cyprus, as i saw it in 1879-第96章

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army　of　the　Czar　retired　from　the　gates　of　the　capital；　the　nation
bankrupt　beyond　all　hopes　of　liquidation；　the　various　states　in　chronic
discontent　both　in　Europe　and　in　Asia；　and　the　claims　of　Greece
threatening　to　explode　the　combustible　materials；　we　may　well　appreciate
the　back…door　that　has　so　frequently　afforded　a　retreat　from　an
untenable　position。

If　it　is　necessary　for　England　to　form　a　defensive　alliance　with　Turkey
as　a　crippled　Power；　with　Russia　actually　established　in　Asia　Minor；　why
should　we　have　waited　until　Turkey　was　mortally　stricken；　when　by　an
earlier　alliance　we　could　have　at　least　saved　Asia　Minor　in　its
integrity？　We　have　let　the　lion　into　the　house　with　a　boast　that　we　will
turn　him　out　in　the　event　of　further　roaring；　instead　of　having
prevented　his　entry　in　the　first　instance。

Under　all　the　circumstances　of　the　risk　and　responsibility　assumed　by
England　in　a　defensive　alliance　with　Turkey　under　the　title　of　a
Protectorate　of　Asia　Minor；　the　Cyprus　Convention　is　highly　unfavourable
in　its　conditions。　The　island　should　have　been　simply　conveyed　from
Turkey　and　transferred　as　a　free　gift　to　England；　as　a　position
necessary　for　her　occupation　under　the　probable　contingencies　of　the
Anglo…Turkish　alliance；　and　it　should　have　at　once　become　a　portion　of
the　British　Empire。　Had　this　course　been　pursued　a　mutual　confidence
would　have　been　established；　on　the　other　hand；　all　back…doors　would
have　been　sealed；　as　we　should　have　been　bound　by　all　the　laws　of　honour
to　defend　Turkey　to　the　last　extremity　in　Asia　Minor。

Russia；　in　Kars；　occupies　a　position　which　affords　an　unbounded　horizon
for　political　intrigue。　The　various　Turkish　Pachas　and　other　district
authorities　throughout　Asia　Minor　have　witnessed　the　irresistible
advance　of　Russia；　while　England　stood　afar　off；　and　only　assisted
Turkey　with　her　good　counsel。　The　same　authorities　now　see　Russia　in
possession；　while　England；　who　has　not　assisted　during　the　bloody
struggle；　appears　upon　the　scene　as　a　political　Paul　Pry；　and　intrudes
upon　the　mysteries　that　surround　Pachas；　Governors；　and　various
functionaries；　who；　from　the　highest　to　the　lowest　official；　mainly
exist　upon　extortion。

It　is　hardly　necessary　to　explain　that　British　assistance　in　such　a　form
will　be　most　unwelcome；　and　will　increase　our　reputation　for
intermeddling　while　in　the　hour　of　extremity　we　withhold　the　required
aid。　Any　interference　on　our　part　with　the　administration　of　Asia　Minor
will　cause　an　extreme　jealousy　and　suspicion　throughout　all　classes　of
Turkish　officials；　who　will　be　rendered　the　more　amenable　to　the　guiles
of　Russian　intrigues　from　Kars　and　Ardahan。　A　very　slight　knowledge　of
Turkish　character　would　induce　the　natural　conclusion。　The　English　would
be　suspected　of　coveting　Asia　Minor；　as　they　had　already　obtained
Cyprus；　and　Russia　would　have　gained　her　end　in　destroying　all
confidence　that　might　possibly　have　existed；　and　thus　endanger　the
defensive　alliance。

There　are　serious　risks　that　might　enforce　the　advance　of　Russian　troops
beyond　the　defined　frontier。　Already　there　are　reports　of　general
discontent　and　threatened　disturbances。　In　the　event　of　a　mutiny　of
Turkish　troops　on　the　Russian　border；　the　Russians　might　be　invited　to
assist　by　the　Pacha　in　command。　Sometimes　such　revolts　are　factitious；
for　political　purposes。　In　all　cases　the　position　of　Russia　in　Asia
Minor　is　one　of　extreme　danger　to　Turkey；　and　it　is　far　from　improbable
that　activity　on　her　side；　and　passiveness　upon　ours；　may　terminate　in　a
friendship　between　the　Russians　and　the　Turks　to　the　detriment　of
British　interests；　and　to　the　confusion　of　the　assumed　Protectorate。
This　document　distinctly　states：If　〃Batoum；　Ardahan；　Kars；　or　any　of
them　shall　be　retained　by　Russia；　and　if　any　further　attempt　shall　be
made　at　any　future　time　by　Russia　to　take　possession　of　any　further
territories　of　his　Imperial　Majesty　the　Sultan　in　Asia　as　fixed　by　the
definitive　treaty　of　peace；　England　engages　to　join　his　Imperial　Majesty
the　Sultan　in　defending　them　by　force　of　arms。〃

