philosophy of right-第69章
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best means of effecting this is to give them philosophical insight into the essence of the state；
though； in default of that； a religious frame of mind may lead to the same result。 For this reason； the
state may have need of religion and faith。 But the state remains essentially distinct from religion；
since whatever it claims； it claims in the form of a legal duty； and it is a matter of indifference to it in
what spirit that duty is performed。 The field of religion； on the other hand； is the inner life； and just
as the state would jeopardise the right of that life if； like religion； it made claims on it； so also when
the church acts like a state and imposes penalties； it degenerates into a religion of tyranny。
A third difference which is connected with the foregoing is that the content of religion is and
remains veiled； and consequently religion's place is in the field of the heart； feeling； and
representative thinking。 In this field everything has the form of subjectivity。 The state； on the other
hand； actualises itself and gives its specific institutions a stable； objective； existence。 Now if
religious feeling wished to assert itself in the state in the same way as it is wont to do in its own
field； it would overturn the organisation of the state； because the different organs of the state have
latitude to pursue their several distinct paths； while in religion everything is always referred back to
the whole。 If this whole； then； wished to engulf all the concerns of the state； this would be
tantamount to fanaticism； the wish to have the whole in every particular could be fulfilled only by
the destruction of the particular； and fanaticism is just the refusal to give scope to particular
differences。 Hence to say： 'To the pious man no law is given' is nothing but an expression of this
same fanaticism。 Once piety usurps the place of the state； it cannot tolerate the determinate but
simply shatters it。 It is quite consistent with this if piety leaves decisions to conscience； to the inner
life； and is not governed by reasons。 This inner life does not develop into reasoned argument or
give an account of itself。 Hence if piety is to pass for the actuality of the state； all laws are cast to
the winds and subjective feeling is the legislator。 This feeling may be pure caprice； and whether it is
or not can only be learnt from its actions。 But by becoming actions and precepts； its actions
assume the guise of laws； and this is just the very opposite of the subjective feeling with which we
started。 This feeling has God for its object； and we might make him the determinant of everything。
But God is the universal Idea and this feeling can regard him only as the indeterminate； which is
too immature to determine what is existent in the state in a developed form。 It is precisely the fact
that everything in the state is fixed and secure which is the bulwark against caprice and dogmatic
opinion。 Religion as such； then； ought not to be the governor。
§ 271。
The constitution of the state is； in the first place； the organisation of the state and
the self…related process of its organic life； a process whereby it differentiates its
moments within itself and develops them to self…subsistence。 Secondly； the state
is an individual； unique and exclusive； and therefore related to others。 Thus it
turns its differentiating activity outward and accordingly establishes within itself
the ideality of its subsisting inward differentiations。
Addition： Just as irritability in the living organism is itself from one point of view something
inward； something pertaining to the organism as such； so here again the outward reference is an
inward tendency。 The inner side of the state as such is the civil power； while its outward tendency
is the military power； although this has a fixed place inside the state itself。 Now to have both these
powers in equilibrium constitutes an important factor in the spirit of the state。 Sometimes the civil
power is wholly effaced and rests entirely on the military power； as was the case； for instance； in
the time of the Roman Emperors and the Praetorians。 At other times； nowadays for example； the
military power is a mere by…product of the civil power once all the citizens are conscriptable。
1。 The Constitution （on its internal side only）
2。 Sovereignty vis…à…vis foreign States
B。 International Law
§ 330。
International law springs from the relations between autonomous states。 It is for
this reason that what is absolute in it retains the form of an ought…to…be； since its
actuality depends on different wills each of which is sovereign。
Addition： States are not private persons but completely autonomous totalities in themselves；
and so the relation between them differs from a moral relation and a relation involving private
rights。 Attempts have often been made to regard the state as a person with the rights of persons
and as a moral entity。 But the position with private persons is that they are under the jurisdiction of
a court which gives effect to what is right in principle。 Now a relation between states ought also to
be right in principle； but in mundane affairs a principle ought also to have power。 Now since there
is no power in existence which decides in face of the state what is right in principle and actualises
this decision； it follows that so far as international relations are concerned we can never get
beyond an 'ought'。 The relation between states is a relation between autonomous entities which
make mutual stipulations but which at the same time are superior to these stipulations。
§ 331。
The nation state is mind in its substantive rationality and immediate actuality and
is therefore the absolute power on earth。 It follows that every state is sovereign
and autonomous against its neighbours。 It is entitled in the first place and without
qualification to be sovereign from their point of view； i。e。 to be recognised by
them as sovereign。 At the same time； however； this title is purely formal； and the
demand for this recognition of the state； merely on the ground that it is a state； is
abstract。 Whether a state is in fact something absolute depends on its content； i。e。
on its constitution and general situation； and recognition； implying as it does an
identity of both form and content； is conditional on the neighbouring state's
judgement and will。
Remark： A state is as little an actual individual without relations to other states （see § 322） as
an individual is actually a person without rapport with other persons （see § 71 and elsewhere）。
The authority of a state and； more particularly； so far as its foreign relations are concerned； of its
monarch also； is partly a purely domestic matter （one state should not meddle with the domestic
affairs of another）。 On the other hand； however； it is no less essential that this authority should
receive its full and final legitimation through its recognition by other states； although this recognition
requires to be safeguarded by the proviso that where a state is to be recognised by others； it shall
likewise recognise them； i。e。 respect their autonomy； and so it comes about that they cannot be
indifferent to each other's domestic affairs。
The question arises how far a nomadic people； for instance； or any people on a low level of
civilisation； can be regarded as a state。 As once was the case with the Jews and the Mohammedan
peoples； religious views may entail an opposition at a higher level between one people and its
neighbours and so preclude the general identity which is requisite for recognition。
Addition： When Napoleon said before the Peace of Campoformio that 'the French Republic
needs recognition as little as the sun requires it'； what his words implied was simply the thing's
strength which carries with it； without any verbal expression； the guarantee of recognition。
§ 332。
The immediate actuality which any state possesses from the point of view of
other states is particularised into a multiplicity of relations which are determin
