the common law-第26章

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entured　on　without　authority；　that　such　a　permission　to　a　young　man　of　twenty　possessed　of　common　intelligence　has　no　effect　whatever。

Take　again　the　law　of　ancient　lights　in　England。　An　obstruction　to　be　actionable　must　be　substantial。　Under　ordinary　circumstances　the　erection　of　a　structure　a　hundred　yards　off；　and　one　foot　above　the　ground；　would　not　be　actionable。　One　within　a　foot　of　the　window；　and　covering　it；　would　be；　without　any　finding　of　a　jury　beyond　these　facts。　In　doubtful　cases　midway；　the　question　whether　the　interference　was　substantial　has　been　left　to　the　jury。　/4/　But　as　the　elements　are　few　and　permanent；　an　inclination　has　been　shown　to　lay　down　a　definite　rule；　that；　in　ordinary　cases；　the　building　complained　of　must　not　be　higher　than　the　distance　of　its　base　from　the　dominant　windows。　And　although　this　attempt　to　work　out　an　exact　line　requires　much　caution；　it　is　entirely　philosophical　in　spirit。　/5/

The　same　principle　applies　to　negligence。　If　the　whole　evidence　in　the　case　was　that　a　party；　in　full　command　of　＇129＇　senses　and　intellect；　stood　on　a　railway　track；　looking　at　an　approaching　engine　until　it　ran　him　down；　no　judge　would　leave　it　to　the　jury　to　say　whether　the　conduct　was　prudent。　If　the　whole　evidence　was　that　he　attempted　to　cross　a　level　track；　which　was　visible　for　half　a　mile　each　way；　and　on　which　no　engine　was　in　sight；　no　court　would　allow　a　jury　to　find　negligence。　Between　these　extremes　are　cases　which　would　go　to　the　jury。　But　it　is　obvious　that　the　limit　of　safety　in　such　cases；　supposing　no　further　elements　present；　could　be　determined　to　a　foot　by　mathematical　calculation。

The　trouble　with　many　cases　of　negligence　is；　that　they　are　of　a　kind　not　frequently　recurring；　so　as　to　enable　any　given　judge　to　profit　by　long　experience　with　juries　to　lay　down　rules；　and　that　the　elements　are　so　complex　that　courts　are　glad　to　leave　the　whole　matter　in　a　lump　for　the　jury's　determination。

I　reserve　the　relation　between　negligent　and　other　torts　for　the　next　Lecture。

LECTURE　IV。

FRAUD；　MALICE；　AND　INTENT。…　THE　THEORY　OF　TORTS。

＇130＇　The　next　subjects　to　be　considered　are　fraud；　malice；　and　intent。　In　the　discussion　of　unintentional　wrongs；　the　greatest　difficulty　to　be　overcome　was　found　to　be　the　doctrine　that　a　man　acts　always　at　his　peril。　In　what　follows；　on　the　other　hand；　the　difficulty　will　be　to　prove　that　actual　wickedness　of　the　kind　described　by　the　several　words　just　mentioned　is　not　an　element　in　the　civil　wrongs　to　which　those　words　are　applied。

It　has　been　shown；　in　dealing　with　the　criminal　law；　that；　when　we　call　an　act　malicious　in　common　speech；　we　mean　that　harm　to　another　person　was　intended　to　come　of　it；　and　that　such　harm　was　desired　for　its　own　sake　as　an　end　in　itself。　For　the　purposes　of　the　criminal　law；　however；　intent　alone　was　found　to　be　important；　and　to　have　the　same　consequences　as　intent　with　malevolence　superadded。　Pursuing　the　analysis；　intent　was　found　to　be　made　up　of　foresight　of　the　harm　as　a　consequence；　coupled　with　a　desire　to　bring　it　about；　the　latter　being　conceived　as　the　motive　for　the　act　in　question。　Of　these；　again；　foresight　only　seemed　material。　As　a　last　step；　foresight　was　reduced　to　its　lowest　term；　and　it　was　concluded　that；　subject　to　exceptions　which　were　explained；　the　general　basis　of　criminal　liability　was　knowledge；　at　the　time　of　action；　＇131＇　of　facts　from　which　common　experience　showed　that　certain　harmful　results　were　likely　to　follow。

It　remains　to　be　seen　whether　a　similar　reduction　is　possible　on　the　civil　side　of　the　law；　and　whether　thus　fraudulent；　malicious；　intentional；　and　negligent　wrongs　can　be　brought　into　a　philosophically　continuous　series。

A　word　of　preliminary　explanation　will　be　useful。　It　has　been　shown　in　the　Lecture　just　referred　to　that　an　act；　although　always　importing　intent；　is　per　se　indifferent　to　the　law。　It　is　a　willed；　and　therefore　an　intended　coordination　of　muscular　contractions。　But　the　intent　necessarily　imported　by　the　act　ends　there。　And　all　muscular　motions　or　co…ordinations　of　them　are　harmless　apart　from　concomitant　circumstances；　the　presence　of　which　is　not　necessarily　implied　by　the　act　itself。　To　strike　out　with　the　fist　is　the　same　act；　whether　done　in　a　desert　or　in　a　crowd。

