the common law-第23章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


　even　in　that　case。　When　a　more　exact　and　specific　rule　has　been　arrived　at；　he　must　obey　that　rule　at　his　peril　to　the　same　extent。　But；　further；　if　the　law　is　wholly　a　standard　of　external　conduct；　a　man　must　always　comply　with　that　standard　at　his　peril。

Some　examples　of　the　process　of　specification　will　be　useful。　In　LL。　Alfred；　36；　/1/　providing　for　the　case　of　a　man's　staking　himself　on　a　spear　carried　by　another；　we　read；　〃Let　this　（liability）　be　if　the　point　be　three　fingers　higher　than　the　hindmost　part　of　the　shaft；　if　they　be　both　on　a　level；　。。。　be　that　without　danger。〃

The　rule　of　the　road　and　the　sailing　rules　adopted　by　Congress　from　England　are　modern　examples　of　such　statutes。　By　the　former　rule；　the　question　has　been　narrowed　from　the　vague　one；　Was　the　party　negligent？　to　the　precise　one；　Was　he　on　the　right　or　left　of　the　road？　To　avoid　a　possible　misconception；　it　may　be　observed　that；　of　course；　this　question　does　not　necessarily　and　under　all　circumstances　decide　that　of　liability；　a　plaintiff　may　have　been　on　the　wrong　side　of　the　road；　as　he　may　have　been　negligent；　and　yet　the　conduct　of　the　defendant　may　have　been　unjustifiable；　and　a　ground　of　liability。　/2/　So；　no　doubt；　a　defendant　could　justify　or　excuse　being　on　the　wrong　side；　under　some　circumstances。　The　difference　between　alleging　that　a　defendant　was　on　the　wrong　side　of　the　road；　and　that　he　was　negligent；　is　the　difference　between　an　allegation　of　facts　requiring　to　be　excused　by　a　counter　allegation　of　further　facts　to　prevent　their　being　a　ground　of　liability；　and　an　allegation　which　involves　a　conclusion　of　law；　and　denies　in　advance　the　existence　of　an　＇114＇　excuse。　Whether　the　former　allegation　ought　not　to　be　enough；　and　whether　the　establishment　of　the　fact　ought　not　to　shift　the　burden　of　proof；　are　questions　which　belong　to　the　theory　of　pleading　and　evidence；　and　could　be　answered　either　way　consistently　with　analogy。　I　should　have　no　difficulty　in　saying　that　the　allegation　of　facts　which　are　ordinarily　a　ground　of　liability；　and　which　would　be　so　unless　excused；　ought　to　be　sufficient。　But　the　forms　of　the　law；　especially　the　forms　of　pleading；　do　not　change　with　every　change　of　its　substance；　and　a　prudent　lawyer　would　use　the　broader　and　safer　phrase。

The　same　course　of　specification　which　has　been　illustrated　from　the　statute…　book　ought　also　to　be　taking　place　in　the　growth　of　judicial　decisions。　That　this　should　happen　is　in　accordance　with　the　past　history　of　the　law。　It　has　been　suggested　already　that　in　the　days　of　the　assize　and　jurata　the　court　decided　whether　the　facts　constituted　a　ground　of　liability　in　all　ordinary　cases。　A　question　of　negligence　might；　no　doubt；　have　gone　to　the　jury。　Common　sense　and　common　knowledge　are　as　often　sufficient　to　determine　whether　proper　care　has　been　taken　of　an　animal；　as　they　are　to　say　whether　A　or　B　owns　it。　The　cases　which　first　arose　were　not　of　a　kind　to　suggest　analysis；　and　negligence　was　used　as　a　proximately　simple　element　for　a　long　time　before　the　need　or　possibility　of　analysis　was　felt。　Still；　when　an　issue　of　this　sort　is　found；　the　dispute　is　rather　what　the　acts　or　omissions　of　the　defendant　were　than　on　the　standard　of　conduct。　/1/　The　＇115＇　distinction　between　the　functions　of　court　and　jury　does　not　come　in　question　until　the　parties　differ　as　to　the　standard　of　conduct。　Negligence；　like　ownership；　is　a　complex　conception。　Just　as　the　latter　imports　the　existence　of　certain　facts；　and　also　the　consequence　（protection　against　all　the　world）　which　the　law　attaches　to　those　facts；　the　former　imports　the　existence　of　certain　facts　（conduct）　and　also　the　consequence　（liability）　which　the　law　attaches　to　those　facts。　In　most　cases　the　question　is　upon　the　facts；　and　it　is　only　occasionally　that　one　arises　on　the　consequence。

It　will　have　been　noticed　how　the　judges　pass　on　the　defendant's　acts　（on　grounds　of　fault　and　public　policy）　in　the　case　of　the　thorns；　and　that　in　Weaver　v。　Ward　/1/it　is　said　that　the　facts　constituting　an　excuse；　and　showing　that　the　defendant　was　free　from　negligence；　should　have　been　spread　upon　the　record；　in　order　that　the　court　might　judge。　A　similar　requirement　was　laid　down　with　regard　to　the　defence　of　probable　cause　in　an　action　for　malicious　prosecution。　/2/　And　to　this　day　the　question　of　probable　cause　is　always　passed　on　by　the　court。　Later　evidence　will　be　found　in　what　follows。

