the common law-第48章

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tement；　uses　a　phrase　which；　but　for　the　explanation；　would　seem　to　import　ownership；〃Poterit　rem　suam　petere。〃　/4/　The　writs　of　later　days　used　the　same　language；　and　when　it　was　objected；　as　it　frequently　was；　to　a　suit　by　a　bailee　for　a　taking　of　bona　et　catalla　sua；　that　it　should　have　been　for　bona　in　custodia　sua　existentia；　it　was　always　answered　that　those　in　the　Chancery　would　not　frame　a　writ　in　that　form。　/5/

The　substance　of　the　matter　was；　that　goods　in　a　man's　possession　were　his　（sua）；　within　the　meaning　of　the　writ。　But　it　was　very　natural　to　attempt　a　formal　reconciliation　between　that　formal　word　and　the　fact　by　saying　that；　although　the　plaintiff　had　not　the　general　property　in　the　＇243＇　chattels；　yet　he　had　a　property　as　against　strangers；　/1/　or　a　special　property。　This　took　place；　and；　curiously　enough；　two　of　the　earliest　instances　in　which　I　have　found　the　latter　phrase　used　are　cases　of　a　depositary；　/2/　and　a　borrower。　/3/　Brooke　says　that　a　wrongful　taker　〃has　title　against　all　but　the　true　owner。〃　/4/　In　this　sense　the　special　property　was　better　described　as　a　〃possessory　property；〃　as　it　was；　in　deciding　that；　in　an　indictment　for　larceny；　the　property　could　be　laid　in　the　bailee　who　suffered　the　trespass。　/5/

I　have　explained　the　inversion　by　which　a　bailee's　right　of　action　against　third　persons　was　supposed　to　stand　on　his　responsibility　over；　although　in　truth　it　was　the　foundation　of　that　responsibility；　and　arose　simply　from　his　possession。　The　step　was　short；　from　saying　that　bailees　could　sue　because　they　were　answerable　over；　/6/　to　saying　that　they　had　the　property　as　against　strangers；　or　a　special　property；　because　they　were　answerable　over；　/7/　and　that　they　could　sue　because　they　had　a　special　property　and　were　answerable　over。　/8/　And　thus　the　notion　that　special　property　meant　something　more　than　possession；　and　was　a　requisite　to　maintaining　an　action；　got　into　the　law。

The　error　was　made　easier　by　a　different　use　of　the　phrase　in　a　different　connection。　A　bailee　was　in　general　liable　for　goods　stolen　from　his　custody；　whether　he　had　a　lien　or　not。　But　the　law　was　otherwise　as　to　a　＇244＇　pledgee；　if　he　had　kept　the　pledge　with　his　own　goods；　and　the　two　were　stolen　together。　/1/　This　distinction　was　accounted　for；　at　least　in　Lord　Coke's　time；　by　saying　that　the　pledge　was；　in　a　sense；　the　pledgee's　own；　that　he　had　a　special　property　in　it；　and　thus　that　the　ordinary　relation　of　bailment　did　not　exist；　or　that　the　undertaking　was　only　to　keep　as　his　own　goods。　/2/　The　same　expression　was　used　in　discussing　the　pledgee's　right　to　assign　the　pledge；　/3/　In　this　sense　the　term　applied　only　to　pledges；　but　its　significance　in　a　particular　connection　was　easily　carried　over　into　the　others　in　which　it　was　used；　with　the　result　that　the　special　property　which　was　requisite　to　maintain　the　possessory　actions　was　supposed　to　mean　a　qualified　interest　in　the　goods。

With　regard　to　the　legal　consequences　of　possession；　it　only　remains　to　mention　that　the　rules　which　have　been　laid　down　with　regard　to　chattels　also　prevail　with　regard　to　land。　For　although　the　plaintiff　in　ejectment　must　recover　on　the　strength　of　his　own　title　as　against　a　defendant　in　possession；　it　is　now　settled　that　prior　possession　is　enough　if　the　defendant　stands　on　his　possession　alone　Possession　is　of　course　sufficient　for　trespass。5　And　although　the　early　remedy　by　assize　was　restricted　to　those　who　had　a　technical　seisin；　this　was　for　reasons　which　do　not　affect　the　general　theory。

Before　closing　I　must　say　a　word　concerning　ownership　and　kindred　conceptions。　Following　the　order　of　analysis　＇245＇　which　has　been　pursued　with　regard　to　possession；　the　first　question　must　be；　What　are　the　facts　to　which　the　rights　called　ownership　are　attached　as　a　legal　consequence？　The　most　familiar　mode　of　gaining　ownership　is　by　conveyance　from　the　previous　owner。　But　that　presupposes　ownership　already　existing；　and　the　problem　is　to　discover　what　calls　it　into　being。