The　same　considerations　which　have　been　urged　to　show　that　an　act　alone；　by　itself；　does　not　and　ought　not　to　impose　either　civil　or　criminal　liability；　apply；　at　least　frequently；　to　a　series　of　acts；　or　to　conduct；　although　the　series　shows　a　further　co…ordination　and　a　further　intent。　For　instance；　it　is　the　same　series　of　acts　to　utter　a　sentence　falsely　stating　that　a　certain　barrel　contains　No。　1　Mackerel；　whether　the　sentence　is　uttered　in　the　secrecy　of　the　closet；　or　to　another　man　in　the　course　of　a　bargain。　There　is；　to　be　sure；　in　either　case；　the　further　intent；　beyond　the　co…ordination　of　muscles　for　a　single　sound；　to　allege　that　a　certain　barrel　has　certain　contents；an　intent　necessarily　shown　by　the　ordering　of　the　words。　But　both　the　series　of　acts　and　the　intent　are　per　se　indifferent。　They　are　innocent　when　spoken　in　solitude；　and　＇132＇　are　only　a　ground　of　liability　when　certain　concomitant　circumstances　are　shown。

The　intent　which　is　meant　when　spoken　of　as　an　element　of　legal　liability　is　an　intent　directed　toward　the　harm　complained　of；　or　at　least　toward　harm。　It　is　not　necessary　in　every　case　to　carry　the　analysis　back　to　the　simple　muscular　contractions　out　of　which　a　course　of　conduct　is　made　up。　On　the　same　principle　that　requires　something　more　than　an　act　followed　by　damage　to　make　a　man　liable；　we　constantly　find　ourselves　at　liberty　to　assume　a　co…ordinated　series　of　acts　as　a　proximately　simple　element；　per　se　indifferent；　in　considering　what　further　circumstances　or　facts　must　be　present　before　the　conduct　in　question　is　at　the　actor's　peril。　It　will　save　confusion　and　the　need　of　repetition　if　this　is　borne　in　mind　in　the　following　discussion。

The　chief　forms　of　liability　in　which　fraud；　malice；　and　intent　are　said　to　be　necessary　elements；　are　deceit；　slander　and　libel；　malicious　prosecution；　and　conspiracy；　to　which；　perhaps；　may　be　added　trover。

Deceit　is　a　notion　drawn　from　the　moral　world；　and　in　its　popular　sense　distinctly　imports　wickedness。　The　doctrine　of　the　common　law　with　regard　to　it　is　generally　stated　in　terms　which　are　only　consistent　with　actual　guilt；　and　all　actual　guilty　intent。　It　is　said　that　a　man　is　liable　to　an　action　for　deceit　if　he　makes　a　false　representation　to　another；　knowing　it　to　be　false；　but　intending　that　the　other　should　believe　and　act　upon　it；　if　the　person　addressed　believes　it；　and　is　thereby　persuaded　to　act　to　his　own　harm。　This　is　no　doubt　the　typical　case；　and　it　is　a　case　of　intentional　moral　wrong。　Now；　what　is　the　party's　conduct　here。　It　consists　in　uttering　certain　words；　＇133＇　so　ordered　that　the　utterance　of　them　imports　a　knowledge　of　the　meaning　which　they　would　convey　if　heard。　But　that　conduct　with　only　that　knowledge　is　neither　moral　nor　immoral。　Go　one　step　further；　and　add　the　knowledge　of　another's　presence　within　hearing；　still　the　act　has　no　determinate　character。　The　elements　which　make　it　immoral　are　the　knowledge　that　the　statement　is　false；　and　the　intent　that　it　shall　be　acted　on。

The　principal　question　then　is；　whether　this　intent　can　be　reduced　to　the　same　terms　as　it　has　been　in　other　cases。　There　is　no　difficulty　in　the　answer。　It　is　perfectly　clear　that　the　intent　that　a　false　representation　should　be　acted　on　would　be　conclusively　established　by　proof　that　the　defendant　knew　that　the　other　party　intended　to　act　upon　it。　If　the　defendant　foresaw　the　consequence　of　his　acts；　he　is　chargeable；　whether　his　motive　was　a　desire　to　induce　the　other　party　to　act；　or　simply　an　unwillingness　for　private　reasons　to　state　the　truth。　If　the　defendant　knew　a　present　fact　（the　other　party's　intent）；　which；　according　to　common　experience；　made　it　likely　that　his　act　would　have　the　harmful　consequence；　he　is　chargeable；　whether　he　in　fact　foresaw　the　consequence　or　not。

In　this　matter　the　general　conclusion　follows　from　a　single　instance。　For　the　moment　it　is　admitted　th