There　is；　however；　an　important　consideration；　which　has　not　yet　been　adverted　to。　It　is　undoubtedly　possible　that　those　who　have　the　making　of　the　law　should　deem　it　〃wise　to　put　the　mark　higher　in　some　cases　than　the　point　established　by　common　practice　at　which　blameworthiness　begins。　For　instance；　in　Morris　v。　Platt；　/2/　the　court；　while　declaring　in　the　strongest　terms　that；　in　general；　＇116＇　negligence　is　the　foundation　of　liability　for　accidental　trespasses；　nevertheless　hints　that；　if　a　decision　of　the　point　were　necessary；　it　might　hold　a　defendant　to　a　stricter　rule　where　the　damage　was　caused　by　a　pistol；　in　view　of　the　danger　to　the　public　of　the　growing　habit　of　carrying　deadly　weapons。　Again；　it　might　well　seem　that　to　enter　a　man's　house　for　the　purpose　of　carrying　a　present；　or　inquiring　after　his　health　when　he　was　ill；　was　a　harmless　and　rather　praiseworthy　act；　although　crossing　the　owner's　boundary　was　intentional。　It　is　not　supposed　that　an　action　would　lie　at　the　present　day　for　such　a　cause；　unless　the　defendant　had　been　forbidden　the　house。　Yet　in　the　time　of　Henry　VIII。　it　was　said　to　be　actionable　if　without　license；　〃for　then　under　that　color　my　enemy　might　be　in　my　house　and　kill　me。〃　/1/　There　is　a　clear　case　where　public　policy　establishes　a　standard　of　overt　acts　without　regard　to　fault　in　any　sense。　In　like　manner；　policy　established　exceptions　to　the　general　prohibition　against　entering　another's　premises；　as　in　the　instance　put　by　Chief　Justice　Choke　in　the　Year　Book；　of　a　tree　being　blown　over　upon　them；　or　when　the　highway　became　impassable；　or　for　the　purpose　of　keeping　the　peace。　/2/

Another　example　may　perhaps　be　found　in　the　shape　which　has　been　given　in　modern　times　to　the　liability　for　animals；　and　in　the　derivative　principle　of　Rylands　v。　Fletcher；　/3/　that　when　a　person　brings　on　his　lands；　and　collects　and　keeps　there；　anything　likely　to　do　mischief　if　it　escapes；　he　must　keep　it　in　at　his　peril；　and；　if　he　does　not　do　so；　is　prima　facie　answerable　for　all　the　＇117＇　damage　which　is　the　natural　consequence　of　its　escape。　Cases　of　this　sort　do　not　stand　on　the　notion　that　it　is　wrong　to　keep　cattle；　or　to　have　a　reservoir　of　water；　as　might　have　been　thought　with　more　plausibility　when　fierce　and　useless　animals　only　were　in　question。　/1/　It　may　even　be　very　much　for　the　public　good　that　the　dangerous　accumulation　should　be　made　（a　consideration　which　might　influence　the　decision　in　some　instances；　and　differently　in　different　jurisdictions）；　but　as　there　is　a　limit　to　the　nicety　of　inquiry　which　is　possible　in　a　trial；　it　may　be　considered　that　the　safest　way　to　secure　care　is　to　throw　the　risk　upon　the　person　who　decides　what　precautions　shall　be　taken。　The　liability　for　trespasses　of　cattle　seems　to　lie　on　the　boundary　line　between　rules　based　on　policy　irrespective　of　fault；　and　requirements　intended　to　formulate　the　conduct　of　a　prudent　man。

It　has　been　shown　in　the　first　Lecture　how　this　liability　for　cattle　arose　in　the　early　law；　and　how　far　the　influence　of　early　notions　might　be　traced　in　the　law　of　today；　Subject　to　what　is　there　said；　it　is　evident　that　the　early　discussions　turn　on　the　general　consideration　whether　the　owner　is　or　is　not　to　blame。　/2/　But　they　do　not　stop　there：　they　go　on　to　take　practical　distinctions；　based　on　common　experience。　Thus；　when　the　defendant　chased　sheep　out　of　his　land　with　a　dog；　and　as　soon　as　the　sheep　were　out　called　in　his　dog；　but　the　dog　pursued　them　into　adjoining　land；　the　chasing　of　the　sheep　beyond　the　defendant's　line　was　held　no　trespass；　because　〃the　nature　of　a　dog　is　such　that　he　cannot　be　ruled　suddenly。〃　/3/

＇118＇　It　was　lawful　in　ploughing　to　turn　the　horses　on　adjoining　land；　and　if　while　so　turning　the　beasts　took　a　mouthful　of