phenomenology of mind-第27章

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down　as　an　ultimate　criterion。　For　an　examination　consists　in　applying　an　accepted　standard；　and；
on　the　final　agreement　or　disagreement　therewith　of　what　is　tested；　deciding　whether　the　latter　is
right　or　wrong；　and　the　standard　in　general；　and　so　science；　were　this　the　criterion；　is　thereby
accepted　as　the　essence　or　inherently　real　（Ausich）。　But；　here；。　where　science　first　appears　on　the
scene；　neither　science　nor　any　sort　of　standard　has　justified　itself　as　the　essence　or　ultimate　reality；
and　without　this　no　examination　seems　able　to　be　instituted。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　13

This　contradiction　and　the　removal　of　it　will　become　more　definite　if　；　to　begin　with；　we　call　to
mind　the　abstract　determinations　of　knowledge　and　of　truth　as　they　are　found　in　consciousness。
Consciousness；　we　find；　distinguishes　from　itself　something；　to　which　at　the　same　time　it　relates
itself；　or；　to　use　the　current　expression；　there　is　something　for　consciousness；　and　the　determinate
form　of　this　process　of　relating；　or　of　there　being　something　for　a　consciousness；　is　knowledge。　But
from　this　being　for　another　we　distinguish　being　in　itself　or　per　se；　what　is　related　to　knowledge　is
likewise　distinguished　from　it；　and　posited　as　also　existing　outside　this　relation；　the　aspect　of　being
per　se　or　in　itself　is　called　Truth。　What　really　lies　in　these　determinations　does　not　further　concern
us　here；　for　since　the　object　of　our　inquiry　is　phenomenal　knowledge。；　its　determinations　are　also
taken　up；　in　the　first　instance；　as　they　are　immediately　offered　to　us。　And　they　are　offered　to　us
very　much　in　the　way　we　have　just　stated。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　14

If　now　our　inquiry　deals　with　the　truth　of　knowledge；　it　appears　that　we　are　inquiring　what
knowledge　is　in　itself。　But　in　this　inquiry　knowledge　is　our　object；　it　is　for　us；　and　the　essential
nature　（Ansich）　of　knowledge；　were　this　to　come　to　light；　would　be　rather　its　being　for　us：　what
we　should　assert　to　be　its　essence　would　rather　be；　not　the　truth　of　knowledge；　but　only　our
knowledge　of　it。　The　essence　or　the　criterion　would　lie　in　us；　and　that　which　was　to　be　compared
with　this　standard；　and　on　which　a　decision　was　to　be　passed　as　a　result　of　this　comparison；　would
not　necessarily　have　to　recognize　that　criterion。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　15

But　the　nature　of　the　object　which　we　are　examining　surmounts　this　separation；　or　semblance　of
separation；　and　presupposition。　Consciousness　furnishes　its　own　criterion　in　itself；　and　the　inquiry
will　thereby　be　a　comparison　of　itself　with　its　own　self　；　for　the　distinction；　just　made；　falls　inside
itself。　In　consciousness　there　is　one　element　for　an　other；　or；　in　general；　consciousness　implicates
the　specific　character　of　the　moment　of　knowledge。　At　the　same　time　this　〃other〃　is　to
consciousness　not　merely　for　it；　but　also　outside　this　relation；　or　has　a　being　in　itself；　i。e。　there　is
the　moment　of　truth。　Thus　in　what　consciousness　inside　itself　declares　to　be　the　essence　or　truth
we　have　the　standard　which　itself　sets　up；　and　by　which　we　are　to　measure　its　knowledge。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　16

Suppose　we　call　knowledge　the　notion；　and　the　essence　or　truth　〃being〃　or　the　object；　then　the
examination　consists　in　seeing　whether　the　notion　corresponds　with　the　object。　But　if　we　call　the
inner　nature　of　the　object；　or　what　it　is　in　itself；　the　notion；　and；　on　the　other　side；　understand　by
object　the　notion　qua　object；　i。e。　the　way　the　notion　is　for　an　other；　then　the　examination　consists
in　our　seeing　whether　the　object　corresponds　to　its　own　notion。　It　is　clear；　of　course；　that　both　of
these　processes　are　the　same。　The　essential　fact；　however；　to　be　borne　in　mind　throughout　the
whole　inquiry　is　that　both　these　moments；　notion　and　object；　〃being　for　another〃　and　〃being　in
itself〃；　themselves　fall　within　that　knowledge　which　we　are　examining。　Consequently　we　do　not
require　to　bring　standards　with　us；　nor　to　apply　our　fancies　and　thoughts　in　the　inquire；　and　just　by
our　leaving　these　aside　we　are　enabled　to　treat　and　discuss　the　subject　as　it　actually　is　in　itself　and
for　itself；　as　it　is　in　its　complete　reality。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　17