In　a　despatch　from　Lord　Salisbury　to　Sir　A。　H。　Layard；　dated　30th　May；
1878；　these　ominous　words　are　contained：

　　　〃Even　if　it　be　certain　that　Batoum　and　Ardahan
　　　and　Kars　will　not　become　the　base　from　which
　　　emissaries　of　intrigue　will　issue　forth；　to　be　in　due
　　　time　followed　by　invading　armies；　the　mere　retention
　　　of　them　by　Russia　will　exercise　a　powerful　influence
　　　in　disintegrating　the　Asiatic　dominion　of　the　Porte。〃

In　the　same　lengthy　despatch　the　conditions　are　described　which　Turkey
must　fulfil　in　reforming　the　abuses　of　the　present　administration；　&c。
&c。；　and　there　can　be　no　doubt　that　the　British　government　contemplated
the　necessity　of　supplanting　a　considerable　number　of　the　peculant
Turkish　officials　by　experienced　English　officers；　whose　supervision
would　ensure　the　necessary　reforms。　If　such　a　course　should　have　been
accepted　by　the　Porte　there　could　be　no　question　of　the　salutary　effect；
as　the　presence　of　British　officials　in　actual　authority　throughout　the
provinces　of　Asia　Minor　would　have　proved　to　the　various　races　our
positive　determination　to　uphold　their　rights；　and　to　defend　them　from
the　oppression　and　extortion　to　which　they　had　been　subjected。　Such　a
position　would　have　given　England　the　control　that　is　absolutely
necessary　to　effect　the　reforms　in　the　administration　of　Asia　Minor；
without　which　the　result　will　be　anarchy　and　revolution　within　a　few
years；　fostered　by　Russia　precisely　in　accordance　with　the　policy　that
has　terminated　in　the　disruption　of　Turkey　in　Europe。

In　the　same　despatch　of　30th　May；　1878；　Lord　Salisbury　continues：

　　　　〃Her　Majesty's　Government　intimated　to　the　Porte　on　the
　　　　occasion　of　the　Conference　at　Constantinople　that　they
　　　　were　not　prepared　to　sanction　misgovernment　and
　　　　oppression；　and　it　will　be　requisite　before　they　can
　　　　enter　into　any　agreement　for　the　defence　of　the　Asiatic
　　　　territories　of　the　Porte　in　certain　eventualities；　that
　　　　they　should　be　formally　assured　of　the　intention　of　the
　　　　Porte　to　introduce　the　necessary　reforms　into　the
　　　　government　of　the　Christian　and　other　subjects　of　the
　　　　Porte　in　those　regions。　IT　IS　NOT　DESIRABLE　TO　REQUIRE
　　　　MORE　THAN　AN　ENGAGEMENT　IN　GENERAL　TERMS；　FOR　THE
　　　　SPECIFIC　MEASURES　TO　BE　TAKEN　COULD　ONLY　BE　DEFINED
　　　　AFTER　A　MORE　CAREFUL　INQUIRY　AND　DELIBERATION　THAN
　　　　COULD　BE　SECURED　AT　THE　PRESENT　JUNCTURE。〃

The　italics　are　my　own；　for　the　weak　point　of　the　Convention　is
exhibited　by　this　sentence。

No　〃general　terms〃　should　ever　be　mentioned　in　a　communication　with
Orientals；　and　no　convention　should　have　been　concluded　with　the　Porte；
unless　every　detail　had　been　previously　considered　and　specially　agreed
upon　between　the　contracting　parties。　When　this　Convention　was　made
public；　I　concluded　that　the　British　government　contemplated　the
official　employment　of　a　certain　number　of　their　own　officers　to　carry
out　the　spirit　of　the　agreement；　without　which　the　Convention　would　be　a
farce；　at　the　same　time　I　was　convinced　that　the　suspicions　of　the
Turkish　government　and　the　stubborn　pride　of　the　race　would　resist　any
such　direct　interference　upon　the　part　of　England。　Under　these
conditions　Asia　Minor　would　remain　exactly　where　it　was。　A　grand　scheme
which　would　have　had　immense　political　results；　had　the　Turks　accepted
our　interference　in　the　honourable　spirit　of　our　intentions；　has　been
frustrated　by　their　want　of　confidence；　and　the　Convention　remains；
containing　an　agreement　of　stupendous　importance；　by　which　England　is
committed　to　a　military　undertaking　of　the　first　magnitude；　while　Turkey
risks　nothing　except　her　〃PROMISES　OF　REFORM　in　the　administration　of
her　Asiatic　provinces。〃

〃British　interests〃　in　this　transaction　are　represented　by　Cyprus；　which
we　occupy　as　tenantspaying　96；000　pounds　a　year　for　the　ruined　house；
and　leaving　ourselves　no　balance　from　the　revenue　for　the　necessary
repairs。

There　is　no　more　difficult　political　associate　than　the　Turk；　his
defensive　weapon　is　delay；　and　in　moments　of　the　greatest　emergency　his
peculiar　apa