the common law-第58章

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some　trouble　to　establish。　I　mean　the　doctrine　that　an　executed　consideration　will　not　sustain　a　subsequent　promise。　It　has　been　said；　to　be　sure；　that　such　a　consideration　was　sufficient　if　preceded　by　a　request。　But　the　objections　to　the　view　are　plain。　If　the　request　was　of　such　a　nature；　and　so　put；　as　reasonably　to　imply　that　the　other　person　was　to　have　a　reward；　there　was　an　express　promise；　although　not　put　in　words；　and　that　promise　was　made　at　＇296＇　the　same　time　the　consideration　was　given；　and　not　afterwards。　If；　on　the　other　hand；　the　words　did　not　warrant　the　understanding　that　the　service　was　to　be　paid　for；　the　service　was　a　gift；　and　a　past　gift　can　no　more　be　a　consideration　than　any　other　act　of　the　promisee　not　induced　by　the　promise。

The　source　of　the　error　can　be　traced　partially；　at　least；　in　history。　Some　suggestions　touching　the　matter　were　made　in　the　last　Lecture。　A　few　words　should　be　added　here。　In　the　old　cases　of　debt；　where　there　was　some　question　whether　the　plaintiff　had　showed　enough　to　maintain　his　action；　a　〃contract　precedent〃　was　spoken　of　several　times　as　raising　the　duty。　Thus；　where　a　man　had　granted　that　he　would　be　bound　in　one　hundred　shillings　to　pay　his　servant　on　a　certain　day　for　his　services；　and　for　payments　made　by　the　servant　on　his　account；　it　was　argued　that　there　was　no　contract　precedent；　and　that　by　parol　the　party　is

not　obliged；　and；　further；　that；　so　far　as　appeared；　the　payments　were　made　by　the　servant　out　of　his　own　head　and　at　no　request；　from　which　no　duty　could　commence。　/1/

So　when　debt　was　brought　on　a　deed　to　pay　the　plaintiff　ten　marks；　if　he　would　take　the　defendant's　daughter　to　wife；　and　it　was　objected　that　the　action　should　have　been　covenant；　it　was　answered　that　the　plaintiff　had　a　contract　precedent　which　gave　him　debt。　/2/

The　first　case　in　assumpsit　/3/　only　meant　to　adopt　this　long　familiar　thought。　A　man　went　bail　for　his　friend's　servant；　who　had　been　arrested。　Afterwards　the　master　＇297＇　promised　to　indemnify　the　bail；　and　on　his　failure　to　do　so　was　sued　by　him　in　assumpsit。　It　was　held　that　there　was　no　consideration　wherefore　the　defendant　should　be　charged　unless　the　master　had　first　promised　to　indemnify　the　plaintiff　before　the　servant　was　bailed；　〃for　the　master　did　never　make　request　to　the　plaintiff　for　his　servant　to　do　so　much；　but　he　did　it　of　his　own　head。〃　This　is　perfectly　plain　sailing；　and　means　no　more　than　the　case　in　the　Year　Books。　The　report；　however；　also　states　a　case　in　which　it　was　held　that　a　subsequent　promise；　in　consideration　that　the　plaintiff　at　the　special　instance　of　the　defendant　had　married　the　defendant's　cousin；　was　binding；　and　that　the　marriage　was　〃good　cause　。。。　because　＇it＇　ensued　the　request　of　the　defendant。〃　Whether　this　was　intended　to　establish　a　general　principle；　or　was　decided　with　reference　to　the　peculiar　consideration　of　marriage；　/1/　it　was　soon　interpreted　in　the　broader　sense；　as　was　shown　in　the　last　Lecture。　It　was　several　times　adjudged　that　a　past　and　executed　matter　was　a　sufficient　consideration　for　a　promise　at　a　later　day；　if　only　the　matter　relied　on　had　been　done　or　furnished　at　the　request　of　the　promisor。　/2/

It　is　now　time　to　analyze　the　nature　of　a　promise；　which　is　the　second　and　most　conspicuous　element　in　a　simple　contract。　The　Indian　Contract　Act；　1872；　Section　2；8　says：

　〃（a。）　When　one　person　signifies　to　another　his　willingness　＇298＇　to　do　or　to　abstain　from　doing　anything；　with　a　view　to　obtaining　the　assent　of　that　other　to　such　act　or　abstinence；　he　is　said　to　make　a　proposal：

　〃（b。）　When　the　person　to　whom　the　proposal　is　made　signifies　his　assent　thereto；　the　proposal　is　said　to　be　accepted。　A　proposal　when　accepted　becomes　a　promise。〃

According　to　this　definition　the　scope　of　promises　is　confined　to　conduct　on　the　part　of　the　promisor。　If　this　only　meant　that　the　promisor　alone　must　bear　the　legal　burden　which　his　promise　may　create；　it　would　be　true。　But　this　is　not　the　meaning。　For　the　definition　is　of　a　promise；　not　of　a　legally　binding　promise。　We　are　not　seeking　for　the　legal　effects　of　a　contract；　but　for　the　possible　contents　of　a　promise　which　the　law　may　or　may　not　enforce。　We　must　therefore　only　consider　the　question　what　can　possibly　be　promised　in　a　legal　sense；　not　what　will　be　the　secondary　consequence　of　a　promise　binding；　but　not　performed。

