the common law-第62章

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ntiff　has　to　state　that　a　condition　has　been　performed　in　order　to　put　the　defendant　to　his　answer；　in　others；　it　is　left　to　the　defendant　to　set　up　that　a　condition　has　been　broken。

In　one　sense；　all　conditions　are　subsequent；　in　another；　all　are　precedent。　All　are　subsequent　to　the　first　stage　of　the　obligation。　/4/　Take；　for　instance；　the　case　of　a　promise　to　pay　for　work　if　done　to　the　satisfaction　of　an　architect。　The　condition　is　a　clear　case　of　what　is　called　a　condition　precedent。　There　can　be　no　duty　to　pay　until　the　architect　is　satisfied。　But　there　can　be　a　＇317＇　contract　before　that　moment；　because　the　determination　whether　the　promisor　shall　pay　or　not　is　no　longer　within　his　control。　Hence　the　condition　is　subsequent　to　the　existence　of　the　obligation。

On　the　other　hand；　every　condition　subsequent　is　precedent　to　the　incidence　of　the　burden　of　the　law。　If　we　look　at　the　law　as　it　would　be　regarded　by　one　who　had　no　scruples　against　doing　anything　which　he　could　do　without　incurring　legal　consequences；　it　is　obvious　that　the　main　consequence　attached　by　the　law　to　a　contract　is　a　greater　or　less　possibility　of　having　to　pay　money。　The　only　question　from　the　purely　legal　point　of　view　is　whether　the　promisor　will　be　compelled　to　pay。　And　the　important　moment　is　that　at　which　that　point　is　settled。　All　conditions　are　precedent　to　that。

But　all　conditions　are　precedent；　not　only　in　this　extreme　sense；　but　also　to　the　existence　of　the　plaintiff's　cause　of　action。　As　strong　a　case　as　can　be　put　is　that　of　a　policy　of　insurance　conditioned　to　be　void　if　not　sued　upon　within　one　year　from　a　failure　to　pay　as　agreed。　The　condition　does　not　come　into　play　until　a　loss　has　occurred；　the　duty　to　pay　has　been　neglected；　and　a　cause　of　action　has　arisen。　Nevertheless；　it　is　precedent　to　the　plaintiff's　cause　of　action。　When　a　man　sues；　the　question　is　not　whether　he　has　had　a　cause　of　action　in　the　past；　but　whether　he　has　one　then。　He　has　not　one　then；　unless　the　year　is　still　running。　If　it　were　left　for　the　defendant　to　set　up　the　lapse　of　the　year；　that　would　be　due　to　the　circumstance　that　the　order　of　pleading　does　not　require　a　plaintiff　to　meet　all　possible　defences；　and　to　set　out　a　case　unanswerable　except　by　denial。　The　point　at　which　the　law　calls　on　the　defendant　for　an　answer　varies　＇318＇　in　different　cases。　Sometimes　it　would　seem　to　be　governed　simply　by　convenience　of　proof；　requiring　the　party　who　has　the　affirmative　to　plead　and　prove　it。　Sometimes　there　seems　to　be　a　reference　to　the　usual　course　of　events；　and　matters　belong　to　the　defence　because　they　are　only　exceptionally　true。

The　most　logical　distinction　would　be　between　conditions　which　must　be　satisfied　before　a　promise　can　be　broken；　and　those　which；　like　the　last；　discharge　the　liability　after　a　breach　has　occurred。　/1/　But　this　is　of　the　slightest　possible　importance；　and　it　may　be　doubted　whether　another　case　like　the　last　could　be　found。

It　is　much　more　important　to　mark　the　distinction　between　a　stipulation　which　only　has　the　effect　of　confining　a　promise　to　certain　cases；　and　a　condition　properly　so　called。　Every　condition；　it　is　true；　has　this　effect　upon　the　promise　to　which　it　is　attached；　so　that；　whatever　the　rule　of　pleading　may　be；　/2/　a　promise　is　as　truly　kept　and　performed　by　doing　nothing　where　the　condition　of　the　stipulated　act　has　been　broken；　as　it　would　have　been　by　doing　the　act　if　the　condition　had　been　fulfilled。　But　if　this　were　all；　every　clause　in　a　contract　which　showed　what　the　promisor　did　not　promise　would　be　a　condition；　and　the　word　would　be　worse　than　useless。　The　characteristic　feature　is　quite　different。

A　condition　properly　so　called　is　an　event；　the　happening　of　which　authorizes　the　person　in　whose　favor　the　condition　is　reserved　to　treat　the　contract　as　if　it　had　not　been　made；to　avoid　it；　as　is　commonly　said；that　is；　to　insist　on　both　parties　being　restored　to　the　position　in　＇319＇　which　they　stood　before　the　contract　was　made。　When　a　condition　operates　as　such；　it　lets　in　an　outside　force　to　destroy　the　existing　state　of　things。　For　although　its　existence　is　due　to　consent　of　parties；　its　operation　depends　on　the　choice　of　one　of　them。　When　a　condition　is　broken；　the　person　entitled　to　insist　on　it　may　do　so　if　he　chooses；　but　he　may；　if　he　prefers；　elect　to　keep　the　contract　on　foot。　He　gets　his　right　to　avoid　it　from　the　agreement；　but　the　avoidance　comes　from　him。

