an enquiry concerning human understanding-第22章

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opinion；　there　are　even　few　of　the　speculative　parts　of
learning　to　which　it　is　not　essential。　What　would　become　of
；　had　we　not　a　dependence　on　the　veracity　of　the
historian　according　to　the　experience　which　we　have　had　of
mankind？　How　could　　be　a　science；　if　laws　and
forms　of　government　had　not　a　uniform　influence　upon
society？　Where　would　be　the　foundation　of　；　if
particular　characters　had　no　certain　or　determinate　power　to
produce　particular　sentiments；　and　if　these　sentiments　had
no　constant　operation　on　actions？　And　with　what　pretence
could　we　employ　our　　upon　any　poet　or　polite
author；　if　we　could　not　pronounce　the　conduct　and　sentiments
of　his　actors　either　natural　or　unnatural　to　such
characters；　and　in　such　circumstances？　It　seems　almost
impossible；　therefore；　to　engage　either　in　science　or　action
of　any　kind　without　acknowledging　the　doctrine　of　necessity；
and　this　　from　motive　to　voluntary　actions；　from
characters　to　conduct。

　　　　　And　indeed；　when　we　consider　how　aptly　　and
　evidence　link　together；　and　form　only　one　chain　of
argument；　we　shall　make　no　scruple　to　allow　that　they　are　of
the　same　nature；　and　derived　from　the　same　principles。　A
prisoner　who　has　neither　money　nor　interest；　discovers　the
impossibility　of　his　escape；　as　well　when　he　considers　the
obstinacy　of　the　gaoler；　as　the　walls　and　bars　with　which　he
is　surrounded；　and；　in　all　attempts　for　his　freedom；　chooses
rather　to　work　upon　the　stone　and　iron　of　the　one；　than　upon
the　inflexible　nature　of　the　other。　The　same　prisoner；　when
conducted　to　the　scaffold；　foresees　his　death　as　certainly
from　the　constancy　and　fidelity　of　his　guards；　as　from　the
operation　of　the　axe　or　wheel。　His　mind　runs　along　a　certain
train　of　ideas：　The　refusal　of　the　soldiers　to　consent　to
his　escape；　the　action　of　the　executioner；　the　separation　of
the　head　and　body；　bleeding；　convulsive　motions；　and　death。
Here　is　a　connected　chain　of　natural　causes　and　voluntary
actions；　but　the　mind　feels　no　difference　between　them　in
passing　from　one　link　to　another：　Nor　is　it　less　certain　of
the　future　event　than　if　it　were　connected　with　the　objects
present　to　the　memory　or　senses；　by　a　train　of　causes；
cemented　together　by　what　we　are　pleased　to　call　a
　necessity。　The　same　experienced　union　has　the
same　effect　on　the　mind；　whether　the　united　objects　be
motives；　volition；　and　actions；　or　figure　and　motion。　We　may
change　the　name　of　things；　but　their　nature　and　their
operation　on　the　understanding　never　change。

　　　　　Were　a　man；　whom　I　know　to　be　honest　and　opulent；　and
with　whom　I　live　in　intimate　friendship；　to　come　into　my
house；　where　I　am　surrounded　with　my　servants；　I　rest
assured　that　he　is　not　to　stab　me　before　he　leaves　it　in
order　to　rob　me　of　my　silver　standish；　and　I　no　more　suspect
this　event　than　the　falling　of　the　house　itself；　which　is
new；　and　solidly　built　and　founded。　　。　　So　may　a　sudden
earthquake　arise；　and　shake　and　tumble　my　house　about　my
ears。　I　shall　therefore　change　the　suppositions。　I　shall　say
that　I　know　with　certainty　that　he　is　not　to　put　his　hand
into　the　fire　and　hold　it　there　till　it　be　consumed：　And
this　event；　I　think　I　can　foretell　with　the　same　assurance；
as　that；　if　he　throw　himself　out　at　the　window；　and　meet
with　no　obstruction；　he　will　not　remain　a　moment　suspended
in　the　air。　No　suspicion　of　an　unknown　frenzy　can　give　the
least　possibility　to　the　former　event；　which　is　so　contrary
to　all　the　known　principles　of　human　nature。　A　man　who　at
noon　leaves　his　purse　full　of　gold　on　the　pavement　at
Charing…Cross；　may　as　well　expect　that　it　will　fly　away　like
a　feather；　as　that　he　will　find　it　untouched　an　hour　after。
Above　one　half　of　human　reasonings　contain　inferences　of　a
similar　nature；　attended　with　more　or　less　degrees　of
certainty　proportioned　to　our　experience　of　the　usual
conduct　of　mankind　in　such　particular　situations。

