the common law-第31章

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　risk　of　it　on　the　actor。

For　instance；　when　a　man　does　the　series　of　acts　called　＇153＇　walking；　it　is　assumed　for　all　purposes　of　responsibility　that　he　knows　the　earth　is　under　his　feet。　The　conduct　per　se　is　indifferent；　to　be　sure。　A　man　may　go　through　the　motions　of　walking　without　legal　peril；　if　he　chooses　to　practise　on　a　private　treadmill；　but　if　he　goes　through　the　same　motions　on　the　surface　of　the　earth；　it　cannot　be　doubted　that　he　knows　that　the　earth　is　there。　With　that　knowledge；　he　acts　at　his　peril　in　certain　respects。　If　he　crosses　his　neighbor's　boundary；　he　is　a　trespasser。　The　reasons　for　this　strict　rule　have　been　partially　discussed　in　the　last　Lecture。　Possibly　there　is　more　of　history　or　of　past　or　present　notions　of　policy　its　explanation　than　is　there　suggested；　and　at　any　rate　I　do　not　care　to　justify　the　rule。　But　it　is　intelligible。　A　man　who　walks　knows　that　he　is　moving　over　the　surface　of　the　earth；　he　knows　that　he　is　surrounded　by　private　estates　which　he　has　no　right　to　enter；　and　he　knows　that　his　motion；　unless　properly　guided；　will　carry　him　into　those　estates。　He　is　thus　warned；　and　the　burden　of　his　conduct　is　thrown　upon　himself。

But　the　act　of　walking　does　not　throw　the　peril　of　all　possible　consequences　upon　him。　He　may　run　a　man　down　in　the　street；　but　he　is　not　liable　for　that　unless　he　does　it　negligently。　Confused　as　the　law　is　with　cross…lights　of　tradition；　and　hard　as　we　may　find　it　to　arrive　at　perfectly　satisfactory　general　theory；　it　does　distinguish　in　a　pretty　sensible　way；　according　to　the　nature　and　degree　of　the　different　perils　incident　to　a　given　situation。

》From　the　simple　case　of　walking　we　may　proceed　to　the　more　complex　cases　of　dealings　with　tangible　objects　of　property。　It　may　be　said　that；　generally　speaking；　a　man　meddles　with　such　things　at　his　own　risk。　It　does　not　＇154＇　matter　how　honestly　he　may　believe　that　they　belong　to　himself；　or　are　free　to　the　public；　or　that　he　has　a　license　from　the　owner；　or　that　the　case　is　one　in　which　the　law　has　limited　the　rights　of　ownership；　he　takes　the　chance　of　how　the　fact　may　turn　out；　and　if　the　fact　is　otherwise　than　as　he　supposes；　he　must　answer　for　his　conduct。　As　has　been　already　suggested；　he　knows　that　he　is　exercising　more　or　less　dominion　over　property；　or　that　he　is　injuring　it；　he　must　make　good　his　right　if　it　is　challenged。

Whether　this　strict　rule　is　based　on　the　common　grounds　of　liability；　or　upon　some　special　consideration　of　past　or　present　policy；　policy　has　set　some　limits　to　it；　as　was　mentioned　in　the　foregoing　Lecture。

Another　case　of　conduct　which　is　at　the　risk　of　the　party　without　further　knowledge　than　it　necessarily　imports；　is　the　keeping　of　a　tiger　or　bear；　or　other　animal　of　a　species　commonly　known　to　be　ferocious。　If　such　an　animal　escapes　and　does　damage；　the　owner　is　liable　simply　on　proof　that　he　kept　it。　In　this　instance　the　comparative　remoteness　of　the　moment　of　choice　in　the　line　of　causation　from　the　effect　complained　of；　will　be　particularly　noticed。　Ordinary　cases　of　liability　arise　out　of　a　choice　which　was　the　proximate　cause　of　the　harm　upon　which　the　action　is　founded。　But　here　there　is　usually　no　question　of　negligence　in　guarding　the　beast。　It　is　enough　in　most；　if　not　in　all　cases；　that　the　owner　has　chosen　to　keep　it。　Experience　has　shown　that　tigers　and　bears　are　alert　to　find　means　of　escape；　and　that；　if　they　escape；　they　are　very　certain　to　do　harm　of　a　serious　nature。　The　possibility　of　a　great　danger　has　the　same　effect　as　the　probability　of　a　less　one；　and　the　law　throws　the　risk　of　＇155＇　the　venture　on　the　person　who　introduces　the　peril　into　the　community。

This　remoteness　of　the　opportunity　of　choice　goes　far　to　show　that　this　risk　is　thrown　upon　the　owner　for　other　reasons　than　the　ordinary　one　of　imprudent　conduct。　It　has　been　suggested　that　the　liability　stood　upon　remote　inadvertence。　/1/　But　the　law　does　not　forbid　a　man　to　keep　a　menagerie；　or　deem　it　in　any　way　blameworthy。　It　has　applied　nearly　as　strict　a　rule　to　dealings　which　are　even　more　clearly　beneficial　to　the　community　than　a　show　of　wild　beasts。