One　fact　which　has　this　effect　is　first　possession。　The　captor　of　wild　animals；　or　the　taker　of　fish　from　the　ocean；　has　not　merely　possession；　but　a　title　good　against　all　the　world。　But　the　most　common　mode　of　getting　an　original　and　independent　title　is　by　certain　proceedings；　in　court　or　out　of　it；　adverse　to　all　the　world。　At　one　extreme　of　these　is　the　proceeding　in　rem　of　the　admiralty；　which　conclusively　disposes　of　the　property　in　its　power；　and；　when　it　sells　or　condemns　it；　does　not　deal　with　this　or　that　man's　title；　but　gives　a　new　title　paramount　to　all　previous　interests；　whatsoever　they　may　be。　The　other　and　more　familiar　case　is　prescription；　where　a　public　adverse　holding　for　a　certain　time　has　a　similar　effect。　A　title　by　prescription　is　not　a　presumed　conveyance　from　this　or　owner　alone；　it　extinguishes　all　previous　and　inconsistent　claims。　The　two　coalesce　in　the　ancient　fine　with　proclamations　where　the　combined　effect　of　the　judgment　and　the　lapse　of　a　year　and　a　day　was　to　bar　claims。　/1/

So　rights　analogous　to　those　of　ownership　may　be　given　by　the　legislature　to　persons　of　whom　some　other　set　of　facts　is　true。　For　instance；　a　patentee；　or　one　to　whom　the　government　has　issued　a　certain　instrument；　and　who　in　fact　has　made　a　patentable　invention。

＇246＇　But　what　are　the　rights　of　ownership？　They　are　substantially　the　same　as　those　incident　to　possession。　Within　the　limits　prescribed　by　policy；　the　owner　is　allowed　to　exercise　his　natural　powers　over　the　subject…matter　uninterfered　with；　and　is　more　or　less　protected　in　excluding　other　people　from　such　interference。　The　owner　is　allowed　to　exclude　all；　and　is　accountable　to　no　one。　The　possessor　is　allowed　to　exclude　all　but　one；　and　is　accountable　to　no　one　but　him。　The　great　body　of　questions　which　have　made　the　subject　of　property　so　large　and　important　are　questions　of　conveyancing；　not　necessarily　or　generally　dependent　on　ownership　as　distinguished　from　possession。　They　are　questions　of　the　effect　of　not　having　an　independent　and　original　title；　but　of　coming　in　under　a　title　already　in　existence；　or　of　the　modes　in　which　an　original　title　can　be　cut　up　among　those　who　come　in　under　it。　These　questions　will　be　dealt　with　and　explained　where　they　belong；　in　the　Lectures　on　Successions。

＇247＇　LECTURE　VII。

CONTRACT。　　I。　HISTORY。

The　doctrine　of　contract　has　been　so　thoroughly　remodelled　to　meet　the　needs　of　modern　times；　that　there　is　less　here　than　elsewhere　for　historical　research。　It　has　been　so　ably　discussed　that　there　is　less　room　here　elsewhere　for　essentially　new　analysis。　But　a　short　of　the　growth　of　modern　doctrines；　whether　necessary　or　not；　will　at　least　be　interesting；　while　an　analysis　of　their　main　characteristics　cannot　be　omitted；　and　may　present　some　new　features。

It　is　popularly　supposed　that　the　oldest　forms　of　contract　known　to　our　law　are　covenant　and　debt；　and　they　are　of　early　date；　no　doubt。　But　there　are　other　contracts　still　in　use　which；　although　they　have　in　some　degree　put　on　modern　forms；　at　least　suggest　the　question　whether　they　were　not　of　equally　early　appearance。

One　of　these；　the　promissory　oath；　is　no　longer　the　foundation　of　any　rights　in　private　law。　It　is　used；　but　as　mainly　as　a　solemnity　connected　with　entering　upon　a　public　office。　The　judge　swears　that　he　will　execute　justice　according　to　law；　the　juryman　that　he　will　find　his　verdict　according　to　law　and　the　evidence；　the　newly　adopted　citizen　that　he　will　bear　true　faith　and　allegiance　to　the　government　of　his　choice。

But　there　is　another　contract　which　plays　a　more　important　part。　It　may；　perhaps；　sound　paradoxical　to　mention　＇248＇　the　contract　of　suretyship。　Suretyship；　nowadays；　is　only　an　accessory　obligation；　which　presupposes　a　principal　undertaking；　and　which；　so　far　as　the　nature　of　the　contract　goes；　is　just　like　any　other。　But；　as　has　been　pointed　out　by　Laferriere；　/1/　and　very　likely　by　earlier　writers；　the　surety　of　ancient　law　was　the　hostage；　and　the　giving　of　hostages　was　by　no　means　confined　to　international　dealings。

In　the　old　metrical　romance　of　Huon　of　Bordeaux；　Huon；　having　killed　the　son　of　Charlemagne；　is　required　by　the　Emperor　to　p