phenomenology of mind-第139章

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the　sense　of　a　given　case；　into　a　reality　that　is　enacted；　the　conversion　of　the　bare　state　of　objective
knowledge　into　one　of　knowledge　about　reality　as　something　produced　and　brought　about　by
consciousness。　Just　as　sensuous　certainty　is　directly　taken　up；　or　rather　converted；　into　the
essential　life　and　substance　of　spirit；　this　other　transformation　is　also　simple　and　unmediated；　a
transition　made　through　the　pure　conception　without　changing　the　content；　the　content　being
conditioned　by　some　interest　on　the　part　of　the　consciousness　knowing　it。

Further　conscience　does　not　break　up　the　circumstances　of　the　case　into　a　variety　of　duties。　It
does　not　operate　as　the　positive　general　medium；　in　which　the　manifold　duties；　each　for　itself；
would　acquire　immovable　substantial　existence。　If　it　did　so；　either　no　action　could　take　place　at
all；　because　each　concrete　case　involves　opposition　in　general；　and；　in　the　specific　case　of
morality；　opposition　of　duties　—　and　hence　there　would　always　be　one　side　injured；　one　duty
violated；　by　the　very　nature　of　concrete　action：　or　else；　if　action　does　take　place；　the　violation　of
one　of　the　conflicting　duties　would　be　the　actual　result　brought　about。　Conscience　is　rather　the
negative　single　unity；　it　is　the　absolute　self；　which　does　away　with　this　variety　of　substantial　moral
constituents。　It　is　simple　action　in　accordance　with　duty；　action　which　does　not　fulfil　this　or　that
duty；　but　knows　and　does　what　is　concretely　right。　It　is；　therefore；　in　general；　and　for　the　first　time
in　moral　experience；　moral　action　as　action；　and　into　this　the　previous　stage　of　mere　consciousness
of　morality　without　action　has　passed。

The　concrete　shape　which　the　act　takes　may　be　analysed　by　a　conscious　process　of　distinction
into　a　variety　of　properties；　i。e。　in　this　case　into　a　variety　of　moral　relationships；　and　these　may
either　be　each　expressly　held　to　be　absolute　（as　each　must　be　if　it　is　to　be　duty）　or；　again；
subjected　to　comparison　and　criticism。　In　the　simple　moral　action　arising　from　conscience；　duties
are　so　piled　and　commingled　that　the　isolated　independence　of　all　these　separate　entities　is
immediately　destroyed；　and　the　process　of　critically　considering　and　worrying　about　what　our　duty
is《　finds　no　place　at　all　in　the　unshaken　certainty　of　conscience。

Just　as　little；　again；　do　we　find　in　conscience　that　fluctuating　uncertainty　of　mind；　which　puts　now
so…called　〃pure〃　morality　away　from　itself；　assigning　it　to　some　other　holy　being；　and　takes　itself　to
be　unholy；　and　then　again；　on　the　other　hand；　puts　this　moral　purity　within　itself；　and　places　in　that
other　the　connexion　of　the　sensuous　with　the　moral　element。

It　renounces　all　these　semblances　and　dissemblances　（Stellungen　und　Verstellungen）
characteristic　of　the　moral　point　of　view；　when　it　gives　up　thinking　that　there　is　a　contradiction
between　duty　and　actual　reality。　According　to　this　latter　state　of　mind；　I　act　morally　when　I　am
conscious　of　performing　merely　pure　duty　and　nothing　else　but　that：　i。e。　in　fact；　when　I　do　not　act。
When；　however；　I　really　act；　I　am　conscious　of　an　〃other〃；　of　a　reality　which　is　there　before　me；
and　one　which　I　want　to　bring　about；　I　have　a　definite　end　and　fulfil　a　definite　duty。　There　is
something　else　therein　than　the　pure　duty；　which　alone　was　supposed　to　be　kept　in　view。

Conscience；　on　the　other　hand；　is　the　sense　that；　when　the　moral　consciousness　declares　pure　duty
to　be　the　essence　of　its　action；　this　pure　purpose　is　a　dissemblance　of　the　actual　fact。　For　the　real
fact　is　that　pure　duty　consists　in　the　empty　abstraction　of　pure　thought；　and　finds　its　reality　and
content　solely　in　some　definite　actual　existence；　an　actuality　which　is　actuality　of　consciousness
itself　—　not　of　consciousness　in　the　sense　of　a　thought…entity；　but　as　an　individual。　Conscience　for
its　own　part；　finds　its　truth　to　lie　in　the　direct　certainty　of　itself。　This　immediate　concrete　certainty　of
itself　is　the　real　essence。　Looking　at　this　certainty　from　the　point　of　view　of　the　opposition　which
consciousness　involves；　the　agent's　own　immediate　individuality　constitutes　the　content　of　moral
action；　and　the　form　of　moral　action　is　just　this　very　self　as　a　pure　process；　viz。　as　the　process　of
knowing；　in　other　words；　is　private　individual　conviction。