But　not　only　in　this　respect；　that　notion　and　object；　the　criterion　and　what　is　to　be　tested；　are　ready
to　hand　in　consciousness　itself；　is　any　addition　of　ours　superfluous；　but　we　are　also　spared　the
trouble　of　comparing　these　two　and　of　making　an　examination　in　the　strict　sense　of　the　term；　so
that　in　this　respect；　too；　since　consciousness　tests　and　examines　itself；　all　we　are　left　to　do　is　simply
and　solely　to　look　on。　For　consciousness　is；　on　the　one　hand；　consciousness　of　the　object；　on　the
other；　consciousness　of　itself；　consciousness　of　what　to　it　is　true；　and　consciousness　of　its
knowledge　of　that　truth。　Since　both　are　for　the　same　consciousness；　it　is　itself　their　comparison；　it
is　the　same　consciousness　that　decides　and　knows　whether　its　knowledge　of　the　object
corresponds　with　this　object　or　not。　The　object；　it　is　true；　appears　only　to　be　in　such　wise　for
consciousness　as　consciousness　knows　it。　Consciousness　does　not　seem　able　to　get；　so　to　say；
behind　it　as　it　is；　not　for　consciousness；　but　in　itself；　and　consequently　seems　also　unable　to　test
knowledge　by　it。　But　just　because　consciousness　has；　in　general；　knowledge　of　an　object；　there　is
already　present　the　distinction　that　the　inherent　nature；　what　the　object　is　in　itself；　is　one　thing　to
consciousness；　while　knowledge；　or　the　being　of　the　object　for　consciousness；　is　another　moment。
Upon　this　distinction；　which　is　present　as　a　fact；　the　examination　turns。　Should　both；　when　thus
compared；　not　correspond；　consciousness　seems　bound　to　alter　its　knowledge；　in　order　to　make　it
fit　the　object。　But　in　the　alteration　of　the　knowledge；　the　object　itself　also；　in　point　of　fact；　is
altered；　for　the　knowledge　which　existed　was　essentially　a　knowledge　of　the　object；　with　change　in
the　knowledge；　the　object　also　becomes　different；　since　it　belonged　essentially　to　this　knowledge。
Hence　consciousness　comes　to　find　that　what　formerly　to　it　was　the　essence　is　not　what　is　per　se；
or　what　was　per　se　was　only　per　se　for　consciousness。　Since；　then；　in　the　case　of　its　object
consciousness　finds　its　knowledge　not　corresponding　with　this　object；　the　object　likewise　fails　to
hold　out；　or　the　standard　for　examining　is　altered　when　that；　whose　criterion　this　standard　was　to
be；　does　not　hold　its　ground　in　the　course　of　the　examination；　and　the　examination　is　not　only　an
examination　of　knowledge；　but　also　of　the　criterion　used　in　the　process。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　18

This　dialectic　process　which　consciousness　executes　on　itself…on　its　knowledge　as　well　as　on　its
object　—　in　the　sense　that　out　of　it　the　new　and　true　object　arises；　is　precisely；　what　is　termed
Experience。　In　this　connection；　there　is　a　moment　in　the　process　just　mentioned　which　should　be
brought　into　more　decided　prominence；　and　by　which　a　new　light　is　cast　on　the　scientific　aspect　of
the　following　exposition。　Consciousness　knows　something；　this　something　is　the　essence　or　is　per
se。　This　object；　however；　is　also　the　per　se；　the　inherent　reality；　for　consciousness。　Hence　comes
ambiguity　of　this　truth。　Consciousness；　as　we　see；　has　now　two　objects：　one　is　the　first　per　se；　the
second　is　the　existence　for　consciousness　of　this　per　se。　The　last　object　appears　at　first　sight　to
be　merely　the　reflection　of　consciousness　into　itself；　i。e。　an　idea　not　of　an　object；　but　solely　of　its
knowledge　of　that　first　object。　But；　as　was　already　indicated；　by　that　very　process　the　first　object
is　altered；　it　ceases　to　be　what　is　per　se；　and　becomes　consciously　something　which　is　per　se　only
for　consciousness。　Consequently；　then；　what　this　real　per　se　is　for　consciousness　is　truth：　which；
however；　means　that　this　is　the　essential　reality；　or　the　object　which　consciousness　has。　This　new
object　contains　the　nothingness　of　the　first；　the　new　object　is　the　experience　concerning　that　first
object。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　19

In　this　treatm