phenomenology of mind-第31章

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state　of　despair　about　it　altogether；　and　in　dealing　with　them　he　partly　himself　brings　about　the
nothingness　of　those　things；　partly　he　sees　these　bring　about　their　own　nothingness。　Even　animals
are　not　shut　off　from　this　wisdom；　but　show　they　are　deeply　initiated　into　it。　For　they　do　not　stand
stock　still　before　things　of　sense　as　if　these　were　things　per　se；　with　being　in　themselves：　they
despair　of　this　reality　altogether；　and　in　complete　assurance　of　the　nothingness　of　things　they　fall…to
without　more　ado　and　eat　them　up。　And　all　nature　proclaims；　as　animals　do；　these　open　secrets；
these　mysteries　revealed　to　all；　which　teach　what　the　truth　of　things　of　sense　is。

Those　who　put　forward　such　assertions　really　themselves　say；　if　we　bear　in　mind　what　we
remarked　before；　the　direct　opposite　of　what　they　mean：　a　fact　which　is　perhaps　best　able　to　bring
them　to　reflect　on　the　nature　of　the　certainty　of　sense…experience。　They　speak　of　the　〃existence〃　of
external　objects；　which　can　be　more　precisely　characterized　as　actual；　absolutely　particular；　wholly
personal；　individual　things；　each　of　them　not　like　anything　or　anyone　else；　this　is　the　existence
which　they　say　has　absolute　certainty　and　truty。　They　〃mean〃　this　bit　of　paper　I　am　writing　on；　or
rather　have　written　on：　but　they　do　not　say　what　they　〃mean〃。　If　they　really　wanted　to　say　this　bit
of　paper　which　they　〃mean〃；　and　they　wanted　to　say　so；　that　is　impossible；　because　the　This　of
sense；　which　is　〃meant〃；　cannot　be　reached　by　language；　which　belongs　to　consciousness；　i。e。　to
what　is　inherently　universal。　In　the　very　attempt　to　say　it；　it　would；　therefore；　crumble　in　their
hands；　those　who　have　begun　to　describe　it　would　not　be　able　to　finish　doing　so：　they　would　have
to　hand　it　over　to　others；　who　would　themselves　in　the　last　resort　have　to　confess　to　speaking
about　a　thing　that　has　no　being。　They　mean；　then；　doubtless　this　bit　of　paper　here；　which　is　quite
different　from　that　bit　over　there；　but　they　speak　of　actual　things；　external　or　sensible　objects；
absolutely　individual；　real；　and　so　on；　that　is；　they　say　about　them　what　is　simply　universal。
Consequently　what　is　called　unspeakable　is　nothing　else　than　what　is　untrue；　irrational；　something
barely　and　simply　meant。

If　nothing　is　said　of　a　thing　except　that　it　is　an　actual　thing；　an　external　object；　this　only　makes　it　the
most　universal　of　all　possible　things；　and　thereby　we　express　its　likeness；　its　identity；　with
everything；　rather　than　its　difference　from　everything　else。　When　I　say　〃an　individual　thing〃；　I　at
once　state　it　to　be　really　quite　a　universal；　for　everything　is　an　individual　thing：　and　in　the　same　way
〃this　thing〃　is　everything　and　anything　we　like。　More　precisely；　as　this　bit　of　paper；　each　and　every
paper　is　a　〃this　bit　of　paper〃；　and　I　have　thus　said　all　the　while　what　is　universal。　If　I　want；
however；　to　help　out　speech…which　has　the　divine　nature　of　directly　turning　the　mere　〃meaning〃
right　round　about；　making　it　into　something　else；　and　so　not　letting　it　ever　come　the　length　of　words
at　all…by　pointing　out　this　bit　of　paper；　then　I　get　the　experience　of　what　is；　in　point　of　fact；　the　real
truth　of　sense…certainty。　I　point　it　out　as　a　Here；　which　is　a　Here　of　other　Heres；　or　is　in　itself
simply　many　Heres　together；　i。e。　is　a　universal。　I　take　it　up　then；　as　in　truth　it　is；　and　instead　of
knowing　something　immediate；　I　〃take〃　something　〃truly〃；　I　per…ceive　（wahrnehme；　per…cipio）。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　



1。　In　addition　to　the　works　mentioned　on　p。　40　（note）；　the　reader　may　be　referred　to　the　analysis
of　Sensation　and　Perception　in　Plato's　Theaetetus；　and　to　Bradley's　Appearance　and　Reality；
Chaps。　II；　V；　VIII　and　XIX。　

