darwin and modern science-第157章

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n　continuous　evolution　it　could　perhaps　still　find　an　analogy　to　the　inner　evolution　of　ideas　in　the　mind；　but　in　the　demand　for　power　in　order　to　struggle　with　outward　conditions　Realism　seemed　to　announce　itself　in　its　most　brutal　form。　　Every　form　of　Idealism　had　to　ask　itself　seriously　how　it　was　going　to　〃struggle　for　life〃　with　this　new　Realism。

We　will　now　give　a　short　account　of　the　position　which　leading　thinkers　in　different　countries　have　taken　up　in　regard　to　this　question。

I。　　Herbert　Spencer　was　the　philosopher　whose　mind　was　best　prepared　by　his　own　previous　thinking　to　admit　the　theory　of　Darwin　to　a　place　in　his　conception　of　the　world。　　His　criticism　of　the　arguments　which　had　been　put　forward　against　the　hypothesis　of　Lamarck；　showed　that　Spencer；　as　a　young　man；　was　an　adherent　to　the　evolution　idea。　　In　his　〃Social　Statics〃　（1850）　he　applied　this　idea　to　human　life　and　moral　civilisation。　　In　1852　he　wrote　an　essay　on　〃The　Development　Hypothesis〃；　in　which　he　definitely　stated　his　belief　that　the　differentiation　of　species；　like　the　differentiation　within　a　single　organism；　was　the　result　of　development。　　In　the　first　edition　of　his　〃Psychology〃　（1855）　he　took　a　step　which　put　him　in　opposition　to　the　older　English　school　（from　Locke　to　Mill）：　　he　acknowledged　〃innate　ideas〃　so　far　as　to　admit　the　tendency　of　acquired　habits　to　be　inherited　in　the　course　of　generations；　so　that　the　nature　and　functions　of　the　individual　are　only　to　be　understood　through　its　connection　with　the　life　of　the　species。　　In　1857；　in　his　essay　on　〃Progress〃；　he　propounded　the　law　of　differentiation　as　a　general　law　of　evolution；　verified　by　examples　from　all　regions　of　experience；　the　evolution　of　species　being　only　one　of　these　examples。　　On　the　effect　which　the　appearance　of　〃The　Origin　of　Species〃　had　on　his　mind　he　writes　in　his　〃Autobiography〃：　　〃Up　to　that　time。。。I　held　that　the　sole　cause　of　organic　evolution　is　the　inheritance　of　functionally…produced　modifications。　　The　〃Origin　of　Species〃　made　it　clear　to　me　that　I　was　wrong；　and　that　the　larger　part　of　the　facts　cannot　be　due　to　any　such　cause。。。To　have　the　theory　of　organic　evolution　justified　was　of　course　to　get　further　support　for　that　theory　of　evolution　at　large　with　which。。。all　my　conceptions　were　bound　up。〃　　（Spencer；　〃Autobiography〃；　Vol。　II。　page　50；　London；　1904。）　　Instead　of　the　metaphorical　expression　〃natural　selection；〃　Spencer　introduced　the　term　〃survival　of　the　fittest；〃　which　found　favour　with　Darwin　as　well　as　with　Wallace。

In　working　out　his　ideas　of　evolution；　Spencer　found　that　differentiation　was　not　the　only　form　of　evolution。　　In　its　simplest　form　evolution　is　mainly　a　concentration；　previously　scattered　elements　being　integrated　and　losing　independent　movement。　　Differentiation　is　only　forthcoming　when　minor　wholes　arise　within　a　greater　whole。　　And　the　highest　form　of　evolution　is　reached　when　there　is　a　harmony　between　concentration　and　differentiation；　a　harmony　which　Spencer　calls　equilibration　and　which　he　defines　as　a　moving　equilibrium。　　At　the　same　time　this　definition　enables　him　to　illustrate　the　expression　〃survival　of　the　fittest。〃　　〃Every　living　organism　exhibits　such　a　moving　equilibriuma　balanced　set　of　functions　constituting　its　life；　and　the　overthrow　of　this　balanced　set　of　functions　or　moving　equilibrium　is　what　we　call　death。　　Some　individuals　in　a　species　are　so　constituted　that　their　moving　equilibria　are　less　easily　overthrown　than　those　of　other　individuals；　and　these　are　the　fittest　which　survive；　or；　in　Mr　Darwin's　language；　they　are　the　select　which　nature　preserves。〃　　（Ibid。　page　100。）　　Not　only　in　the　domain　of　organic　life；　but　in　all　domains；　the　summit　of　evolution　is；　according　to　Spencer；　characterised　by　such　a　harmonyby　a　moving　equilibrium。