Looking　more　closely　at　the　unity　and　the　significance　of　the　moments　of　this　stage；　we　find　that
moral　consciousness　conceived　itself　merely　in　the　form　of　the　inherent　principle；　or　as　ultimate
essence；　qua　conscience；　however；　it　lays　hold　of　its　explicit　individual　self…existence
（Fürsichseyn）；　or　its　self。　The　contradiction　involved　in　the　moral　point　of　view　is　resolved；　i。e。　the
distinction；　which　lay　at　the　basis　of　its　peculiar　attitude；　proves　to　be　no　distinction；　and　melts　into
the　process　of　pure　negativity。　This　process　of　negativity　is；　however；　just　the　self：　a　single　simple
self　which　is　at　once　pure　knowledge　and　knowledge　of　itself　as　this　individual　conscious　life。　This
self　constitutes；　therefore；　the　content　of　what　formerly　was　the　empty　essence；　for　it　is　something
actual　and　concrete；　which　no　longer　has　the　significance　of　being　a　nature　alien　to　the　ultimate
essence；　a　nature　independent　and　with　laws　of　its　own。　As　the　negative　element；　it　introduces
distinction　into　the　pure　essence；　a　definite　content；　and　one；　too；　which　has　a　value　in　its　own　right
as　it　stands。

Further；　this　self　is；　qua　pure　self　…identical　knowledge；　the　universal　without　qualification；　so　that
just　this　knowledge；　being　its　very　own　knowledge；　being　conviction；　constitutes　duty。　Duty　is　no
longer　the　universal　appearing　over　against　and　opposed　to　the　self；　duty　is　known　to　have　in　this
condition　of　separation　no　validity。　It　is　now　the　law　which　exists　for　the　sake　of　the　self；　and　not
the　law　for　the　sake　of　which　the　self　exists。　The　law　and　duty；　however；　have　for　that　reason　not
only　the　significance　of　existing　on　their　own　account；　but　also　of　being　inherent　and　essential；　for
this　knowledge　is；　in　virtue　of　its　identity　with　itself；　just　what　is　inherently　essential。　This　inherent
being　gets　also　separated　in　consciousness　from　that　direct　and　immediate　unity　with　self…existence：
so　contrasted　and　opposed；　it　is　objective　being；　it　is　being　for　something　else。

Duty　itself　now；　qua　duty　deserted　by　the　self；　is　known　to　be　merely　a　moment；　it　has　ceased　to
mean　absolute　being；　it　has　become　degraded　to　something　which　is　not　a　self；　does　not　exist　on
its　own　account；　and　is　thus　what　exists　for　something　else。　But　this　existing…for…something…else
remains　an　essential　moment　just　for　the　reason　that　self；　qua　consciousness；

constitutes　and　establishes　the　opposition　between　existence…for…self　and　existence…for…another；
and　now　duty　essentially　means　something　immediately　actual；　and　is　no　longer　a　mere　abstract
pure　consciousness。

This　existence　for　something　else　is；　then；　the　inherently　essential　substance　distinguished　from　the
self。　Conscience　has　not　given　up　pure　duty；　the　abstract　implicit　essence：　pure　duty　is　the　essential
moment　of　relating　itself；　qua　universality；　to　others。　Conscience　is　the　common　element　of　distinct
self…consciousnesses；　and　this　is　the　substance　in　which　the　act　secures　subsistence　and　reality；　the
moment　of　being　recognized　by　others。　The　moral　self…consciousness　does　not　possess　this
moment　of　recognition；　of　pure　consciousness　which　has　definite　existence；　and　on　that　account
really　does　not　〃act〃　at　all；　does　not　effectually　actualize　anything。　Its　inherent　nature　is　for　it　either
the　abstract　unreal　essence；　or　else　existence　in　the　form　of　a　reality　which　has　no　spiritual
character。　The　actual　reality　of　conscience；　however；　is　one　which　is　a　self；　i。e。　an　existence
conscious　of　itself；　the　spiritual　element　of　being　recognized。　Doing　something　is；　therefore；　merely
the　translation　of　its　individual　content　into　that　objective　element　where　it　is　universal　and　is
recognized；　and　this　very　fact；　that　the　content　is　recognized；　makes　the　deed　an　actuality。　The
action　is　recognized　and　thereby　real；　because　the　actual　reality　is　immediately　bound　up　with