an enquiry concerning human understanding-第13章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


sentiments。　B/ELIEF　is　the　true　and　proper　name　of　this
feeling；　and　no　one　is　ever　at　a　loss　to　know　the　meaning　of
that　term；　because　every　man　is　every　moment　conscious　of
the　sentiment　represented　by　it。　It　may　not；　however；　be
improper　to　attempt　a　　of　this　sentiment；　in
hopes　we　may；　by　that　means；　arrive　at　some　analogies；　which
may　afford　a　more　perfect　explication　of　it。　I　say；　then；
that　belief　is　nothing　but　a　more　vivid；　lively；　forcible；
firm；　steady　conception　of　an　object；　than　what　the
imagination　alone　is　ever　able　to　attain。　This　variety　of
terms；　which　may　seem　so　unphilosophical；　is　intended　only
to　express　that　act　of　the　mind；　which　renders　realities；　or
what　is　taken　for　such；　more　present　to　us　than　fictions；
causes　them　to　weigh　more　in　the　thought；　and　gives　them　a
superior　influence　on　the　passions　and　imagination。　Provided
we　agree　about　the　thing；　it　is　needless　to　dispute　about
the　terms。　The　imagination　has　the　command　over　all　its
ideas；　and　can　join　and　mix　and　vary　them；　in　all　the　ways
possible。　It　may　conceive　fictitious　objects　with　all　the
circumstances　of　place　and　time。　It　may　set　them；　in　a
manner；　before　our　eyes；　in　their　true　colours；　just　as　they
might　have　existed。　But　as　it　is　impossible　that　this
faculty　of　imagination　can　ever；　of　itself；　reach　belief；　it
is　evident　that　belief　consists　not　in　the　peculiar　nature
or　order　of　ideas；　but　in　the　　of　their　conception；
and　in　their　　to　the　mind。　I　confess；　that　it　is
impossible　perfectly　to　explain　this　feeling　or　manner　of
conception。　We　may　make　use　of　words　which　express　something
near　it。　But　its　true　and　proper　name；　as　we　observed
before；　is　；　which　is　a　term　that　every　one
sufficiently　understands　in　common　life。　And　in　philosophy；
we　can　go　no　farther　than　assert；　that　　is　something
felt　by　the　mind；　which　distinguishes　the　ideas　of　the
judgement　from　the　fictions　of　the　imagination。　It　gives
them　more　weight　and　influence；　makes　them　appear　of　greater
importance；　enforces　them　in　the　mind；　and　renders　them　the
governing　principle　of　our　actions。　I　hear　at　present；　for
instance；　a　person's　voice；　with　whom　I　am　acquainted；　and
the　sound　comes　as　from　the　next　room。　This　impression　of　my
senses　immediately　conveys　my　thought　to　the　person；
together　with　all　the　surrounding　objects。　I　paint　them　out
to　myself　as　existing　at　present；　with　the　same　qualities
and　relations；　of　which　I　formerly　knew　them　possessed。
These　ideas　take　faster　hold　of　my　mind　than　ideas　of　an
enchanted　castle。　They　are　very　different　to　the　feeling；
and　have　a　much　greater　influence　of　every　kind；　either　to
give　pleasure　or　pain；　joy　or　sorrow。

　　　　　Let　us；　then；　take　in　the　whole　compass　of　this
doctrine；　and　allow；　that　the　sentiment　of　belief　is　nothing
but　a　conception　more　intense　and　steady　than　what　attends
the　mere　fictions　of　the　imagination；　and　that　this　
of　conception　arises　from　a　customary　conjunction　of　the
object　with　something　present　to　the　memory　or　senses：　I
believe　that　it　will　not　be　difficult；　upon　these
suppositions；　to　find　other　operations　of　the　mind　analogous
to　it；　and　to　trace　up　these　phenomena　to　principles　still
more　general。

　　　　　We　have　already　observed　that　nature　has　established
connexions　among　particular　ideas；　and　that　no　sooner　one
idea　occurs　to　our　thoughts　than　it　introduces　its
correlative；　and　carries　our　attention　towards　it；　by　a
gentle　and　insensible　movement。　These　principles　of
connexion　or　association　we　have　reduced　to　three；　namely；
；　　and　；　which　are　the
only　bonds　that　unite　our　thoughts　together；　and　beget　that
regular　train　of　reflection　or　discourse；　which；　in　a
greater　or　less　degree；　takes　place　among　all　mankind。　Now
here　arises　a　question；　on　which　the　solution　of　the　present
difficulty　will　depend。　Does　it　happen；　in　all　these
relations；　that；　when　one　of　the　objects　is　presented　to　the
senses　or　memory；　the　mind　is　not　only　carried　to　the
conception　of　the　correlative；　but　reaches　a　steadier　and
stronger　conception　of　it　than　what　otherwise　it　would　have
been　able　to　attain？　This　seems　to　be　the　case　with　that
belief　which　arises　from　the　relation　of　cause　and　effect。
And　if　the　case　be　the　same　with　the　other　relations　or
principles　of　associations；　this　may　be　established　as　a
general　law；　which　takes　place　in　all　the　operations　of　the
mind。

