsion that the particular rises to the
form of universality and seeks and gains its stability in that form。
§ 187。
Individuals in their capacity as burghers in this state are private persons whose
end is their own interest。 This end is mediated through the universal which thus
appears as a means to its realisation。 Consequently； individuals can attain their
ends only in so far as they themselves determine their knowing； willing； and
acting in a universal way and make themselves links in this chain of social
connections。 In these circumstances； the interest of the Idea — an interest of
which these members of civil society are as such unconscious — lies in the
process whereby their singularity and their natural condition are raised； as a result
of the necessities imposed by nature as well as of arbitrary needs； to formal
freedom and formal universality of knowing and willing — the process whereby
their particularity is educated up to subjectivity。
Remark： The idea that the state of nature is one of innocence and that there is a simplicity of
manners in uncivilised （ungebildeter） peoples； implies treating education （Bildung） as something
purely external； the ally of corruption。 Similarly； the feeling that needs； their satisfaction； the
pleasures and comforts of private life； and so forth； are absolute ends； implies treating education as
a mere means to these ends。 Both these views display lack of acquaintance with the nature of mind
and the end of reason。 Mind attains its actuality only by creating a dualism within itself； by
submitting itself to physical needs and the chain of these external necessities； and so imposing on
itself this barrier and this finitude； and finally by maturing （bildet） itself inwardly even when under
this barrier until it overcomes it and attains its objective reality in the finite。 The end of reason；
therefore； is neither the manners of an unsophisticated state of nature； nor； as particularity
develops； the pleasure for pleasure’s sake which education procures。 On the contrary； its end is
to banish natural simplicity； whether the passivity which is the absence of the self； or the crude type
of knowing and willing； i。e。 immediacy and singularity； in which mind is absorbed。 It aims in the
first instance at securing for this； its external condition； the rationality of which it is capable； i。e。 the
form of universality or the Understanding （Verst？ndigkeit）。 By this means alone does mind
become at home with itself within this pure externality。 There； then； mind’s freedom is existent and
mind becomes objective to itself in this element which is implicitly inimical to mind’s appointed
end； freedom； it has to do there only with what it has itself produced and stamped with its seal。 It
is in this way then that the form of universality comes explicitly into existence in thought； and this
form is the only worthy element for the existence of the Idea。 The final purpose of education；
therefore； is liberation and the struggle for a higher liberation still； education is the absolute
transition from an ethical substantiality which is immediate and natural to the one which is
intellectual and so both infinitely subjective and lofty enough to have attained universality of form。
In the individual subject； this liberation is the hard struggle against pure subjectivity