　　　　　I　have　frequently　considered；　what　could　possibly　be
the　reason　why　all　mankind；　though　they　have　ever；　without
hesitation；　acknowledged　the　doctrine　of　necessity　in　their
whole　practice　and　reasoning；　have　yet　discovered　such　a
reluctance　to　acknowledge　it　in　words；　and　have　rather　shown
a　propensity；　in　all　ages；　to　profess　the　contrary　opinion。
The　matter；　I　think；　may　be　accounted　for　after　the
following　manner。　If　we　examine　the　operations　of　body；　and
the　production　of　effects　from　their　causes；　we　shall　find
that　all　our　faculties　can　never　carry　us　farther　in　our
knowledge　of　this　relation　than　barely　to　observe　that
particular　objects　are　　together；　and
that　the　mind　is　carried；　by　a　；　from
the　appearance　of　one　to　the　belief　of　the　other。　But　though
this　conclusion　concerning　human　ignorance　be　the　result　of
the　strictest　scrutiny　of　this　subject；　men　still　entertain
a　strong　propensity　to　believe　that　they　penetrate　farther
into　the　powers　of　nature；　and　perceive　something　like　a
necessary　connexion　between　the　cause　and　the　effect。　When
again　they　turn　their　reflections　towards　the　operations　of
their　own　minds；　and　　no　such　connexion　of　the　motive
and　the　action；　they　are　thence　apt　to　suppose；　that　there
is　a　difference　between　the　effects　which　result　from
material　force；　and　those　which　arise　from　thought　and
intelligence。　But　being　once　convinced　that　we　know　nothing
farther　of　causation　of　any　kind　than　merely　the　　of　objects；　and　the　consequent　　of
the　mind　from　one　to　another；　and　finding　that　these　two
circumstances　are　universally　allowed　to　have　place　in
voluntary　actions；　we　may　be　more　easily　led　to　own　the　same
necessity　common　to　all　causes。　And　though　this　reasoning
may　contradict　the　systems　of　many　philosophers；　in
ascribing　necessity　to　the　determinations　of　the　will；　we
shall　find；　upon　reflection；　that　they　dissent　from　it　in
words　only；　not　in　their　real　sentiment。　Necessity；
according　to　the　sense　in　which　it　is　here　taken；　has　never
yet　been　rejected；　nor　can　ever；　I　think；　be　rejected　by　any
philosopher。　It　may　only；　perhaps；　be　pretended　that　the
mind　can　perceive；　in　the　operations　of　matter；　some　farther
connexion　between　the　cause　and　effect；　and　connexion　that
has　not　place　in　voluntary　actions　of　intelligent　beings。
Now　whether　it　be　so　or　not；　can　only　appear　upon
examination；　and　it　is　incumbent　on　these　philosophers　to
make　good　their　assertion；　by　defining　or　describing　that
necessity；　and　pointing　it　out　to　us　in　the　operations　of
material　causes。

　　　　　It　would　seem；　indeed；　that　men　begin　at　the　wrong　end
of　this　question　concerning　liberty　and　necessity；　when　they
enter　upon　it　by　examining　the　faculties　of　the　soul；　the
influence　of　the　understanding；　and　the　operations　of　the
will。　Let　them　first　discuss　a　more　simple　question；　namely；
the　operations　of　body　and　of　brute　unintelligent　matter；
and　try　whether　they　can　there　form　any　idea　of　causation
and　necessity；　except　that　of　a　constant　conjunction　of
objects；　and　subsequent　inference　of　the　mind　from　one　to
another。　If　these　circumstances　form；　in　reality；　the　whole
of　that　necessity；　which　we　conceive　in　matter；　and　if　these
circumstances　be　also　universally　acknowledged　to　take　place
in　the　operations　of　the　mind；　the　dispute　is　at　an　end；　at
least；　must　be　owned　to　be　thenceforth　merely　verbal。　But　as
long　as　we　will　rashly　suppose；　that　we　have　some　farther
idea　of　necessity　and　causation　in　the　operations　of
external　objects；　at　the　same　time；　that　we　can　find　nothing
farther　in　the　voluntary　actions　of　the　mind；　there　is　no
possibility　of　bringing　the　question　to　any　determinate
issue；　while　we　proceed　upon　so　erroneous　a　supposition。　The
only　method　of　undeceiving　us　is　to　mount　up　higher；　to
examine　the　narrow　extent　of　science　when　applied　to
material　causes；　and　to　convince　ourselves　that　all　we　know
of　them　is　the　constant　conjunction　and　inference　above
mentioned。　We　may；　perhaps；　find　that　it　is　with　difficulty
we　are　induced　to　fix　such　narrow　limits