phenomenology of mind-第29章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！



It　is　not　only　we　who　make　this　distinction　of　essential　truth　and　particular　example；　of　essence　and
instance；　immediacy　and　mediation；　we　find　it　in　sense…certainty　itself；　and　it　has　to　be　taken　up　in
the　form　in　which　it　exists　there；　not　as　we　have　just　determined　it。　One　of　them　is　put　forward　in　it
as　existing　in　simple　immediacy；　as　the　essential　reality；　the　object。　The　other；　however；　is　put
forward　as　the　non…essential；　as　mediated；　something　which　is　not　per　se　in　the　certainty；　but　there
through　something　else；　ego；　a　state　of　knowledge　which　only　knows　the　object　because　the
object　is；　and　which　can　as　well　be　as　not　be。　The　object；　however；　is　the　real　truth；　is　the
essential　reality；　it　is；　quite　indifferent　to　whether　it　is　known　or　not；　it　remains　and　stands　even
though　it　is　not　known；　while　the　knowledge　does　not　exist　if　the　object　is　not　there。

We　have　thus　to　consider　as　to　the　object；　whether　in　point　of　fact　it　does　exist　in　sense…certainty
itself　as　such　an　essential　reality　as　that　certainty　gives　it　out　to　be；　whether　its　meaning　and　notion；
which　is　to　be　essential　reality；　corresponds　to　the　way　it　is　present　in　that　certainty。　We　have　for
that　purpose　not　to　reflect　about　it　and　ponder　what　it　might　be　in　truth；　but　to　deal　with　it　merely
as　sense…certainty　contains　it。

Sense…certainty　itself　has　thus　to　be　asked：　What　is　the　This　？　If　we　take　it　in　the　two…fold　form　of
its　existence；　as　the　Now　and　as　the　Here；　the　dialectic　it　has　in　it　will　take　a　form　as　intelligible　as
the　This　itself。　To　the　question；　What　is　the　Now？　we　reply；　for　example；　the　Now　is　night…time。
To　test　the　truth　of　this　certainty　of　sense；　a　simple　experiment　is　all　we　need：　write　that　truth
down。　A　truth　cannot　lose　anything　by　being　written　down；　and　just　as　little　by　our　preserving　and
keeping　it。　If　we　look　again　at　the　truth　we　have　written　down；　look　at　it　now；　at　this　noon…time；
we　shall　have　to　say　it　has　turned　stale　and　become　out　of　date。

The　Now　that　is　night　is　kept　fixed；　i。e。　it　is　treated　as　what　it　is　given　out　to　be；　as　something
which　is；　but　it　proves　to　be　rather　a　something　which　is　not。　The　Now　itself　no　doubt　maintains
itself；　but　as　what　is　not　night；　similarly　in　its　relation　to　the　day　which　the　Now　is　at　present；　it
maintains　itself　as　something　that　is　also　not　day；　or　as　altogether　something　negative。　This　self
…maintaining　Now　is　therefore　not　something　immediate　but　something　mediated；　for；　qua
something　that　remains　and　preserves　itself；　it　is　determined　through　and　by　means　of　the　fact　that
something　else；　namely　day　and　night；　is　not。　Thereby　it　is　just　as　much　as　ever　it　was　before；
Now；　and　in　being　this　simple　fact；　it　is　indifferent　to　what　is　still　associated　with　it；　just　as　little　as
night　or　day　is　its　being；　it　is　just　as　truly　also　day　and　night；　it　is　not　in　the　least　affected　by　this
otherness　through　which　it　is　what　it　is。　A　simple　entity　of　this　sort；　which　is　by　and　through
negation；　which　is　neither　this　nor　that；　which　is　a　not…this；　and　with　equal　indifference　this　as　well
as　that　—　a　thing　of　this　kind　we　call　a　Universal。　The　Universal　is　therefore　in　point　of　fact　the　truth
of　sense…certaintv；　the　true　content　of　sense…experience。

It　is　as　a　universal；　too；　that　we（3）　give　utterance　to　sensuous　fact。　What　we　say　is：　〃This〃；　i。e。　the
universal　this；　or　we　say：　〃it　is〃；　i。e。　being　in　general。　Of　course　we　do　not　present　before　our　mind
in　saying；　so　the　universal　this；　or　being　in　general；　but　we　utter　what　is　universal；　in　other　words；
we　do　not　actually　and　absolutely　say　what　in　this　sense…certainty　we　really　mean。　Language；
however；　as　we　see；　is　the　more　truthful；　in　it　we　ourselves　refute　directly　and　at　once　our　own
〃meaning〃；　and　since　universality　is　the　real　truth　of　sense…certainty；　and　language　merely　expresses
this　truth；　it　is　not　possible　at　all　for　us　even　to　express　in　words　any　sensuous　existence　which　we
〃mean〃。

The　same　will　be　the　case　when　we　take　the　Here；　the　other　form　of　the　This。　The　Here　is　e。g。　the
tree。　

