an enquiry concerning human understanding-第41章

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comparing　its　effects　in　equal　or　unequal　times；　but　by　a
direct　mensuration　and　comparison。
　　　　　As　to　the　frequent　use　of　the　words；　Force；　Power；
Energy；　&c。；　which　every　where　occur　in　common　conversation；
as　well　as　in　philosophy；　that　is　no　proof；　that　we　are
acquainted；　in　any　instance；　with　the　connecting　principle
between　cause　and　effect；　or　can　account　ultimately　for　the
production　of　one　thing　to　another。　These　words；　as　commonly
used；　have　very　loose　meanings　annexed　to　them；　and　their
ideas　are　very　uncertain　and　confused。　No　animal　can　put
external　bodies　in　motion　without　the　sentiment　of　a　
or　endeavour；　and　every　animal　has　a　sentiment　or　feeling
from　the　stroke　or　blow　of　an　external　object；　that　is　in
motion。　These　sensations；　which　are　merely　animal；　and　from
which　we　can　　draw　no　inference；　we　are　apt　to
transfer　to　inanimate　objects；　and　to　suppose；　that　they
have　some　such　feelings；　whenever　they　transfer　or　receive
motion。　With　regard　to　energies；　which　are　exerted；　without
our　annexing　to　them　any　idea　of　communicated　motion；　we
consider　only　the　constant　experienced　conjunction　of　the
events；　and　as　we　　a　customary　connexion　between　the
ideas；　we　transfer　that　feeling　to　the　objects；　as　nothing
is　more　usual　than　to　apply　to　external　bodies　every
internal　sensation；　which　they　occasion。
　　　　　＇22＇T/HE　prevalence　of　the　doctrine　of　liberty　may　be
accounted　for；　from　another　cause；　。　a　false　sensation
of　seeming　experience　which　we　have；　or　may　have；　of　liberty
or　indifference；　in　many　of　our　actions。　The　necessity　of
any　action；　whether　of　matter　or　of　mind；　is　not；　properly
speaking；　a　quality　in　the　agent；　but　in　any　thinking　or
intelligent　being；　who　may　consider　the　action；　and　it
consists　chiefly　in　the　determination　of　his　thoughts　to
infer　the　existence　of　that　action　from　some　preceding
objects；　as　liberty；　when　opposed　to　necessity；　is　nothing
but　the　want　of　that　determination；　and　a　certain　looseness
or　indifference；　which　we　feel；　in　passing；　or　not　passing；
from　the　idea　of　one　object　to　that　of　any　succeeding　one。
Now　we　may　observe；　that；　though；　in　　on　human
actions；　we　seldom　feel　such　a　looseness；　or　indifference；
but　are　commonly　able　to　infer　them　with　considerable
certainty　from　their　motives；　and　from　the　dispositions　of
the　agent；　yet　it　frequently　happens；　that；　in　
the　actions　themselves；　we　are　sensible　of　something　like
it：　And　as　all　resembling　objects　are　readily　taken　for　each
other；　this　has　been　employed　as　a　demonstrative　and　even
intuitive　proof　of　human　liberty。　We　feel；　that　our　actions
are　subject　to　our　will；　on　most　occasions；　and　imagine　we
feel；　that　the　will　itself　is　subject　to　nothing；　because；
when　by　a　denial　of　it　we　are　provoked　to　try；　we　feel；　that
it　moves　easily　every　way；　and　produces　an　image　of　itself
（or　a　；　as　it　is　called　in　the　schools）　even　on
that　side；　on　which　it　did　not　settle。　This　image；　or　faint
motion；　we　persuade　ourselves；　could；　at　that　time；　have
been　compleated　into　the　thing　itself；　because；　should　that
be　denied；　we　find；　upon　a　second　trial；　that；　at　present；
it　can。　We　consider　not；　that　the　fantastical　desire　of
shewing　liberty；　is　here　the　motive　of　our　actions。　And　it
seems　certain；　that；　however　we　may　imagine　we　feel　a
liberty　within　ourselves；　a　spectator　can　commonly　infer　our
actions　from　our　motives　and　character；　and　even　where　he
cannot；　he　concludes　in　general；　that　he　might；　were　he
perfectly　acquainted　with　every　circumstance　of　our
situation　and　temper；　and　the　most　secret　springs　of　our
complexion　and　disposition。　Now　this　is　the　very　essence　of
necessity；　according　to　the　foregoing　doctrine。
　　　　　＇23＇T/HUS；　if　a　cause　be　defined；　；　it　is　easy　to　observe；　that　　is
synonymous　to　。　In　like　manner；　if　a　cause　be
defined；　；　this　is　liable　to
the　same　objection。　For　what　is　meant　by　these　words；　？　Had　it　been　said；　that　a　cause　is　　after　which
