phenomenology of mind-第142章

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the　general　consciousness　acknowledging　this　act　to　be　duty；　stand　equally　loose　from　the　specific
character　belonging　to　this　deed。　On　account　of　this　freedom　and　detachment；　the　relation　of　the
two　within　the　common　medium　of　their　connexion　is　rather　a　relationship　of　complete　disparity　—
as　a　result　of　which；　the　consciousness；　which　is　aware　of　the　act；　finds　itself　in　complete
uncertainty　regarding　the　spirit　which　does　the　act　and　is　〃certain　of　itself〃。　This　spirit　acts　and
places　in　existence　a　determinate　characteristic；　others　hold　to　this　existence；　as　its　truth；　and　are
therein　certain　of　this　spirit；　it　has　therein　expressed　what　it　takes　to　be　its　duty。　But　it　is　detached
and　free　from　any　specific　duty；　it　has；　therefore；　left　the　point　where　other　people　think　it　actually
to　be；　and　this　very　medium　of　existence　and　duty　as　inherently　existing　are　held　by　it　to　be　merely
transitory　moments。　What　it　thus　places　before　them；　it　also　〃displaces〃　again；　or　rather　has；　eo
ipso；　immediately　〃displaced〃。　For　its　reality　is；　for　it；　not　the　duty　and　determinate　content　thus　put
forward；　but　rather　is　the　reality　which　it　has　in　its　absolute　certainty　of　itself。

The　other　self…consciousnesses　do　not　know；　then；　whether　this　particular　conscience　is　morally
good　or　is　wicked；　or；　rather；　not　merely　can　they　not　know　this　conscience；　but　they　must　take　it
to　be　also　wicked。　For　just　as　it　stands　loose　to　the　determinate　content　of　duty；　and　detached
from　duty　as　inherently　existing；　so　do　they　likewise。　What　it　places　before　them；　they　themselves
know　how　to　〃displace〃　or　dissemble：　it　is　something　expressing　merely　the　self　of　another
individual；　not　their　own：　they　do　not　merely　know　themselves　to　be　detached　and　free　from　it；　but
have　to　resolve　and　analyse　it　within　their　own　consciousness；　reduce　it　to　nothingness　by
judgments　and　explanations　in　order　to　preserve　their　own　self。

But　the　act　of　conscience　is　not　merely　this　determination　of　existence；　a　determinate　content
forsaken　by　the　pure　self。　What　is　to　be　binding　and　to　be　recognized　as　duty；　only　is　so　through
knowledge　and　conviction　as　to　its　being　duty；　by　knowledge　of　self　in　the　deed　done。　When　the
deed　ceases　to　have　this　self　in　it；　it　ceases　to　be　what　is　alone　its　essential　nature。　Its　existence；　if
deserted　by　this　consciousness　of　self；　would　be　an　ordinary　reality；　and　the　act　would　appear　to
us　a　way　of　fulfilling　one's　pleasure　and　desire。　What　ought　to　exist　has　here　essentiality　only　by　its
being　known　to　be　individuality　giving　itself　expression。　And　its　being　thus　known　is　what　is
acknowledged　and　recognized　by　others；　and　is　that　which　as　such　ought　to　have　existence。

The　self　enters　existence　as　self。　The　spirit　which　is　certain　of　itself　exists　as　such　for　others；　its
immediate　act　is　not　what　is　valid　and　real；　what　is　acknowledged　by　others　is；　not　the　determinate
element；　not　the　inherent　being；　but　solely　and　simply　the　self　knowing　itself　as　such。　The　element
which　gives　permanence　and　stability　is　universal　self…consciousness。　What　enters　this　element
cannot　be　the　effect　of　the　act：　the　latter　does　not　last　there；　and　acquires　no　permanence：　only
self…consciousness　is　what　is　recognized　and　gains　concrete　reality。

Here　again；（4）　then；　we　see　Language　to　be　the　form　in　which　spirit　finds　existence。　Language　is
self…consciousness　existing　for　others；　it　is　self…consciousness　which　as　such　is　there　immediately
present；　and　which　in　its　individuality　is　universal。　Language　is　self　separating　itself　from　itself；
which　as　the　pure　ego　identical　with　ego　becomes　an　object　to　itself；　which　at　once　maintains　itself
in　this　objective　form　as　this　actual　self；　and　at　the　same　time　fuses　directly　with　others　and　is　their
self…consciousness。　The　self　perceives　itself　at　the　same　time　that　it　is　perceived　by　others：　and　this
perceiving　is　just　existence　which　has　become　a　self。