I　turn　about　and　this　truth　has　disappeared　and　has　changed　round　into　its　opposite：　the　Here；　is
not　a　tree；　but　a　house。　The　Here　itself　does　not　disappear；　it　is　and　remains　in　the　disappearance
of　the　house；　tree；　and　so　on；　and　is　indifferently　house；　tree。　The　This　is　shown　thus　again　to　be
mediated　simplicity；　in　other　words；　to　be　universality。

Pure　being；　then；　remains　as　the　essential　element　for　this　sense…certainty；　since　sense…certainty　in
its　very　nature　proves　the　universal　to　be　the　truth　of　its　object。　But　that　pure　being　is　not　in　the
form　of　something　immediate；　but　of　something　in　which　the　process　of　negation　and　mediation　is
essential。　Consequently　it　is　not　what　we　intend　or　〃mean〃　by　being；　but　being　with　the
characteristic　that　it　is　an　abstraction；　the　purely　universal；　and　our　intended　〃meaning〃；　which
takes　the　truth　of　sense…certainty　to　be　not　something　universal；　is　alone　left　standing　in　contrast　to
this　empty。　indifferent　Now　and　Here。

If　we　compare　the　relation　in　which　knowledge　and　the　object　first　stood　with　the　relation　they
have　come　to　assume　in　this　result；　it　is　found　to　be　just　the　reverse　of　what　first　appeared。　The
object；　which　professed　to　be　the　essential　reality；　is　now　the　non…essential　element　of
sense…certainty；　for　the　universal；　which　the　object　has　come　to　be；　is　no　longer　such　as　the　object
essentially　was　to　be　for　sense…certainty。　The　certainty　is　now　found　to　lie　in　the　opposite　element；
namely　in　knowledge；　which　formerly　was　the　non…essential　factor。　Its　truth　lies　in　the　object　as　my
（meinem）　object；　or　lies　in　the　〃meaning〃　（Meinen）；　in　what　I　〃mean〃；　it　is；　because　I　know　it。
Sense…certainty　is　thus　indeed　banished　from　the　object；　but　it　is　not　yet　thereby　done　away　with；　it
is　merely　forced　back　into　the　I。　We　have　still　to　see　what　experience　reveals　regarding　its　reality
in　this　sense。

The　force　of　its　truth　thus　lies　now　in　the　I；　in　the　immediate　fact　of　my　seeing；　hearing；　and　so　on；
the　disappearance　of　the　particular　Now　and　Here　that　we　〃mean〃　is　prevented　by　the　fact　that　I
keep　hold　on　them。　The　Now　is　daytime；　because　I　see　it；　the　Here　is　a　tree　for　a　similar　reason。
Sense…certainty；　however；　goes　through；　in　this　connection；　the　same　dialectic　process　as　in　the
former　case。　I；　this　I；　see　the　tree；　and　assert　the　tree　to　be　the　Here；　another　I；　however；　sees
the　house　and　maintains　the　Here　is　not　a　tree　but　a　house。　Both　truths　have　the　same　authenticity
—　the　immediacy　of　seeing　and　the　certainty　and　assurance　both　have　as　to　their　specific　way　of
knowing；　but　the　one　certainty　disappears　in　the　other。

In　all　this；　what　does　not　disappear　is　the　I　qua　universal；　whose　seeing　is　neither　the　seeing　of　this
tree　nor　of　this　house；　but　just　seeing　simpliciter；　which　is　mediated　through　the　negation　of　this
house；　etc。；　and；　in　being　so；　is　all　the　same　simple　and　indifferent　to　what　is　associated　with　it；　the
house；　the　tree；　and　so　on。　I　is　merely　universal；　like　Now；　Here；　or　This　in　general。　No　doubt　I
〃mean〃　an　individual　I；　but　just　something　as　little　as　I　am　able　to　say　what　I　〃mean〃　by　Now；
Here；　so　it　is　impossible　in　the　case　of　the　I　too。　By　saying　〃this　Here〃；　〃this　Now〃；　〃an　individual
thing〃；　I　say　all　Thises；　Heres；　Nows；　or　Individuals。　In　the　same　way　when　I　say　〃I〃；　〃this
individual　I〃；　I　say　quite　generally　〃all　I's〃；　every　one　is　〃I〃；　this　individual　I。　When　philosophy
is。requested；　by　way　of　putting　it　to　a　crucial　test　—　a　test　which　it　could　not　possibly　sustain　—　to
〃deduce〃；　to　〃construe〃；　〃to　find　a　priori〃；　or　however　it　is　put；　a　so…called　this　thing；　or　this
particular　man；（4）　it　is　reasonable　that　the　person　making　this　demand　should　say　what　〃this
thing〃；　or　what　〃this　I〃；　he　means：　but　to　say　this　is　quite　impossible。

Sense…certainty　discovers　by　experience；　therefore；　that　its　essential　nature　lies　neither　in　the
object　nor　in　the　I；　and　that　the　immediacy　peculiar　to　it　is　neither　an　immediacy　of　the　one　nor　of
the　other。　For；　in　the　case　of　both；　what　I　〃mean〃　is　rather　something　non…essential；　and　the　object
and　the　I　are