heretics-第13章

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The　fact　is　very　simple。　　Unless　you　are　going　deliberately　to　prevent



a　thing　being　good；　you　cannot　prevent　it　being　worth　fighting　for。



It　is　impossible　to　prevent　a　possible　conflict　of　civilizations；



because　it　is　impossible　to　prevent　a　possible　conflict　between　ideals。



If　there　were　no　longer　our　modern　strife　between　nations；　there　would



only　be　a　strife　between　Utopias。　　For　the　highest　thing　does　not　tend



to　union　only；　the　highest　thing；　tends　also　to　differentiation。



You　can　often　get　men　to　fight　for　the　union；　but　you　can



never　prevent　them　from　fighting　also　for　the　differentiation。



This　variety　in　the　highest　thing　is　the　meaning　of　the　fierce　patriotism；



the　fierce　nationalism　of　the　great　European　civilization。



It　is　also；　incidentally；　the　meaning　of　the　doctrine　of　the　Trinity。







But　I　think　the　main　mistake　of　Mr。　Wells's　philosophy　is　a　somewhat



deeper　one；　one　that　he　expresses　in　a　very　entertaining　manner



in　the　introductory　part　of　the　new　Utopia。　　His　philosophy　in　some



sense　amounts　to　a　denial　of　the　possibility　of　philosophy　itself。



At　least；　he　maintains　that　there　are　no　secure　and　reliable



ideas　upon　which　we　can　rest　with　a　final　mental　satisfaction。



It　will　be　both　clearer；　however；　and　more　amusing　to　quote



Mr。　Wells　himself。







He　says；　〃Nothing　endures；　nothing　is　precise　and　certain



（except　the　mind　of　a　pedant）。　。　。　。　Being　indeed！there　is　no　being；



but　a　universal　becoming　of　individualities；　and　Plato　turned　his　back



on　truth　when　he　turned　towards　his　museum　of　specific　ideals。〃



Mr。　Wells　says；　again；　〃There　is　no　abiding　thing　in　what　we　know。



We　change　from　weaker　to　stronger　lights；　and　each　more　powerful



light　pierces　our　hitherto　opaque　foundations　and　reveals



fresh　and　different　opacities　below。〃　　Now；　when　Mr。　Wells



says　things　like　this；　I　speak　with　all　respect　when　I　say



that　he　does　not　observe　an　evident　mental　distinction。



It　cannot　be　true　that　there　is　nothing　abiding　in　what　we　know。



For　if　that　were　so　we　should　not　know　it　all　and　should　not　call



it　knowledge。　　Our　mental　state　may　be　very　different　from　that



of　somebody　else　some　thousands　of　years　back；　but　it　cannot　be



entirely　different；　or　else　we　should　not　be　conscious　of　a　difference。



Mr。　Wells　must　surely　realize　the　first　and　simplest　of　the　paradoxes



that　sit　by　the　springs　of　truth。　　He　must　surely　see　that　the　fact



of　two　things　being　different　implies　that　they　are　similar。



The　hare　and　the　tortoise　may　differ　in　the　quality　of　swiftness；



but　they　must　agree　in　the　quality　of　motion。　　The　swiftest　hare



cannot　be　swifter　than　an　isosceles　triangle　or　the　idea　of　pinkness。



When　we　say　the　hare　moves　faster；　we　say　that　the　tortoise　moves。



And　when　we　say　of　a　thing　that　it　moves；　we　say；　without　need



of　other　words；　that　there　are　things　that　do　not　move。



And　even　in　the　act　of　saying　that　things　change；　we　say　that　there



is　something　unchangeable。







But　certainly　the　best　example　of　Mr。　Wells's　fallacy　can　be



found　in　the　example　which　he　himself　chooses。　　It　is　quite　true



that　we　see　a　dim　light　which；　compared　with　a　darker　thing；



is　light；　but　which；　compared　with　a　stronger　light；　is　darkness。



But　the　quality　of　light　remains　the　same　thing；　or　else　we



should　not　call　it　a　stronger　light　or　recognize　it　as　such。



If　the　character　of　light　were　not　fixed　in　the　mind；　we　should　be



quite　as　likely　to　call　a　denser　shadow　a　stronger　light；　or　vice



versa　If　the　character　of　light　became　even　for　an　instant　unfixed；



if　it　became　even　by　a　hair's…breadth　doubtful；　if；　for　example；



there　crept　into　our　idea　of　light　some　vague　idea　of　blueness；



then　in　that　flash　we　have　become　doubtful　whether　the　new　light