The　content；　which　language　has　here　obtained；　is　no　longer　the　self　we　found　in　the　world　of
culture；　perverted；　perverting；　and　distraught。　It　is　spirit　which；　having　returned　to　itself；　is　certain
of　itself；　certain　in　itself　of　its　truth；　or　of　its　own　act　of　recognition；　and　which　is　recognized　as　this
knowledge。　The　language　of　the　ethical　spirit　of　society　is　law；　and　simple　command　and
complaint；　which　is　but　a　tear　shed　over　necessity。　Moral　consciousness；　on　the　other　hand；
remains　dumb；　shut　up　within　its　inner　life；　for　self　has　no　existence　as　yet　in　its　case：　rather
existence　and　self　there　stand　as　yet　only　in　external　relation　to　each　other。　Language；　however；
comes　forward　merely　as　the　mediating　element　only　between　self…consciousnesses　independent
and　recognized；　and　the　existent　self　means　immediately　universal　recognition；　means　manifold
recognition　and　in　this　very　manifoldness　simple　recognition。　What　the　language　of　conscience
contains　is　the　self　knowing　itself　as　essential　reality。　This　alone　is　what　that　language　expresses；
and　this　expression　is　the　true　realization　of　〃doing〃；　of　action；　and　is　the　validation　of　the　act。
Consciousness　expresses　its　conviction：　in　this　conviction　alone　is　the　action　duty：　it　holds　good　as
duty；　too；　solely　by　the　conviction　being　expressed。　For　universal　self…consciousness　stands
detached　from　the　specific　act　which　merely　exists：　the　act　qua　existence　means　nothing　to　it：　what
it　holds　of　importance　is　the　conviction　that　the　act　is　a　duty；　and　this　appears　concretely　in
language。

To　realize　the　act　means　here　not　translating　its　content　from　the　form　of　purpose；　or
self…existence；　into　the　form　of　abstract　reality：　it　means　translating　it　from　the　form　of　immediate
certainty　of　self；　which　takes　its　knowledge；　its　self…existence；　to　be　the　essential　fact；　into　the　form
of　the　assurance　that　consciousness　is　convinced　of　its　duty；　and；　being　conscience；　knows　of　itself
what　duty　is。　This　assurance　thus　guarantees　that　consciousness　is　convinced　of　its　conviction
being　the　essential　fact。

Whether　the　assurance；　that　it　acts　from　conviction　of　duty；　is　true；　whether　it　really　is　duty　which
is　done　—　these　questions　or　doubts　have　no　meaning　as　directed　against　conscience。　In　the　case
of　the　question；　whether　the　assurance　is　true；　it　would　be　assumed　that　the　inner　attention　is
different　from　the　one　put　forward；　i。e。　that　the　willing　of　the　individual　self　can　be　separated　from
duty；　from　the　will　of　the　universal　and　pure　consciousness：　the　latter　will　would　in　that　case　be　a
matter　of　words；　while　the　former　would　be　strictly　the　real　moving　principle　of　the　act。　But　such　a
distinction　between　the　universal　consciousness　and　the　individual　self　is　precisely　what　has　been
cancelled；　and　the　superseding　of　it　constitutes　conscience。　Immediate　knowledge　on　the　part　of
self　which　is　certain　of　itself　is　law　and　duty。　Its　intention；　by　being　its　own　intention；　is　what　is
right。　All　that　is　required　is　that　it　should　know　this；　and　state　its　conviction　that　its　knowledge　and
will　are　the　right。　The　expression　of　this　assurance　ipso　facto　cancels　the　form　of　its　particularity。　It
recognizes　thereby　the　necessary　universality　of　the　self。　In　that　it　calls　itself　conscience；　it　calls
itself　pure　self…knowledge　and　pure　abstract　will；　i。e。　it　calls　itself　a　universal　knowledge　and　will
which　acknowledges　and　recognizes　others；　is　like　them　—　for　they　are　just　this　pure
self…knowledge　and　will　—　and　which　is　on　that　account　also　recognized　by　them。　In　the　willing　of
the　self　which　is　certain　of　itself；　in　this　knowledge　of　the　self　as　the　essential　reality；　lies　the
essence　of　the　right。

When　any　one　says；　therefore；　he　is　acting　from　conscience；　he　is　saying　what　is　true；　for　his
conscience　is　the　self　which　knows　and　wills。　But　it　is　essential　he　should　say　so；　for　this　self　has　to
be　at　the　same　time　universal　self。　It　is　not　universal　in　the　content　of　the　act：　for　this　content　is　per
se　indifferent　on　account　of　its　being　specific　and　determinate。　The　universality　lies　in　the　form　of
the　act。　It　is　this　form　which　is　to　be　affirmed　as　real：　the　form　is　the　self；　which　as　such　is　actual　in
language；　pronounces　itself