；　we　should　have　understood　the
terms。　For　this　is；　indeed；　all　we　know　of　the　matter。　And
this　constantly　forms　the　very　essence　of　necessity；　nor
have　we　any　other　idea　of　it。
　　　　　＇24＇S/INCE　all　reasoning　concerning　facts　or　causes　is
derived　merely　from　custom；　it　may　be　asked　how　it　happens；
that　men　so　much　surpass　animals　in　reasoning；　and　one　man
so　much　surpasses　another？　Has　not　the　same　custom　the　same
influence　on　all？
　　　　　We　shall　here　endeavour　briefly　to　explain　the　great
difference　in　human　understandings：　After　which　the　reason
of　the　difference　between　men　and　animals　will　easily　be
comprehended。
　　　　　1。　When　we　have　lived　any　time；　and　have　been
accustomed　to　the　uniformity　of　nature；　we　acquire　a　general
habit；　by　which　we　always　transfer　the　known　to　the　unknown；
and　conceive　the　latter　to　resemble　the　former。　By　means　of
this　general　habitual　principle；　we　regard　even　one
experiment　as　the　foundation　of　reasoning；　and　expect　a
similar　event　with　some　degree　of　certainty；　where　the
experiment　has　been　made　accurately；　and　free　from　all
foreign　circumstances。　It　is　therefore　considered　as　a
matter　of　great　importance　to　observe　the　consequences　of
things；　and　as　one　man　may　very　much　surpass　another　in
attention　and　memory　and　observation；　this　will　make　a　very
great　difference　in　their　reasoning。
　　　　　2。　Where　there　is　a　complication　of　causes　to　produce
any　effect；　one　mind　may　be　much　larger　than　another；　and
better　able　to　comprehend　the　whole　system　of　objects；　and
to　infer　justly　their　consequences。
　　　　　3。　One　man　is　able　to　carry　on　a　chain　of　consequences
to　a　greater　length　than　another。
　　　　　4。　Few　men　can　think　long　without　running　into　a
confusion　of　ideas；　and　mistaking　one　for　another；　and　there
are　various　degrees　of　this　infirmity。
　　　　　5。　The　circumstance；　on　which　the　effect　depends；　is
frequently　involved　in　other　circumstances；　which　are
foreign　and　extrinsic。　The　separation　of　it　often　requires
great　attention；　accuracy；　and　subtility。
　　　　　6。　The　forming　of　general　maxims　from　particular
observation　is　a　very　nice　operation；　and　nothing　is　more
usual；　from　haste　or　a　narrowness　of　mind；　which　sees　not　on
all　sides；　than　to　commit　mistakes　in　this　particular。
　　　　　7。　When　we　reason　from　analogies；　the　man；　who　has　the
greater　experience　or　the　greater　promptitude　of　suggesting
analogies；　will　be　the　better　reasoner。
　　　　　8。　Biases　from　prejudice；　education；　passion；　party；
&c。　hang　more　upon　one　mind　than　another。
　　　　　9。　After　we　have　acquired　a　confidence　in　human
testimony；　books　and　conversation　enlarge　much　more　the
sphere　of　one　man's　experience　and　thought　than　those　of
another。
　　　　　It　would　be　easy　to　discover　many　other　circumstances
that　make　a　difference　in　the　understandings　of　men。
　　　　　＇25＇P/LUTARCH；　in　vita　Catonis。
　　　　　＇26＇N/O　I/NDIAN；　it　is　evident；　could　have　experience
that　water　did　not　freeze　in　cold　climates。　This　is　placing
nature　in　a　situation　quite　unknown　to　him；　and　it　is
impossible　for　him　to　tell　　what　will　result　from
it。　It　is　making　a　new　experiment；　the　consequence　of　which
is　always　uncertain。　One　may　sometimes　conjecture　from
analogy　what　will　follow；　but　still　this　is　but　conjecture。
And　it　must　be　confessed；　that；　in　the　present　case　of
freezing；　the　event　follows　contrary　to　the　rules　of
analogy；　and　is　such　as　a　rational　I/NDIAN　would　not　look
for。　The　operations　of　cold　upon　water　are　not　gradual；
according　to　the　degrees　of　cold；　but　whenever　it　comes　to
the　freezing　point；　the　water　passes　in　a　moment；　from　the
utmost　liquidity　to　perfect　hardness。　Such　an　event；
therefore；　may　be　denominated　；　and　requires
a　pretty　strong　testimony；　to　render　it　credible　to　people
in　a　warm　climate：　But　still　it　is　not　；　nor
contrary　to　uniform　experience　of　the　course　of　nature　in
cases　where　all　the　circumstances　are　the　same。　The
inhabitants　of　S/UMATRA　have　always　seen　water　fluid　in
their　own　climate；　and　the　freezing　of　their　rivers　o