wealbk04-第24章

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colonies。

　　　　　Drawbacks；　however；　it　must　always　be　understood；　are　useful

only　in　those　cases　in　which　the　goods　for　the　exportation　of

which　they　are　given　are　really　exported　to　some　foreign　country；

and　not　clandestinely　re…imported　into　our　own。　That　some

drawbacks；　particularly　those　upon　tobacco；　have　frequently　been

abused　in　this　manner；　and　have　given　occasion　to　many　frauds

equally　hurtful　both　to　the　revenue　and　to　the　fair　trader；　is

well　known。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　CHAPTER　V



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Of　Bounties　



　　　　　BOUNTIES　upon　exportation　are；　in　Great　Britain；　frequently

petitioned　for；　and　sometimes　granted　to　the　produce　of

particular　branches　of　domestic　industry。　By　means　of　them　our

merchants　and　manufacturers；　it　is　pretended；　will　be　enabled　to

sell　their　goods　as　cheap；　or　cheaper　than　their　rivals　in　the

foreign　market。　A　greater　quantity；　it　is　said；　will　thus　be

exported；　and　the　balance　of　trade　consequently　turned　more　in

favour　of　our　own　country。　We　cannot　give　our　workmen　a　monopoly

in　the　foreign　as　we　have　done　in　the　home　market。　We　cannot

force　foreigners　to　buy　their　goods　as　we　have　done　our　own

countrymen。　The　next　best　expedient；　it　has　been　thought；

therefore；　is　to　pay　them　for　buying。　It　is　in　this　manner　that

the　mercantile　system　proposes　to　enrich　the　whole　country；　and

to　put　money　into　all　our　pockets　by　means　of　the　balance　of

trade。

　　　　　Bounties；　it　is　allowed；　ought　to　be　given　to　those　branches

of　trade　only　which　cannot　be　carried　on　without　them。　But　every

branch　of　trade　in　which　the　merchant　can　sell　his　goods　for　a

price　which　replaces　to　him；　with　the　ordinary　profits　of　stock；

the　whole　capital　employed　in　preparing　and　sending　them　to

market；　can　be　carried　on　without　a　bounty。　Every　such　branch　is

evidently　upon　a　level　with　all　the　other　branches　of　trade　which

are　carried　on　without　bounties；　and　cannot　therefore　require　one

more　than　they。　Those　trades　only　require　bounties　in　which　the

merchant　is　obliged　to　sell　his　goods　for　a　price　which　does　not

replace　to　him　his　capital；　together　with　the　ordinary　profit；　or

in　which　he　is　obliged　to　sell　them　for　less　than　it　really　costs

him　to　send　them　to　market。　The　bounty　is　given　in　order　to　make

up　this　loss；　and　to　encourage　him　to　continue；　or　perhaps　to

begin；　a　trade　of　which　the　expense　is　supposed　to　be　greater

than　the　returns；　of　which　every　operation　eats　up　a　part　of　the

capital　employed　in　it；　and　which　is　of　such　a　nature　that；　if

all　other　trades　resembled　it；　there　would　soon　be　no　capital

left　in　the　country。

　　　　　The　trades；　it　is　to　be　observed；　which　are　carried　on　by

means　of　bounties；　are　the　only　ones　which　can　be　carried　on

between　two　nations　for　any　considerable　time　together；　in　such　a

manner　as　that　one　of　them　shall　always　and　regularly　lose；　or

sell　its　goods　for　less　than　it　really　costs　to　send　them　to

market。　But　if　the　bounty　did　not　repay　to　the　merchant　what　he

would　otherwise　lose　upon　the　price　of　his　goods；　his　own

interest　would　soon　oblige　him　to　employ　his　stock　in　another

way；　or　to　find　out　a　trade　in　which　the　price　of　the　goods　would

replace　to　him；　with　the　ordinary　profit；　the　capital　employment

in　sending　them　to　market。　The　effect　of　bounties；　like　that　of

all　the　other　expedients　of　the　mercantile　system；　can　only　be　to

force　the　trade　of　a　country　into　a　channel　much　less

advantageous　than　that　in　which　it　would　naturally　run　of　its　own

accord。

　　　　　The　ingenious　and　well…informed　author　of　the　tracts　upon

the　corn　trade　has　shown　very　clearly　that；　since　the　bounty　upon

the　exportation　of　corn　was　first　established；　the　price　of　the

corn　exported；　valued　moderately　enough；　has　exceeded　that　of　the

corn　imported；　valued　very　high；　by　a　much　greater　sum　than　the

amount　of　the　whole　bounties　which　have　been　paid　during　that

period。　This；　he　imagines；　upon　the　true　principles　of　the

