phenomenology of mind-第3章
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results of the empirical sciences at the time Hegel wrote。 In particular the physiological
conceptions of 〃irritability〃； 〃sensibility〃 and 〃reproduction〃； discussed on p。 302 ff。； were
first formulated by Haller； Elementa Physiologiae （1757…66）。 For a list of the chief scientific
works which appeared shortly before or about the time the following analysis was written；
and which doubtless provided art of the material for the analysis； see Merz； History of
European Thought； Vol。 1； pp。 82…83。
The polemical criticism which runs through this as through almost every section of the work
is directed against the one…sided idealism of Hegel's predecessors and the imperfect
conception of scientific method displayed by the current science of nature。
V。 Certainty and Truth of Reason
A。 Observation as a function of Reason
a。 （1） Observation of Nature
（2） Observation of Organic Nature
b。 Observation of self…consciousness as self…consciousness； and as
standing in relation to external reality。 Logical and Psychological laws
Translator's comments： Observation can be directed upon the self…conscious process of
mind in two ways： it may consider the mind's thinking relation to reality； and it may
consider the mind's active or biotic relation to reality。 The result of observation here； as in
the foregoing cases； finds expression in a number of laws； which it 〃frames〃。 The 〃laws〃 in
the first case are 〃laws of thought〃 or connected logical laws： in the latter case we have
laws of psychic events； 〃psychological〃 laws。
The analysis in this section shows the inadequacy of observation as such to deal with its
material in both cases。 It fails in the first case because （1） 〃laws of thought〃 have no
meaning apart from the reality with which thought is necessarily concerned； laws of thought
are laws of 〃thinking〃； and thinking is both form and content： （2） observation gives each
law an absolute being of its own； as if it were detached from the unity of
self…consciousness； whereas this unity is the fundamental principle of each and all the
laws； which only exist in and by the single process of that unity。 Hence a type of logic
confined to 〃observing〃 laws of thought is necessarily untrue。 Observation again fails in the
second case because it is impossible to separate mind from its total environment。
Observational or empirical psychology therefore is incapable of giving an adequate account
of mind the constitution of the environment enters into and in part determines the
constitution of the psychic events； and the latter cannot be explained even as events
without interpreting the former at the same time。
（1） Laws of Thought
（2） Psychological Laws
（3） The Law of Indiviuality
c。Observation of self…consciousness to its immediate actuality。 Physiognomy
and Phrenology
Translator's comments： In the previous section observation was directed upon the relation of
mind to external reality — the natural environment of individuality。 The relation of mind to
its own physical embodiment furnishes a further object for observation to take up。 How
observation operates in dealing with this relation forms the subject of the analysis in the
present section。
Up to and at the time at which Hegel wrote； the discussion of this relation took the form of
what are now looked upon either as spurious sciences or at best as falling within the scope
of physiology or psychophysics。 Those pseudo…sciences were Physiognomy and Phrenology
or Cranioscopy。 Both had in one form or another engaged the attention of reflective minds
from the earliest times。 But about the latter half of the eighteenth century they gained
unusual public prominence； in Germany； France and England； through the eloquence and
conviction of their exponents； so much so that in Germany a law was passed forbidding the
promulgation of phrenology as being dangerous to religion； and in England a law of
George II re…enacted a statute of Elizabeth imposing the severest penalties on
physiognomists。 The chief exponents and propagandists of these studies of the human
individual were Lavater （1741…1801）； in physiognomy； and Gall （1758…1828）； along with
his pupil Spurzheim； in phrenology。 The personal character and influence of the first；
combined with his rhetorical eloquence； compelled the attention not only of the popular
mind but of men of outstanding intelligence； while Gall lectured publicly and went from one
University to another expounding the generalizations discovered or made。
It was impossible therefore for any philosopher who attempted to discuss comprehensively
the methods and procedure of observational science to ignore the claims made by these
pseudo…sciences or to refuse to examine the validity of the laws they proposed to
formulate。 This was all the more necessary because the object they dealt with — the
relation of mind to its physical embodiment — was and is unquestionably an important fact
of experience and presents a serious problem to philosophy； especially to idealism。 Hence
we have in the following section an elaborate analysis of the observational 〃sciences〃 of
physiognomy and phrenology — an analysis the length of which can only be explained and
justified by the historical circumstances above indicated。
B。 Realization of rational self…consciousness through itself
Translator's comments： In this section we have the second form in which rational experience
is realized。 In 〃observation〃 mind is directly aware of itself as in conscious unity with its
object： it makes no effort of its own to realize this unity： it finds the unity by looking on；
so to say。 But it may have the same experience by creating through its own effort an
object constituted and determined solely by its self。 Here it does not find the unity of itself
and its object； it makes the object at one with itself by moulding the character and content
of the object after its own nature。 As contrasted with observation； which may be called the
operation of 〃theoretical〃 reason； this new way of having a rational experience may be
called the operation of 〃practical〃 reason。 In the first we have reason in the form of
knowledge and science； in the second； reason in the sense of rational action and practice。
It is this second way of establishing the experience of reason which is analysed in the
following sections。 The immediately succeeding section describes the experience in its
general features。 We have here the sphere of conscious purpose and the foundation of
moral and social life。
a。 Pleasure and Necessity
Translator's comments： The succeeding three sections discuss the procedure of one…sided
subjective individualism — the attempt to realize the individual and yet not transcend the
particular individuality。 The first thought of self…consciousness when it seeks to realize or
objectify itself as a mere individual is to make the objective element return directly to itself
and bring a sense of increase of its own individual being or private Pleasure。 This is all its
interest in the practical realization of its purposes。 But the realization of purposes is an
expression of the life of reason； and reason means universality and systematic connexion
of the content realized。 Hence to seek
