philosophy of right-第9章
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applicable to the science of the state。 Reason cannot content itself with a mere
approximation； something which is neither cold not hot； and must be spewed out
of the mouth。 As little can it be contented with the cold scepticism that in this
world of time things go badly； or at best only moderately well； and that we must
keep the peace with reality； merely because there is nothing better to be had。
Knowledge creates a much more vital peace。
Only one word more concerning the desire to teach the world what it ought to be。
For such a purpose philosophy at least always comes too late。 Philosophy； as the
thought of the world； does not appear until reality has completed its formative
process； and made itself ready。 History thus corroborates the teaching of the
conception that only in the maturity of reality does the ideal appear as counterpart
to the real； apprehends the real world in its substance； and shapes it into an
intellectual kingdom。 When philosophy paints its grey in grey； one form of life has
become old； and by means of grey it cannot be rejuvenated； but only known。 The
owl of Minerva； takes its flight only when the shades of night are gathering。
But it is time to close this preface。 As a preface it is its place to speak only
externally and subjectively of the standpoint of the work which it introduces。 A
philosophical account of the essential content needs a scientific and objective
treatment。 So； too； criticisms； other than those which proceed from such a
treatment； must be viewed by the author as unreflective convictions。 Such
subjective criticisms must be for him a matter of indifference。
BERLIN； June 25th； 1820。
Translated by S W Dyde； 1896
Introduction
§ 1。
THE philosophic science of right has as its object the idea of right； i。e。； the
conception of right and the realisation of the conception。
Remark： Philosophy has to do with ideas or realised thoughts； and hence not with what we have
been accustomed to call mere conceptions。 It has indeed to exhibit the one…sidedness and untruth
of these mere conceptions； and to show that； while that which commonly bears the name
〃conception；〃 is only an abstract product of the understanding； the true conception alone has
reality and gives this reality to itself。 Everything； other than the reality which is established by the
conception； is transient surface existence； external attribute； opinion； appearance void of essence；
untruth； delusion； and so forth。 Through the actual shape； which it takes upon itself in actuality； is
the conception itself understood。 This shape is the other essential element of the idea； and is to be
distinguished from the form； which exists only as conception。
Addition。 The conception and its existence are two sides； distinct yet united； like soul and
body。 The body is the same life as the soul； and yet the two can be named independently。 A soul
without a body would not be a living thing； and vice versa。 Thus the visible existence of the
conception is its body； just as the body obeys the soul which produced it。 Seeds contain the tree
and its whole power； though they are not the tree itself ； the tree corresponds accurately to the
simple structure of the seed。 If the body does not correspond to the soul； it is defective。 The unity
of visible existence and conception； of body and soul； is the idea。 It is not a mere harmony of the
two； but their complete interpenetration。 There lives nothing； which is not in some way idea。 The
idea of right is freedom； which； if it is to be apprehended truly； must be known both in its
conception and in the embodiment of the conception。
§ 2。
The science of right is a part of philosophy。 Hence it must develop the idea；
which is the reason of an object； out of the conception。 It is the same thing to say
that it must regard the peculiar internal development of the thing itself。 Since it is
a part； it has a definite beginning； which is the result and truth of what goes
before； and this； that goes before； constitutes its so…called proof。 Hence the origin
of the conception of right falls outside of the science of right。 The deduction of
the conception is presupposed in this treatise； and is to be considered as already
given。
Addition。 Philosophy forms a circle。 It has； since it must somehow make a beginning； a primary；
directly given matter； which is not proved and is not a result。 But this starting…point is simply
relative； since； from another point of view it appears as a result。 Philosophy is a consequence；
which does not hang in the air or form a directly new beginning； but is self…enclosed。
According to the formal unphilosophic method of the sciences； definition is the first desideratum；
as regards； at least； the external scientific form。 The positive science of right； however； is little
concerned with definition； since its special aim is to give what it is that is right； and also the
particular phases of the laws。 For this reason it has been said as a warning； Omnis definitio in
jure civili periculosa； and in fact the more disconnected and contradictory the phases of a right
are； the less possible is a definition of it。
A definition should contain only universal features； but these forthwith bring to light contradictions；
which in the case of law are injustice； in all their nakedness。 Thus in Roman law； for instance； no
definition of man was possible； because it excluded the slave。 The conception of man was
destroyed by the fact of slavery。 In the same way to have defined property and owner would have
appeared to be perilous to many relations。 But definitions may perhaps be derived from
etymology； for the reason； principally； that in this way special cases are avoided； and a； basis is
found in the feeling and imaginative thought of men。
The correctness of a definition would thus consist in its agreement with existing ideas。 By such a
method everything essentially scientific is cast aside。 As regards the content there is cast aside the
necessity of the self…contained and self…developed object； and as regards the form there is
discarded the nature of the conception。 In philosophic knowledge the necessity of a； conception is
the main thing； and the process； by which it； as a result； has come into being is the proof and
deduction。 After the content is seen to be necessary independently； the second point is to look
about for that which corresponds to it in existing ideas and modes of speech。 But the way in which
a conception exists in its truth； and the way it presents itself in random ideas not only are but must
be different both in form and structure。 If a notion is not in its content false； the conception can be
shown to be contained in it and to be already there in its essential traits。
A notion may thus be raised to the form of a conception。 But so little is any notion the measure
and criterion of an independently necessary and true conception； that it must accept truth from the
conception； be justified by it； and know itself through it。 If the method of knowing； which proceeds
by formal definition； inference and proof； has more or less disappeared； a worse one has come to
take its place。 This new method maintains that ideas； as； e。g。； the idea of right in all its aspects； are
to be directly apprehended as mere facts of consciousness； and that natural feeling or that
heightened form of it which is known as the inspiration of one's own breast； is the source of right。
This method may be the most convenient of all； but it is also the most unphilosophic。 Other
features of this view； referring not merely to knowledge but directly to action； need not detain us
here。 While the first or formal method went so far as to require in definition the form of the
conception； and in proof the form of a necessity of knowledge； the method of the intuitive
consciousness and feeling takes for its principle the arbitrary contingent consciousness of the
subject。 In this treatise we take for granted the scientific procedure of philosophy； which has been
set forth in the philosophic logic。
§ 3。
