贝壳电子书 > 英文原著电子书 > phenomenology of mind >

第34章

phenomenology of mind-第34章

小说: phenomenology of mind 字数: 每页4000字

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页,按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页,按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部!
————未阅读完?加入书签已便下次继续阅读!



is for itself; but it is also for an other; and; further; it is an other for itself as it is for another。 The
thing is; hence; for itself and also for another; a being that has difference of a twofold kind。 But it is
also 〃one〃。 Its being 〃one〃; however; contradicts the diversity it has。 Consciousness would;
consequently; have again to make itself answerable for putting the diversity into the 〃one〃; and
would have to keep this apart from the thing。 It would thus be compelled to say that the thing
〃in…so…far as〃 it is for itself is not for another。 But the oneness belongs to the thing itself; too; as
consciousness has found out; the thing is essentially reflected into self The 〃also〃; the distinction of
elements indifferent to one another; falls doubtless within the thing as well as the 〃oneness〃; but
since both are different; they do not fall within the same thing; but in different things。 The
contradiction which is found in the case of the objective content as a whole is assigned to and
shared by two objects。 The thing is; thus; doubtless as it stands (an und für sich) selfsame; but
this unity with itself is disturbed by other things。 In this way the unity of the thing is preserved; and;
at the same time; the otherness is preserved outside the thing; as well as outside consciousness。 

Now; although the contradiction in the object is in this way allotted to different things; yet the
isolated individual thing will still be affected with distinction。 The different things have a subsistence
on their own account (für sich); and the conflict between them takes place on both sides in such a
way that each is not different from itself; but only from the other。 Each; however; is thereby
characterized as a something distinctive; and contains in it essential distinction from the others; but
at the same time not in such a way that this is an opposition within its being; on the contrary; it is
by itself a simple determinate characteristic which constitutes its essential character; distinguishing it
from others。 As a matter of fact; since the diversity lies in it; this diversity does indeed necessarily
assume the form of a real distinction of manifold qualities within it。 But because the determinate
characteristic gives the essence of the thing; by which it is distinguished from others; and has a
being all its own; this further manifold constitution is something indifferent。 The thing thus no doubt
contains in its unity the qualifying 〃in…so…far〃 in two ways; which have; however; unequal
significance; and by that qualification this oppositeness becomes not a real opposition on the part
of the thing itself; but…so far as the thing comes into a condition of opposition through its absolute
distinction — this opposition belongs to the thing with reference to an other thing lying outside it。
The further manifoldness is doubtless necessarily in the thing too; and cannot be left out; but it is
unessential to the thing。 

This determinate characteristic; which constitutes the essential character of the thing and
distinguishes it from all others; is now so defined that thereby the thing; stands in opposition to
others; but must therein preserve itself for itself (für sich)。 It is; however; a thing; a self…existent
〃one〃; only so far as it does not stand in relation to others。 For in this relation; the connection with
another is rather the point emphasized; and connection with another means giving up
self…existence; means ceasing to have a being on its own account。 It is precisely through the
absolute character and its opposition that the thing relates itself to others; and is essentially this
process of relation; and only this。 The relation; however; is the negation of its independence; and
the thing collapses through its own essential property。 

The necessity of the experience which consciousness has to go through in finding that the thing is
destroyed just by the very characteristic which constitutes its essential nature and its distinctive
existence on its own account; may; as regards the bare principle it implies; be shortly stated thus。
The thing is set up as having a being of its own; as existing for itself; or as an absolute negation of
all otherness; hence it is absolute negation merely relating itself to itself。 But this kind of negation is
the cancelling and superseding of itself; or means that it has its essential reality in an other。 

In point of fact the determination of the object; as it (the object) has turned out; contains nothing
else。 It aims at having an essential property; constituting its bare existence for itself; but with this
bare self…existence it means also to embrace and contain diversity; which is to be necessary; but is
at the same time not to constitute its essential characteristic。 But this is a distinction that only exists
in words; the nonessential; which has all the same to be necessary; cancels its own meaning; or is
what we have just called the negoation of itself。 

With this the last qualifying 〃in…so…far〃; which separated self…existence and existence for another;
drops away altogether。 The object is really in one and the same respect the opposite of itself…for
itself 〃so far as〃 it is for another; and for another 〃so far as〃 it is for itself。 It is for itself; reflected
into self; one; but all this is asserted along with its opposite; with its being for another; and for that
reason is asserted merely to be superseded。 In other words; this existence for itself is as much
unessential as that which alone was meant to be unessential; viz。 the relation to another。 

  3。 The Transition to Unconditioned Universality and the sphere of Understanding

By this process the object in its pure characteristics; in those features which were to constitute its
essential nature; is superseded; just as the object in its sensible mode of existence became
transcended。 From being sensible it passed into being a universal; but this universal; because
derived from sense; is essentially conditioned by it; and hence is; in general; not a genuine
self…identical universality; but one affected with an opposition。 For that reason this universality
breaks up into the extremes of singleness and universality; of the one of the properties and the
〃also〃 of the free constituents or matters〃。 These pure determinations appear to express the
essential nature itself; but they are merely a self…existence which is fettered at the same time with
existence for an other。 Since; however; both essentially exist in a single unity; we have before us
now unconditioned absolute universality; and it is here that consciousness first truly passes into
the sphere of Understanding; of Intelligence。 

Sensible singleness thus disappears in the dialectic process of immediate certainty; and becomes
universality; but merely sensuous universality。 The stage of 〃meaning〃 has vanished; and perceiving
takes the object as it inherently is in itself; or; put generally; as a universal。 Singleness; therefore;
makes its appearance there as true singleness; as the inherent nature of the 〃one〃; or as
reflectedness into self。 This is still; however; a conditioned self…existence alongside which appears
another self…existence; the universality opposed to singleness and conditioned by it。 But these two
contradictory extremes are not merely alongside one another; but within one unity; or; what is the
same thing; the common element of both; self…existence; is entirely fettered to its opposite; i。e。 is;
at the same time; not an existence…for…self。 The sophistry of perception seeks to save these
moments from their contradiction; tries to keep them fixed by distinguishing between 〃aspects〃; by
using terms like 〃also〃 and 〃so far as〃; and seeks in like manner to lay hold on the truth by
distinguishing the unessential element from an essential nature opposed thereto。 But these
expedients; instead of keeping away deception from the process of apprehension; prove rather to
be of no avail at all; and the real truth; which should be got at through the logic of the perceptual
process; proves to be in one and the same 〃aspect〃 the opposite (of what those expedients imply);
and consequently to have as its es

返回目录 上一页 下一页 回到顶部 0 0

你可能喜欢的