philosophy of right-第52章
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and just as little have we any need to be professionals to acquire knowledge of matters of
universal interest。 Law is concerned with freedom； the worthiest and holiest thing in man； the thing
man must know if it is to have obligatory force for him。
§ 216。
For a public legal code； simple general laws are required； and yet the nature of the
finite material to which law is applied leads to the further determining of general
laws ad infinitum。 On the one hand； the law ought to be a comprehensive whole；
closed and complete； and yet； on the other hand； the need for further
determinations is continual。 But since this antinomy arises only when universal
principles； which remain fixed and unchanged； are applied to particular types of
case； the right to a complete legal code remains unimpaired； like the right that
these simple general principles should be capable of being laid down and
understood apart and in distinction from their application to such particular types。
Remark： A fruitful source of complexity in legislation is the gradual intrusion of reason； of what
is inherently and actually right； into primitive institutions which have something wrong at their roots
and so are purely historical survivals。 This occurred in Roman law； as was remarked above （see
Remark to § 180）； in medieval feudal law； &c。 It is essential to notice； however； that the very
nature of the finite material to which law is applied necessarily entails an infinite progress in the
application to it of principles universal in themselves and inherently and actually rational。
It is misunderstanding which has given rise alike to the demand — a morbid craving of German
scholars chiefly — that a legal code should be something absolutely complete； incapable of any
fresh determination in detail； and also to the argument that because a code is incapable of such
completion； therefore we ought not to produce something ‘incomplete’； i。e。 we ought not to
produce a code at all。 The misunderstanding rests in both cases on a misconception of the nature
of a finite subject…matter like private law； whose so…called ‘completeness’ is a perennial
approximation to completeness； on a misconception of the differences between the universal of
reason and the universal of the Understanding； and also in the application of the latter to the
material of finitude and atomicity which goes on for ever。 — Le plus grand ennemi du Bien；
c’est le Meilleur is the utterance of true common sense against the common sense of idle
argumentation and abstract reflection。
Addition： Completeness means the exhaustive collection of every single thing； pertaining to a
given field； and no science or branch of knowledge can be complete in this sense。 Now 。 if we say
that philosophy or any one of the sciences is incomplete； we are not far from holding that we must
wait until the deficiency is made up； since the best part may still be wanting。 But take up this
attitude and advance is impossible； either in geometry； which seems to be a closed science
although new propositions do arise； or in philosophy； which is always capable of freshness in detail
even though its subject is the universal Idea。 In the past； the universal law always consisted of the
ten commandments； now we can see at once that not to lay down the law ‘Thou shalt not kill’；
on the ground that a legal code cannot be complete； is an obvious absurdity。 Any code could be
still better — no effort of reflection is required to justify this affirmation； we can think of the best；
finest； and noblest as still better； finer； and nobler。 But a big old tree puts forth more and more
branches without thereby becoming a new tree； though it would be silly to refuse to plant a tree at
all simply because it might produce new branches。
§ 217。
The principle of rightness passes over in civil society into law。 My individual
right； whose embodiment has hitherto been immediate and abstract； now similarly
becomes embodied in the existent will and knowledge of everyone； in the sense
that it becomes recognised。 Hence property acquisitions and transfers must now
be undertaken and concluded only in the form which that embodiment gives to
them。 In civil society； property rests on contract and on the formalities which
make ownership capable of proof and valid in law。
Remark： Original； i。e。 direct； titles and means of acquisition （see §§ 54 ff。） are simply discarded
in civil society and appear only as isolated accidents or as subordinated factors of property
transactions。 It is either feeling； refusing to move beyond the subjective； or reflection； clinging to its
abstract essences； which casts formalities aside； while the dry…as…dust Understanding may for its
part cling to formalities instead of the real thing and multiply them indefinitely。
Apart from this； however； the march of mental development is the long and hard struggle to free a
content from its sensuous and immediate form； endow it with its appropriate form of thought； and
thereby give it simple and adequate expression。 It is because this is the case that when the
development of law is just beginning； ceremonies and formalities are more circumstantial and count
rather as the thing itself than as its symbol。 Thus even in Roman law； a number of forms and
especially phrases were retained from old…fashioned ceremonial usages； instead of being replaced
by intelligible forms and phrases adequately expressing them。
Addition： Law and the right are identical in the sense that what is implicitly right is posited in the
law。 I possess something； own a property； which I occupied when it was ownerless。 This
possession must now further be recognised and posited as mine。 Hence in civil society formalities
arise in connection with property。 Boundary stones are erected as a symbol for others to
recognise。 Entries are made in mortgage and property registers。 Most property in civil society is
held on contract； and contractual forms are fixed and determinate。 Now we may have an antipathy
to formalities of this kind and we may suppose that they only exist to bring in money to the
authorities； we may even regard them as something offensive and a sign of mistrust because they
impair the validity of the saying： ‘A man is as good as his word。’ But the formality is essential
because what is inherently right must also be posited as right。 My will is a rational will； it has
validity； and its validity should be recognised by others。 At this point； then； my subjectivity and that
of others must be set aside and the will must achieve the security； stability； and objectivity which
can be attained only through such formalities。
§ 218。
Since property and personality have legal recognition and validity in civil society；
wrongdoing now becomes an infringement； not merely of what is subjectively
infinite； but of the universal thing which is existent with inherent stability and
strength。 Hence a new attitude arises： the action is seen as a danger to society and
thereby the magnitude of the wrongdoing is increased。 On the other hand；
however； the fact that society has become strong and sure of itself diminishes the
external importance of the injury and so leads to a mitigation of its punishment。
Remark： The fact that an injury to one member of society is an injury to all others does not alter
the conception of wrongdoing； but it does alter it in respect of its outward existence as an injury
done； an injury which now affects the mind and consciousness of civil society as a whole； not
merely the external embodiment of the person directly injured。 In heroic times； as we see in the
tragedy of the ancients； the citizens did not feel themselves injured by wrongs which members of
the royal houses did to one another。
Implicitly； crime is an infinite； injury； but as an existent fact it must be measured in quantity and
quality （see § 96）； and since its field of existence here has the essential character of affecting an
idea and consciousness of the validity of the laws； its danger to civil society is a determinant of the
magnitude o