This　seems　to　be　one　of　those　cases　where　the　ground　of　liability　is　to　be　sought　in　policy　coupled　with　tradition；　rather　than　in　any　form　of　blameworthiness；　or　the　existence　of　such　a　chance　to　avoid　doing　the　harm　as　a　man　is　usually　allowed。　But　the　fact　that　remote　inadvertence　has　been　suggested　for　an　explanation　illustrates　what　has　been　said　about　the　difficulty　of　deciding　whether　a　given　rule　is　founded　on　special　grounds；　or　has　been　worked　out　within　the　sphere　of　negligence；　when　once　a　special　rule　has　been　laid　down。

It　is　further　to　be　noticed　that　there　is　no　question　of　the　defendant's　knowledge　of　the　nature　of　tigers；　although　without　that　knowledge　he　cannot　be　said　to　have　intelligently　chosen　to　subject　the　community　to　danger。　Here　again　even　in　the　domain　of　knowledge　the　law　applies　its　principle　of　averages。　The　fact　that　tigers　and　bears　are　：：dangerous　is　so　generally　known；　that　a　man　who　keeps　them　is　presumed　to　know　their　peculiarities。　In　other　words；　he　does　actually　know　that　he　has　an　animal　with　certain　teeth；　claws；　and　so　forth；　and　he　must　find　out　the　＇156＇　rest　of　what　an　average　member　of　the　community　would　know；　at　his　peril。

What　is　true　as　to　damages　in　general　done　by　ferocious　wild　beasts　is　true　as　to　a　particular　class　of　damages　done　by　domestic　cattle；　namely；　trespasses　upon　another's　land。　This　has　been　dealt　with　in　former　Lectures；　and　it　is　therefore　needless　to　do　more　than　to　recall　it　here；　and　to　call　attention　to　the　distinction　based　on　experience　and　policy　between　damage　which　is　and　that　which　is　not　of　a　kind　to　be　expected。　Cattle　generally　stray　and　damage　cultivated　land　when　they　get　upon　it。　They　only　exceptionally　hurt　human　beings。

I　need　not　recur　to　the　possible　historical　connection　of　either　of　these　last　forms　of　liability　with　the　noxoe　deditio；　because；　whether　that　origin　is　made　out　or　not；　the　policy　of　the　rule　has　been　accepted　as　sound；　and　carried　further　in　England　within　the　last　few　years　by　the　doctrine　that　a　man　who　brings　upon　his　land　and　keeps　there　anything　likely　to　do　mischief　if　it　escape；　must　keep　it　in　at　his　peril。　/1/　The　strictness　of　this　principle　will　vary　in　different　jurisdictions；　as　the　balance　varies　between　the　advantages　to　the　public　and　the　dangers　to　individuals　from　the　conduct　in　question。　Danger　of　harm　to　others　is　not　the　only　thing　to　be　considered；　as　has　been　said　already。　The　law　allows　some　harms　to　be　intentionally　inflicted；　and　a　fortiori　some　risks　to　be　intentionally　run。　In　some　Western　States　a　man　is　not　required　to　keep　his　cattle　fenced　in。　Some　courts　have　refused　to　follow　Rylands　v。　Fletcher。　/2/　On　the　other　hand；　the　principle　has　been　applied　to　artificial　＇157＇　reservoirs　of　water；　to　cesspools；　to　accumulations　of　snow　and　ice　upon　a　building　by　reason　of　the　form　of　its　roof；　and　to　party　walls。　/1/

In　these　cases；　as　in　that　of　ferocious　animals；　it　is　no　excuse　that　the　defendant　did　not　know；　and　could　not　have　found　out；　the　weak　point　from　which　the　dangerous　object　escaped。　The　period　of　choice　was　further　back；　and；　although　he　was　not　to　blame；　he　was　bound　at　his　peril　to　know　that　the　object　was　a　continual　threat　to　his　neighbors；　and　that　is　enough　to　throw　the　risk　of　the　business　on　him。

I　now　pass　to　cases　one　degree　more　complex　than　those　so　far　considered。　In　these　there　must　be　another　concomitant　circumstance　known　to　the　party　in　addition　to　those　of　which　the　knowledge　is　necessarily　or　practically　proved　by　his　conduct。　The　cases　which　naturally　suggest　themselves　again　concern　animals。　Experience　as　interpreted　by　the　English　law　has　shown　that　dogs；　rams；　and　bulls　are　in　general　of　a　tame　and　mild　nature；　and　that；　if　any　one　of　them　does　by　chance　exhibit　a　tendency　to　bite；　butt；　or　gore；　it　is　an　exceptional　phenomenon。　Hence　it　is　not　the　law　that　a　man　keeps　dogs；　rams；　bulls；　and　other　like　tame　animals　at　his　peril　as　to　the　personal　damages　which　they　may　inflict；　unless　he　knows　or　has　notice　that　the　particular　animal　kept　by　him　has