Hence　it　is　important　to　distinguish　those　stipulations　which　have　this　extreme　effect　from　those　which　only　interpret　the　extent　of　a　promise；　or　define　the　events　to　which　it　applies。　And　as　it　has　just　been　shown　that　a　condition　need　not　be　insisted　on　as　such；　we　must　further　distinguish　between　its　operation　by　way　of　avoidance；　which　is　peculiar　to　it；　and　its　incidental　working　by　way　of　interpretation　and　definition；　in　common　with　other　clauses　not　conditions。

This　is　best　illustrated　by　taking　a　bilateral　contract　between　A　and　B；　where　A's　undertaking　is　conditional　on　B's　doing　what　he　promises　to　do；　and　where；　after　A　has　got　a　certain　distance　in　his　task；　B　breaks　his　half　of　the　bargain。　For　instance；　A　is　employed　as　a　clerk　by　B；　and　is　wrongfully　dismissed　in　the　middle　of　a　quarter。　In　favor　of　A；　the　contract　is　conditional　on　B's　keeping　his　agreement　to　employ　him。　Whether　A　insists　on　the　condition　or　not；　he　is　not　bound　to　do　any　more。　/1/　So　far；　the　condition　works　simply　by　way　of　definition。　It　establishes　that　A　has　not　promised　to　act　in　the　case　which　has　happened。　But　besides　this；　for　which　a　condition　＇320＇　was　not　necessary；　A　may　take　his　choice　between　two　courses。　In　the　first　place；　he　may　elect　to　avoid　the　contract。　In　that　case　the　parties　stand　as　if　no　contract　had　been　made；　and　A；　having　done　work　for　B　which　was　understood　not　to　be　gratuitous；　and　for　which　no　rate　of　compensation　has　been　fixed；　can　recover　what　the　jury　think　his　services　were　reasonably　worth。　The　contract　no　longer　determines　the　quid　pro　quo。　But　as　an　alternative　course　A　may　stand　by　the　contract　if　he　prefers　to　do　so；　and　sue　B　for　breaking　it。　In　that　case　he　can　recover　as　part　of　his　damages　pay　at　the　contract　rate　for　what　he　had　done；　as　well　as　compensation　for　his　loss　of　opportunity　to　finish　it。　But　the　points　which　are　material　for　the　present　discussion　are；　that　these　two　remedies　are　mutually　exclusive；　/1/　one　supposing　the　contract　to　be　relied　on；　the　other　that　it　is　set　aside；　but　that　A's　stopping　work　and　doing　no　more　after　B's　breach　is　equally　consistent　with　either　choice；　and　has　in　fact　nothing　to　do　with　the　matter。

One　word　should　be　added　to　avoid　misapprehension。　When　it　is　said　that　A　has　done　all　that　he　promised　to　do　in　the　case　which　has　happened；　it　is　not　meant　that　he　is　necessarily　entitled　to　the　same　compensation　as　if　he　had　done　the　larger　amount　of　work。　B's　promise　in　the　case　supposed　was　to　pay　so　much　a　quarter　for　services；　and　although　the　consideration　of　the　promise　was　the　promise　by　A　to　perform　them；　the　scope　of　it　was　limited　to　the　case　of　their　being　performed　in　fact。　Hence　A　could　not　simply　wait　till　the　end　of　his　term；　and　then　recover　the　full　amount　which　he　would　have　had　if　the　employment　had　continued。　Nor　is　he　any　more　entitled　to　do　so　from　＇321＇　the　fact　that　it　was　B's　fault　that　the　services　were　not　rendered。　B's　answer　to　any　such　claim　is　perfect。　He　is　only　liable　upon　a　promise；　and　he　in　his　turn　only　promised　to　pay　in　a　case　which　has　not　happened。　He　did　promise　to　employ；　however；　and　for　not　doing　that　he　is　liable　in　damages。

One　or　two　more　illustrations　will　be　useful。　A　promises　to　deliver；　and　B　promises　to　accept　and　pay　for；　certain　goods　at　a　certain　time　and　place。　When　the　time　comes；　neither　party　is　on　hand。　Neither　would　be　liable　to　an　action；　and；　according　to　what　has　been　said；　each　has　done　all　that　he　promised　to　do　in　the　event　which　has　happened；　to　wit；　nothing。　It　might　be　objected　that；　if　A　has　done　all　that　he　is　bound　to　do；　he　ought　to　be　able　to　sue　B；　since　performance　or　readiness　to　perform　was　all　that　was　necessary　to　give　him　that　right；　and　conversely　the　same　might　be　said　o