　　　　　We　may；　therefore；　observe；　as　the　first　experiment　to
our　present　purpose；　that；　upon　the　appearance　of　the
picture　of　an　absent　friend；　our　idea　of　him　is　evidently
enlivened　by　the　；　and　that　every　passion；
which　that　idea　occasions；　whether　of　joy　or　sorrow；
acquires　new　force　and　vigour。　In　producing　this　effect；
there　concur　both　a　relation　and　a　present　impression。　Where
the　picture　bears　him　no　resemblance；　at　least　was　not
intended　for　him；　it　never　so　much　as　conveys　our　thought　to
him：　And　where　it　is　absent；　as　well　as　the　person；　though
the　mind　may　pass　from　the　thought　of　the　one　to　that　of　the
other；　it　feels　its　idea　to　be　rather　weakened　than
enlivened　by　that　transition。　We　take　a　pleasure　in　viewing
the　picture　of　a　friend；　when　it　is　set　before　us；　but　when
it　is　removed；　rather　choose　to　consider　him　directly　than
by　reflection　in　an　image；　which　is　equally　distant　and
obscure。

　　　　　The　ceremonies　of　the　R/OMAN　C/ATHOLIC　religion　may
be　considered　as　instances　of　the　same　nature。　The　devotees
of　that　superstition　usually　plead　in　excuse　for　the
mummeries；　with　which　they　are　upbraided；　that　they　feel　the
good　effect　of　those　external　motions；　and　postures；　and
actions；　in　enlivening　their　devotion　and　quickening　their
fervour；　which　otherwise　would　decay；　if　directed　entirely
to　distant　and　immaterial　objects。　We　shadow　out　the　objects
of　our　faith；　say　they；　in　sensible　types　and　images；　and
render　them　more　present　to　us　by　the　immediate　presence　of
these　types；　than　it　is　possible　for　us　to　do　merely　by　an
intellectual　view　and　contemplation。　Sensible　objects　have
always　a　greater　influence　on　the　fancy　than　any　other；　and
this　influence　they　readily　convey　to　those　ideas　to　which
they　are　related；　and　which　they　resemble。　I　shall　only
infer　from　these　practices；　and　this　reasoning；　that　the
effect　of　resemblance　in　enlivening　the　ideas　is　very
common；　and　as　in　every　case　a　resemblance　and　a　present
impression　must　concur；　we　are　abundantly　supplied　with
experiments　to　prove　the　reality　of　the　foregoing　principle。

　　　　　We　may　add　force　to　these　experiments　by　others　of　a
different　kind；　in　considering　the　effects　of　
as　well　as　of　。　It　is　certain　that　distance
diminishes　the　force　of　every　idea；　and　that；　upon　our
approach　to　any　object；　though　it　does　not　discover　itself
to　our　senses；　it　operates　upon　the　mind　with　an　influence；
which　imitates　an　immediate　impression。　The　thinking　on　any
object　readily　transports　the　mind　to　what　is　contiguous；
but　it　is　only　the　actual　presence　of　an　object；　that
transports　it　with　a　superior　vivacity。　When　I　am　a　few
miles　from　home；　whatever　relates　to　it　touches　me　more
nearly　than　when　I　am　two　hundred　leagues　distant；　though
even　at　that　distance　the　reflecting　on　any　thing　in　the
neighbourhood　of　my　friends　or　family　naturally　produces　an
idea　of　them。　But　as　in　this　latter　case；　both　the　objects
of　the　mind　are　ideas；　notwithstanding　there　is　an　easy
transition　between　them；　that　transition　alone　is　not　able
to　give　a　superior　vivacity　to　any　of　the　ideas；　for　want　of
some　immediate　impression。＇13＇

　　　　　No　one　can　doubt　but　causation　has　the　same　influence
as　the　other　two　relations　of　resemblance　and　contiguity。
Superstitious　people　are　fond　of　the　reliques　of　saints　and
holy　men；　for　the　same　reason；　that　they　seek　after　types　or
images；　in　order　to　enliven　their　devotion；　and　give　them　a
more　intimate　and　strong　conception　of　those　exemplary
lives；　which　they　desire　to　imitate。　Now　it　is　evident；　that
one　of　the　best　reliques；　which　a　devotee　could　procure；
would　be　the　handywork　of　a　saint；　and　if　hi