贝壳电子书 > 英文原著电子书 > the commonwealth of oceana >

第15章

the commonwealth of oceana-第15章

小说: the commonwealth of oceana 字数: 每页4000字

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页,按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页,按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部!
————未阅读完?加入书签已便下次继续阅读!



beneficiaries; or military colonies; it must be either for life; and this an army of Oceaners in their own country; especially having estates of inheritance; will never bear because such an army so planted is as well confiscated as the people; nor had the Mamelukes been contented with such usage in Egypt; but that they were foreigners; and daring not to mix with the natives; it was of absolute necessity to their being。     Or planting them upon inheritance; whether aristocratically as the Neustrians; or democratically as the Israelites; they grow up by certain consequences into the national interest; and this; if they be planted popularly; comes to a commonwealth; if by way of nobility; to a mixed monarchy; which of all other will be found to be the only kind of monarchy whereof this nation; or any other that is of no greater extent; has been or can be capable; for if the Israelites; though their democratical balance; being fixed by their agrarian; stood firm; be yet found to have elected kings; it was because; their territory lying open; they were perpetually invaded; and being perpetually invaded; turned themselves to anything which; through the want of experience; they thought might be a remedy; whence their mistake in election of their kings; under whom they gained nothing; but; on the contrary; lost all they had acquired by their commonwealth; both estates and liberties; is not only apparent; but without parallel。 And if there have been; as was shown; a kingdom of the Goths in Spain; and of the Vandals in Asia; consisting of a single person and a Parliament (taking a parliament to be a council of the people only; without a nobility); it is expressly said of those councils that they deposed their kings as often as they pleased; nor can there be any other consequence of such a government; seeing where there is a council of the people they do never receive laws; but give them; and a council giving laws to a single person; he has no means in the world whereby to be any more than a subordinate magistrate but force: in which case he is not a single person and a parliament; but a single person and an army; which army again must be planted as has been shown; or can be of no long continuance。     It is true; that the provincial balance bring in nature quite contrary to the national; you are no way to plant a provincial army upon dominion。 But then you must have a native territory in strength; situation; or government; able to overbalance the foreign; or you can never hold it。 That an army should in any other case be long supported by a mere tax; is a mere fancy as void of all reason and experience as if a man should think to maintain such a one by robbing of orchards; for a mere tax is but pulling of plum…trees; the roots whereof are in other men's grounds; who; suffering perpetual violence; come to hate the author of it; and it is a maxim; that no prince that is hated by his people can be safe。 Arms planted upon dominion extirpate enemies and make friends; but maintained by a mere tax; have enemies that have roots; and friends that have none。     To conclude; Oceana; or any other nation of no greater extent; must have a competent nobility; or is altogether incapable of monarchy; for where there is equality of estates; there must be equality of power; and where there is equality of power; there can be no monarchy。     To come then to the generation of the commonwealth。 It has been shown how; through the ways and means used by Panurgus to abase the nobility; and so to mend that flaw which we have asserted to be incurable in this kind of constitution; he suffered the balance to fall into the power of the people; and so broke the government; but the balance being in the people; the commonwealth (though they do not see it) is already in the nature of them。 There wants nothing else but time; which is slow and dangerous; or art; which would be more quick and secure; for the bringing those native arms; wherewithal they are found already; to resist; they know not how; everything that opposes them; to such maturity as may fix them upon their own strength and bottom。     But whereas this art is prudence; and that part of prudence which regards the present work is nothing else but the skill of raising such superstructures of government as are natural to the known foundations; they never mind the foundation; but through certain animosities; wherewith by striving one against another they are infected; or through freaks; by which; not regarding the course of things; nor how they conduce to their purpose; they are given to building in the air; come to be divided and subdivided into endless parties and factions; both civil and ecclesiastical; which; briefly to open; I shall first speak of the people in general; and then of their divisions。     A people; says Machiavel; that is corrupt; is not capable of a commonwealth。 But in showing what a corrupt people is; he has either involved himself; or me; nor can I otherwise come out of the labyrinth; than by saying; the balance altering a people; as to the foregoing government; must of necessity be corrupt; but corruption in this sense signifies no more than that the corruption of one government; as in natural bodies; is the generation of another。 Wherefore if the balance alters from monarchy; the corruption of the people in this case is that which makes them capable of a commonwealth。 But whereas I am not ignorant that the corruption which he means is in manners; this also is from the balance。 For the balance leading from monarchical into popular abates the luxury of the nobility; and; enriching the people; brings the government from a more private to a more public interest which coming nearer; as has been shown; to justice and right reason; the people upon a like alteration is so far from such a corruption of manners as should render them incapable of a commonwealth; that of necessity they must thereby contract such a reformation of manners as will bear no other kind of government。 On the other side; where the balance changes from popular to oligarchical or monarchical; the public interest; with the reason and justice included in the sane; becomes more private; luxury is introduced in the room of temperance; and servitude in that of freedom; which causes such a corruption of manners both in the nobility and people; as; by the example of Rome in the time of the Triumvirs; is more at large discovered by the author to have been altogether incapable of a commonwealth。     But the balance of Oceana changing quite contrary to that of Rome; the manners of the people were not thereby corrupted; but; on the contrary; adapted to a commonwealth。 For differences of opinion in a people not rightly informed of their balance; or a division into parties (while there is not any common ligament of power sufficient to reconcile or hold them) is no sufficient proof of corruption。 Nevertheless; seeing this must needs be matter of scandal and danger; it will not be amiss; in showing what were the parties; to show what were their errors。     The parties into which this nation was divided; were temporal or spiritual; and the temporal parties were especially two; the one royalists; the other republicans; each of which asserted their different causes; either out of prudence or ignorance; out of interest or conscience。     For prudence; either that of the ancients is inferior to the modern; which we have hitherto been setting face to face; that anyone may judge; or that of the royalist must be inferior to that of the commonwealths man。 And for interest; taking the commonwealths man to have really intended the public; for otherwise he is a hypocrite and the worst of men; that of the royalist must of necessity have been more private。 Wherefore; the whole dispute will come upon matter of conscience; and this; whether it be urged by the right of kings; the obligation of former laws; or of the oath of allegiance; is absolved by the balance。     For if the right of kings were as immediately derived from the breath of God as the life of man; yet this excludes not death and dissolution。 But; that the dissolution of the late monarchy was as natural as the death of man; has been already shown。 Wherefore it remains with the royalists to discover 

返回目录 上一页 下一页 回到顶部 0 0

你可能喜欢的