2。　Ie。　For　the　purposes　of　philosophical　analysis。　

3。　I。e。　the　na？ve　consciousness　here　analyzed。　

4。　Cf。　Encyclo。　§　250。　

5。　Cf。　Analysis　of　Desire；　p。　220　ff。　




II。　Perception
　　　　　　　Or　Things　and　their　Deceptiveness　（1）

Immediate　certainty　does　not　make　the　truth　its　own；　for　its　truth　is　something　universal；　whereas
certainty　wants　to　deal　with　the　This。　Perception；　on　the　other　hand；　takes　what　exists　for　it　to　be　a
universal。　Universality　being　its　principle　in　general；　its　moments　immediately　distinguished　within　it
are　also　universal；　I　is　a　universal；　and　the　object　is　a　universal。　That　principle　has　arisen　and
come　into　being　for　us　who　are　tracing　the　course　of　experience；　and　our　process　of　apprehending
what　perception　is；　therefore；　is　no　longer　a　contingent　series　of　acts　of　apprehension；　as　is　the
case　with　the　apprehension　of　sense…certainty；　it　is　a　logically　necessitated　process。　With　the
origination　of　the　principle；　both　the　moments；　which　as　they　appear　merely　fall　apart　as
happenings；　have　at　once　together　come　into　being：　the　one；　the　process　of　pointing　out　and
indicating；　the　other　the　same　process；　but　as　a　simple　fact…the　former　the　process　of　perceiving；
the　latter　the　object　perceived。　The　object　is　in　its　essential　nature　the　same　as　the　process；　the
latter　is　the　unfolding　and　distinguishing　of　the　elements　involved；　the　object　is　these　same　elements
taken　and　held　together　as　a　single　totality。　For　us　（tracing　the　process）　or　in　itself；　（2）　the
universal；　qua　principle；　is　the　essence　of　perception；　and　as　against　this　abstraction；　both　the
moments　distinguished…that　which　perceives　and　that　which　is　perceived…are　what　is　non…essential。
But　in　point　of　fact；　because　both　are　themselves　the　universal；　or　the　essence；　they　are　both
essential：　but　since　they　are　related　as　opposites；　only　one　can　in　the　relation　（constituting
perception）　be　the　essential　moment；　and　the　distinction　of　essential　and　non…essential　has　to　be
shared　between　them。　The　one　characterized　as　the　simple　fact；　the　object；　is　the　essence；　quite
indifferent　as　to　whether　it　is　perceived　or　not：　perceiving；　on　the　other　hand；　being　the　process；　is
the　insubstantial；　the　inconstant　factor；　which　can　be　as　well　as　not　be；　is　the　non…essential
moment。　

This　object　we　have　now　to　determine　more　precisely；　and　to　develop　this　determinate　character
from　the　result　arrived　at：　the　more　detailed　development　does　not　fall　in　place　here。　Since　its
principle；　the　universal；　is　in　its　simplicity　a　mediated　principle；　the　object　must　express　this
explicitly　as　its　own　inherent　nature。　The　object　shows　itself　by　so　doing　to　be　the　thing　with
many　properties。　The　wealth　of　sense…knowledge　belongs　to　perception；　not　to　immediate
certainty；　where　all　that　wealth　was　merely　something　alongside　and　by　the　way；　for　it　is　only
perception　that　has　negation；　distinction；　multiplicity　in　its　very　nature。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　1。　The　Notion　of　a　“Thing”

The　This；　then；　is　established　as　not　This；　or　as　superseded；　and　yet　not　nothing　（simpliciter）；　but
a　determinate　nothing；　a　nothing　with　a　certain　content；　viz。　the　This。　The　sense…element　is　in　this
way　itself　still　present；　but　not　in　the　form　of　some　particular　that　is　〃meant〃…as　had　to　be　the　case
in　meediate　certainty…but　as　a　universal；　as　that　which　will　have　the　character　of　the　property。
Cancelling；　superseding；　brings　out　and　lays　bare　its　true　twofold　meaning　which　we　found
contained　in　the　negative：　to　supersede　（aufheben）　is　at　once　to　negate　and　to　preserve。　The
nothing　being　a　negation　of　the　This；　preserves　immediacy　and　is　itself　sensuous；　but　a　universal
immediacy。　Being；　however；　is　a　universal　by　its　having　in　it　mediation　or　negation。　When　it　brings
this　explicitly　out　as　a　factor　in　its　immediacy；　it　is　a　specifically　distinct　determinate　property。　As
a　result；　there　are　many　such　properties　set　up　at　once；　one　the　negation　of　the　other。　Since　they
are　expressed　in　the　simple　form　of　the　universal；　these　determinate　characters…which；　strictly
speaking；　become　properties　only　by　a　further　additional　characteristic…are　self…related；　are
indifferent　to　each　other；　each　is　by　itself；　free　from　the　rest。　The　simple　self…identical　universality；
however；　is　itself　again　distinct　and　detached　from　these　determinate　characteristics　it　has。　It　is
pure　self…relation；　the　〃medium〃　wherin　all　these　characteristics　exist：　in　it；　as　in