Spencer's　analysis　of　the　concept　of　evolution；　based　on　a　great　variety　of　examples；　has　made　this　concept　clearer　and　more　definite　than　before。　　It　contains　the　three　elements；　integration；　differentiation　and　equilibration。　　It　is　true　that　a　concept　which　is　to　be　valid　for　all　domains　of　experience　must　have　an　abstract　character；　and　between　the　several　domains　there　is；　strictly　speaking；　only　a　relation　of　analogy。　　So　there　is　only　analogy　between　psychical　and　physical　evolution。　　But　this　is　no　serious　objection；　because　general　concepts　do　not　express　more　than　analogies　between　the　phenomena　which　they　represent。　　Spencer　takes　his　leading　terms　from　the　material　world　in　defining　evolution　（in　the　simplest　form）　as　integration　of　matter　and　dissipation　of　movement；　but　as　henot　always　quite　consistently　（Cf。　my　letter　to　him；　1876；　now　printed　in　Duncan's　〃Life　and　Letters　of　Herbert　Spencer〃；　page　178；　London；　1908。）assumed　a　correspondence　of　mind　and　matter；　he　could　very　well　give　these　terms　an　indirect　importance　for　psychical　evolution。　　Spencer　has　always；　in　my　opinion　with　full　right；　repudiated　the　ascription　of　materialism。　　He　is　no　more　a　materialist　than　Spinoza。　　In　his　〃Principles　of　Psychology〃　（paragraph　63）　he　expressed　himself　very　clearly：　　〃Though　it　seems　easier　to　translate　so…called　matter　into　so…called　spirit；　than　to　translate　so…called　spirit　into　so…called　matterwhich　latter　is　indeed　wholly　impossibleyet　no　translation　can　carry　us　beyond　our　symbols。〃　　These　words　lead　us　naturally　to　a　group　of　thinkers　whose　starting…point　was　psychical　evolution。　　But　we　have　still　one　aspect　of　Spencer's　philosophy　to　mention。

Spencer　founded　his　〃laws　of　evolution〃　on　an　inductive　basis；　but　he　was　convinced　that　they　could　be　deduced　from　the　law　of　the　conservation　of　energy。　　Such　a　deduction　is；　perhaps；　possible　for　the　more　elementary　forms　of　evolution；　integration　and　differentiation；　but　it　is　not　possible　for　the　highest　form；　the　equilibration；　which　is　a　harmony　of　integration　and　differentiation。　　Spencer　can　no　more　deduce　the　necessity　for　the　eventual　appearance　of　〃moving　equilibria〃　of　harmonious　totalities　than　Hegel　could　guarantee　the　〃higher　unities〃　in　which　all　contradictions　should　be　reconciled。　　In　Spencer's　hands　the　theory　of　evolution　acquired　a　more　decidedly　optimistic　character　than　in　Darwin's；　but　I　shall　deal　later　with　the　relation　of　Darwin's　hypothesis　to　the　opposition　of　optimism　and　pessimism。

II。　　While　the　starting…point　of　Spencer　was　biological　or　cosmological；　psychical　evolution　being　conceived　as　in　analogy　with　physical；　a　group　of　eminent　thinkersin　Germany　Wundt；　in　France　Fouillee；　in　Italy　Ardigo　took；　each　in　his　own　manner；　their　starting…point　in　psychical　evolution　as　an　original　fact　and　as　a　type　of　all　evolution；　the　hypothesis　of　Darwin　coming　in　as　a　corroboration　and　as　a　special　example。　　They　maintain　the　continuity　of　evolution；　they　find　this　character　most　prominent　in　psychical　evolution；　and　this　is　for　them　a　motive　to　demand　a　corresponding　continuity　in　the　material；　especially　in　the　organic　domain。

To　Wundt　and　Fouillee　the　concept　of　will　is　prominent。　　They　see　the　type　of　all　evolution　in　the　transformation　of　the　life　of　will　from　blind　impulse　to　conscious　choice；　the　theories　of　Lamarck　and　Darwin　are　used　to　support　the　view　that　there　is　in　nature　a　tendency　to　evolution　in　steady　reciprocity　with　external　conditions。　　The　struggle　for　life　is　here　only　a　secondary　fact。　　Its　apparent　prominence　is　explained　by　the　circumstance　that　the　influence　of　external　conditions　is　easily　made　out；　while　inner　conditions　can　be　verified　only　through　their　effects。　　For　Ardigo　the　evolution　of　thought　was　the　starting…point　and　the　type：　　in　the　evolution　of　a　scientific　hypothesis　we　see　a　progress　from　the　indefinite　（indistinto）　to　the　definite　（distinto）；　and　this　is　a　characteristic　of　all　evolution；　as　Ardigo　has　pointed　out　in　a　series　of　works。　　The　opposition　between　indistinto　and　distinto　corresponds　to　Spencer's　opposition　between　homogeneity　and　heterogeneity。　　The　hypothesis　of　the　origin　of　differences　of　species　from　more　simple　forms　is　a　special　example　of　the　general　law　of　evolution。

In　the　views　of　Wundt　and　Fouillee　we　find　the　fundamental　idea　of　idealism：　　psychical　phenomena　as　expressions　of　the　innermost　nature　of　existe