has　more　light　or　less。　　In　brief；　the　progress　may　be　as　varying



as　a　cloud；　but　the　direction　must　be　as　rigid　as　a　French　road。



North　and　South　are　relative　in　the　sense　that　I　am　North　of　Bournemouth



and　South　of　Spitzbergen。　　But　if　there　be　any　doubt　of　the　position



of　the　North　Pole；　there　is　in　equal　degree　a　doubt　of　whether　I



am　South　of　Spitzbergen　at　all。　　The　absolute　idea　of　light　may　be



practically　unattainable。　　We　may　not　be　able　to　procure　pure　light。



We　may　not　be　able　to　get　to　the　North　Pole。　　But　because　the　North



Pole　is　unattainable；　it　does　not　follow　that　it　is　indefinable。



And　it　is　only　because　the　North　Pole　is　not　indefinable　that　we



can　make　a　satisfactory　map　of　Brighton　and　Worthing。







In　other　words；　Plato　turned　his　face　to　truth　but　his　back　on



Mr。　H。　G。　Wells；　when　he　turned　to　his　museum　of　specified　ideals。



It　is　precisely　here　that　Plato　shows　his　sense。　　It　is　not　true



that　everything　changes；　the　things　that　change　are　all　the　manifest



and　material　things。　　There　is　something　that　does　not　change；



and　that　is　precisely　the　abstract　quality；　the　invisible　idea。



Mr。　Wells　says　truly　enough；　that　a　thing　which　we　have　seen　in　one



connection　as　dark　we　may　see　in　another　connection　as　light。



But　the　thing　common　to　both　incidents　is　the　mere　idea　of　light



which　we　have　not　seen　at　all。　　Mr。　Wells　might　grow　taller　and　taller



for　unending　aeons　till　his　head　was　higher　than　the　loneliest　star。



I　can　imagine　his　writing　a　good　novel　about　it。　　In　that　case



he　would　see　the　trees　first　as　tall　things　and　then　as　short　things；



he　would　see　the　clouds　first　as　high　and　then　as　low。



But　there　would　remain　with　him　through　the　ages　in　that　starry



loneliness　the　idea　of　tallness；　he　would　have　in　the　awful　spaces



for　companion　and　comfort　the　definite　conception　that　he　was　growing



taller　and　not　（for　instance）　growing　fatter。







And　now　it　comes　to　my　mind　that　Mr。　H。　G。　Wells　actually　has　written



a　very　delightful　romance　about　men　growing　as　tall　as　trees；



and　that　here；　again；　he　seems　to　me　to　have　been　a　victim　of　this



vague　relativism。　　〃The　Food　of　the　Gods〃　is；　like　Mr。　Bernard



Shaw's　play；　in　essence　a　study　of　the　Superman　idea。　　And　it　lies；



I　think；　even　through　the　veil　of　a　half…pantomimic　allegory；



open　to　the　same　intellectual　attack。　　We　cannot　be　expected　to　have



any　regard　for　a　great　creature　if　he　does　not　in　any　manner　conform



to　our　standards。　　For　unless　he　passes　our　standard　of　greatness



we　cannot　even　call　him　great。　　Nietszche　summed　up　all　that　is



interesting　in　the　Superman　idea　when　he　said；　〃Man　is　a　thing



which　has　to　be　surpassed。〃　　But　the　very　word　〃surpass〃　implies



the　existence　of　a　standard　common　to　us　and　the　thing　surpassing　us。



If　the　Superman　is　more　manly　than　men　are；　of　course　they　will



ultimately　deify　him；　even　if　they　happen　to　kill　him　first。



But　if　he　is　simply　more　supermanly；　they　may　be　quite　indifferent



to　him　as　they　would　be　to　another　seemingly　aimless　monstrosity。



He　must　submit　to　our　test　even　in　order　to　overawe　us。



Mere　force　or　size　even　is　a　standard；　but　that　alone　will　never



make　men　think　a　man　their　superior。　　Giants；　as　in　the　wise　old



fairy…tales；　are　vermin。　　Supermen；　if　not　good　men；　are　vermin。







〃The　Food　of　the　Gods〃　is　the　tale　of　〃Jack　the　Giant…Killer〃



told　from　the　point　of　view　of　the　giant。　　This　has　not；　I　think；



been　done　before　in　literature；　but　I　have　little　doubt　that　the



psychological　substance　of　it　existed　in　fact。　　I　have　little　doubt



that　the　giant　whom　Jack　killed　did　regard　himself　as　the　Superman。



It　is　likely　enough　that　he　considered　Jack　a　narrow　and　parochial　person



who　wished　to　frustrate　a　great　forward　movement　of　the　life…force。



If　（as　not　unfrequently　w