An　assurance　that　it　shall　rain　to…morrow；　/1/　or　that　a　third　person　shall　paint　a　picture；　may　as　well　be　a　promise　as　one　that　the　promisee　shall　receive　from　some　source　one　hundred　bales　of　cotton；　or　that　the　promisor　will　pay　the　promisee　one　hundred　dollars。　What　is　the　difference　in　the　cases？　It　is　only　in　the　degree　of　power　possessed　by　the　promisor　over　the　event。　He　has　none　in　the　first　case。　He　has　equally　little　legal　authority　to　make　a　man　paint　a　picture；　although　he　may　have　larger　means　of　persuasion。　He　probably　will　be　able　to　make　sure　that　the　promisee　has　the　cotton。　Being　a　rich　man；　he　is　certain　＇299＇　to　be　able　to　pay　the　one　hundred　dollars；　except　in　the　event　of　some　most　improbable　accident。

But　the　law　does　not　inquire；　as　a　general　thing；　how　far　the　accomplishment　of　an　assurance　touching　the　future　is　within　the　power　of　the　promisor。　In　the　moral　world　it　may　be　that　the　obligation　of　a　promise　is　confined　to　what　lies　within　reach　of　the　will　of　the　promisor　（except　so　far　as　the　limit　is　unknown　on　one　side；　and　misrepresented　on　the　other）。　But　unless　some　consideration　of　public　policy　intervenes；　I　take　it　that　a　man　may　bind　himself　at　law　that　any　future　event　shall　happen。　He　can　therefore　promise　it　in　a　legal　sense。　It　may　be　said　that　when　a　man　covenants　that　it　shall　rain　to…morrow；　or　that　A　shall　paint　a　picture；　he　only　says；　in　a　short　form；　I　will　pay　if　it　does　not　rain；　or　if　A　does　not　paint　a　picture。　But　that　is　not　necessarily　so。　A　promise　could　easily　be　framed　which　would　be　broken　by　the　happening　of　fair　weather；　or　by　A　not　painting。　A　promise；　then；　is　simply　an　accepted　assurance　that　a　certain　event　or　state　of　things　shall　come　to　pass。

But　if　this　be　true；　it　has　more　important　bearings　than　simply　to　enlarge　the　definition　of　the　word　promise。　It　concerns　the　theory　of　contract。　The　consequences　of　a　binding　promise　at　common　law　are　not　affected　by　the　degree　of　power　which　the　promisor　possesses　over　the　promised　event。　If　the　promised　event　does　not　come　to　pass；　the　plaintiff's　property　is　sold　to　satisfy　the　damages；　within　certain　limits；　which　the　promisee　has　suffered　by　the　failure。　The　consequences　are　the　same　in　kind　whether　the　promise　is　that　it　shall　rain；　or　that　another　man　shall　paint　a　picture；　or　that　the　promisor　will　deliver　a　bale　of　cotton。

＇300＇　If　the　legal　consequence　is　the　same　in　all　cases；　it　seems　proper　that　all　contracts　should　be　considered　from　the　same　legal　point　of　view。　In　the　case　of　a　binding　promise　that　it　shall　rain　to…morrow；　the　immediate　legal　effect　of　what　the　promisor　does　is；　that　he　takes　the　risk　of　the　event；　within　certain　defined　limits；　as　between　himself　and　the　promisee。　He　does　no　more　when　he　promises　to　deliver　a　bale　of　cotton。

If　it　be　proper　to　state　the　common…law　meaning　of　promise　and　contract　in　this　way；　it　has　the　advantage　of　freeing　the　subject　from　the　superfluous　theory　that　contract　is　a　qualified　subjection　of　one　will　to　another；　a　kind　of　limited　slavery。　It　might　be　so　regarded　if　the　law　compelled　men　to　perform　their　contracts；　or　if　it　allowed　promisees　to　exercise　such　compulsion。　If；　when　a　man　promised　to　labor　for　another；　the　law　made　him　do　it；　his　relation　to　his　promisee　might　be　called　a　servitude　ad　hoc　with　some　truth。　But　that　is　what　the　law　never　does。　It　never　interferes　until　a　promise　has　been　broken；　and　therefore　cannot　possibly　be　performed　according　to　its　tenor。　It　is　true　that　in　some　instances　equity　does　what　is　called　compelling　specific　performance。　But；　in　the　first　place；　I　am　speaking　of　the　common　law；　and；　in　the　next；　this　only　means　that　equity　compels　the　performance　of　certain　elements　of　the　total　promise　which　are　still　capable　of　performance。　For　instance；　take　a　promise　to　convey　lan