mercantile　system；　is　a　clear　proof　that　this　forced　corn　trade

is　beneficial　to　the　nation；　the　value　of　the　exportation

exceeding　that　of　the　importation　by　a　much　greater　sum　than　the

whole　extraordinary　expense　which　the　public　has　been　at　in　order

to　get　it　exported。　He　does　not　consider　that　this　extraordinary

expense；　or　the　bounty；　is　the　smallest　part　of　the　expense　which

the　exportation　of　corn　really　costs　the　society。　The　capital

which　the　farmer　employed　in　raising　it　must　likewise　be　taken

into　the　account。　Unless　the　price　of　the　corn　when　sold　in　the

foreign　markets　replaces；　not　only　the　bounty；　but　this　capital；

together　with　the　ordinary　profits　of　stock；　the　society　is　a

loser　by　the　difference；　or　the　national　stock　is　so　much

diminished。　But　the　very　reason　for　which　it　has　been　thought

necessary　to　grant　a　bounty　is　the　supposed　insufficiency　of　the

price　to　do　this。

　　　　　The　average　price　of　corn；　it　has　been　said；　has　fallen

considerably　since　the　establishment　of　the　bounty。　That　the

average　price　of　corn　began　to　fall　somewhat　towards　the　end　of

the　last　century；　and　has　continued　to　do　so　during　the　course　of

the　sixty…four　first　years　of　the　present；　I　have　already

endeavoured　to　show。　But　this　event；　supposing　it　to　be　as　real

as　I　believe　it　to　be；　must　have　happened　in　spite　of　the　bounty；

and　cannot　possibly　have　happened　in　consequence　of　it。　It　has

happened　in　France；　as　well　as　in　England；　though　in　France　there

was　not　only　no　bounty；　but；　till　1764；　the　exportation　of　corn

was　subjected　to　a　general　prohibition。　This　gradual　fall　in　the

average　price　of　grain；　it　is　probable；　therefore；　is　ultimately

owing　neither　to　the　one　regulation　nor　to　the　other。　but　to　that

gradual　and　insensible　rise　in　the　real　value　of　silver；　which；

in　the　first　book　in　this　discourse；　I　have　endeavoured　to　show

has　taken　place　in　the　general　market　of　Europe　during　the　course

of　the　present　century。　It　seems　to　be　altogether　impossible　that

the　bounty　could　ever　contribute　to　lower　the　price　of　grain。

　　　　　In　years　of　plenty；　it　has　already　been　observed；　the

bounty；　by　occasioning　an　extraordinary　exportation；　necessarily

keeps　up　the　price　of　corn　in　the　home　market　above　what　it　would

naturally　fall　to。　To　do　so　was　the　avowed　purpose　of　the

institution。　In　years　of　scarcity；　though　the　bounty　is

frequently　suspended；　yet　the　great　exportation　which　it

occasions　in　years　of　plenty　must　frequently　hinder　more　or　less

the　plenty　of　one　year　from　relieving　the　scarcity　of　another。

Both　in　years　of　plenty　and　in　years　of　scarcity；　therefore；　the

bounty　necessarily　tends　to　raise　the　money　price　of　corn

somewhat　higher　than　it　otherwise　would　be　in　the　home　market。

　　　　　That；　in　the　actual　state　of　tillage；　the　bounty　must

necessarily　have　this　tendency　will　not；　I　apprehend；　be　disputed

by　any　reasonable　person。　But　it　has　been　thought　by　many　people

that　it　tends　to　encourage　tillage；　and　that　in　two　different

ways；　first；　by　opening　a　more　extensive　foreign　market　to　the

corn　of　the　farmer；　it　tends；　they　imagine；　to　increase　the

demand　for；　and　consequently　the　production　of　that　commodity；

and　secondly；　by　securing　to　him　a　better　price　than　he　could

otherwise　expect　in　the　actual　state　of　tillage；　it　tends；　they

suppose；　to　encourage　tillage。　This　double　encouragement　must；

they　imagine；　in　a　long　period　of　years；　occasion　such　an

increase　in　the　production　of　corn　as　may　lower　its　price　in　the

home　market　much　more　than　the　bounty　can　raise　it；　in　the　actual

state　which　tillage　may；　at　the　end　of　that　period；　happen　to　be

in。

　　　　　I　answer；　that　whatever　extension　of　the　foreign　market　can

be　occasioned　by　the　bounty　must；　in　every　particular　year；　be

altogether　at　the　expense　of　the　home　market；　as　every　bushel　of

corn　which　is　exported　by　means　of　the　bounty；　and　which　would

not　have　been　exported　without　the　bounty；　would　have　remained　in

the　home　market　to　increase　the　consumption　and　to　lower　the

price　of　that　commodity。　The　corn　bounty；　it　is　to　be　observed；

as　well　as　every　other　bounty　upon